The Role of Work within the Processes of Recognition in Hegel’s Idealism

Paul Redding

**Introduction**

Prior to Kojève’s well-known account in his *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* there seems to have been relatively little interest in Hegel’s concept of recognition; after Kojève, however, a popular view of Hegel’s philosophy emerged within which the idea of recognition played a central role. While Kojève directed attention to the importance of Hegel’s use of notion of recognition in the famous dialectic of “master and slave” in chapter 4 of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, his reading, inspired equally by Marx and Heidegger, was nevertheless difficult to reconcile not only with the more systematic features of Hegel’s philosophy, but also with what Hegel had to say on the topic of recognition within chapter 4, but especially, elsewhere in the *Phenomenology*.

Since the 1970s, another picture of the way in which the notion of “recognition” plays a role in Hegel’s thought has emerged emanating from the work of Jürgen Habermas, and developed more recently by Axel Honneth. Here attention was directed to the earlier *Jena* manuscripts in which Hegel had reworked the notion of recognition from Fichte’s theory of rights into a complex theory of the intersubjective conditions for the formation of the human subject. But while Hegel's sketches there had promised a new and genuinely post-metaphysical way of thinking about human existence, this line of thought, it was claimed, had been aborted, or at least compromised, by the time of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In that work, the concept of recognition was reduced to the single function of its role in the constitution of self-knowledge, and this represented a *regress* in Hegel’s thought, away from a promising intersubjective or dialogical approach to subjectivity to a more “monologic” or consciousness-centred and, ultimately, pre-Kantian “metaphysical” one.

Finally, since about the late 1980s, yet a third picture of Hegel has emerged in which recognition plays an important role. Interpreters advancing this view commonly reject the traditional “metaphysical” interpretation of the mature Hegel and regard Hegel’s generally “recognitive” approach to “spirit” as being central to his
success in avoiding such pre-Kantian metaphysics. They thus tend to see greater continuity within Hegel’s use of the theme of “recognition” throughout his work than had proponents of second approach. Different versions of this third view of Hegel can be discerned in the writings of Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, H. S. Harris, and Robert Williams. Elsewhere, I too have attempted to sketch a picture of Hegel which has these general features. In this paper I want to revisit some of the classic themes of the master–slave dialectic in order to bring to the fore aspects of Hegel’s recognitive treatment of work that may still be significant for us today. More generally, however, I will also suggest that Hegel’s treatment of work enables us to avoid misunderstandings about the nature of his idealism. From his account of work in the master–slave dialectic we can see that far from being an immaterialist doctrine, Hegel’s idealism is premised on a radically embodied conception of the mind and its capacities.

The Struggle for Recognition

In Chapter 4 of the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel sketches a scenario in which a simple model of political life between a master and his slave results from a struggle that is in some sense over recognition. The most obvious comparison here is perhaps Hobbes’s equally mythical vision of the establishment of political society from a state of original struggle through the institution of the social contract, and here it might be helpful to view Hegel’s myth as a type of post-Kantian transformation of Hobbes’s one. The Hobbesian side of the story is the move that initiates a central theme of modern political philosophy: it is the claim that the normative basis of human society is to be found not in the will of a transcendent divine being, but rather in the human will. As Hegel puts it in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hobbes had “sought to derive the bond which holds the state together, that which gives the state its power”, not from holy scripture or positive law, but “from principles which lie within us, which we recognize as our own”. The Kantian side of Hegel’s model is that this human will cannot be conceived naturalistically, as it is in Hobbes, who famously characterised the will as the “final appetite” in a process of practical deliberation. While this anti-naturalism is one of the basic features of such idealist approaches to human society, Hegel’s refusal to reduce what he calls “spirit” to nature has nothing to do with a commitment to any type of mind-body dualism of the early
modern Cartesian approach to the mind, nor with its remnants in Kant’s conception of
the noumenal self. Rather than locate Hegel’s starting point in the modern subjectivist
approach to the mind, we should understand Hegel, I suggest, in relation to Aristotle’s
conception of the human soul as the *form* of the human body. In contrast to
Aristotle, however, Hegel sees bodily form not as something given but as *formed* and,
indeed, *self-forming*, and work is central to the process in which such formation
occurs. But again, the idea of the mind as *giving form* is central to Kantian idealism,
and, so Hegel’s Aristotelianism has a distinctively post-Kantian flavour.

**Willing 1: From Hobbes to Kant**

As suggested above, a characteristic feature of the idealist approach has to do with its
resistance to the type of philosophical assumptions about the will found in the
naturalist and empiricist tradition as exemplified by Hobbes or, somewhat later,
Hume. Hobbes thought of the will as having a content—desire—which is given to the
reasoning faculty *from without*. Desire itself is *arational*, and reason’s task is
effectively the instrumental one of working out how to act so as to best satisfy such
desire. In contrast to this naturalistic account, Hegel follows *Kant* in as much as for
him, the will has to be treated in terms of what Henry Allison has called the
“incorporation thesis”. For Kant, rather than being conceived as some *merely* natural
phenomenon, the will that is expressed in a voluntary act must be conceived as having
been *already* given some type of conceptual form—the form in which that content
could be *endorsed* by the acting subject *as its own*. As some contemporary
philosophers have suggested, there seems a clear distinction between genuine desires
and wants and mere urges or impulses. Being suddenly struck by the urge, say, to
stand naked in downtown Sydney at peak hour and recite the poems of Henry
Lawson, may be more likely to lead to my seeking therapy than actually doing it.
Such an urge is unlikely to be one that I endorse *as mine*. However, Hobbes’s raw
naturalism about desires seems to construe all desires as alien impulses something
like this. Moreover, once we raise any urge to the level of an endorseable or dis-
endorseable conceptualized content, the resulting desire seems to be the sort of thing
for which we can ask for an intelligible *reason*. Kant had tried to capture that by
describing our actions as flowing not from impulses but from rules or maxims that
guide our practical lives. If I characteristically do action \( a \) in context \( f \), it is because I operate on the basis of the implicit rule “do \( a \)-type actions in \( f \)-type contexts”.

On Kant’s version, then, the will, rather than being an element of raw nature is already conceptualized and rationalized. But from Hegel’s perspective, Kant’s attempt to rationalize the will was incomplete. While he insisted on the conceptual form of the will, Kant nevertheless still conceived this in terms of the endorsement or dis-endorsement of an otherwise naturally given content, or “inclination”. However, Kant had not thought of the type of rationality implicit in instrumental reasoning as the only or even the essential form of the will, and had pointed to another form of practical reasoning—the type of moral reasoning that he treated in terms of the categorical imperative, in which the will is not reliant on any externally given content. Kant thus distinguished between the will as \( \text{Willkür} \) and as \( \text{Wille} \), the latter being the autonomous will able to prescribe to itself its content, the moral law.\(^{14} \)

We might think of Hegel as attempting to integrate these two aspects of willing—the object-directed will of rationalized inclination, and the other-directed will of Kantian morality—into a unified picture in as much as our willing relations to worldly things are to be contextualised within conceptually mediated relations to each other. These latter relations Hegel conceived as recognitive relations—relations within which we recognize or acknowledge each other as beings \( \text{with} \) rational wills. It is an idea similar to Kant’s moral idea of treating others not as means to one’s ends but as “ends” themselves, but freed of the formalism of Kant’s conception of the categorical imperative. Moreover, for Hegel, in contrast to Kant, these relations of recognition were constitutive: not only do they constitute the form of the social life within which we live—that is, constitute what Hegel called “objective spirit”—they also constitute conditions for our capacity to have the type of cognitive or intentional life that allow us to function within objective spirit. It is only in as much that we participate in such recognitive relations in which we are recognized as intentional agents that we become intentional agents, rather than merely natural beings, and so, for example, become the kinds of agents for whom there can be “reasons” \( \text{for} \) and not just causes \( \text{of} \) action. Thus, we can say that our belonging to objective spirit is a pre-requisite for our being subjective spirits.
Willing 2: From Kant to Aristotle

It was this rationalization of the will that allowed Hegel to re-appropriate Aristotle’s conception of the soul as the form of the body. Aristotle had endorsed Plato’s idea of the primacy of the forms but had denied that they were separable (chōriston) from the things they were meant to be the forms of.\textsuperscript{15} Thus the mind, as the form of the body, was, for Aristotle, fundamentally incarnated in the body. But this was not to assign the study of mind simply to the natural scientist, the physikos. A state of mind like that of anger, say, might have its material basis in a state of the body—for Aristotle, a “boiling of the blood”, or a “heat around the heart”—but it also should be understood as having a specifically cognitive content, as when we understand anger, for example, as a “desire for retribution”. But to say that it has a cognitive content is to give it the form of concepts or ideas, and this makes it equally an object of study for the logician, or dialektikos.\textsuperscript{16}

As a follower of Plato, Aristotle was a realist about “forms” or “ideas”, including the soul as the form of the body. As a follower of Kant, however, Hegel was an idealist about such logical form. To put this another way, we should not think of the logically structured ideational contents of the soul as quasi-entities that exist “anyway”, independently of their being ascribed to the soul, both by the being whose soul is in question, and by other beings who relate to that being. The former we have already seen in Kant’s difference between a natural inclination and a recognized and endorsed desire—a content doesn’t become soul or mind-like until it is recognized by that soul or mind as its own. Hegel, however, now made this condition of recognition more general. For him, with respect to the cognitive states of souls, the question of their being in a certain state cannot be separated from the question of their being recognized by others as being in that state. If we now return to the Hobbesian story of the constitution of political society we can see how it will be transformed in distinct ways within Hegel’s approach, ways that bring to bear both Kantian and Aristotelian considerations.

Master and Slave

For Hegel, as I have suggested, the will expressed in the primordial struggle from which political society is established has to be conceived in terms other than
Hobbes’s naturalistic ones. For Hobbes, the struggles found in the state of nature are essentially struggles over the power to satisfy naturally given appetites. In contrast, conceived in Hegelian terms, the struggle will have to be conceived as over the authoritative maxims, rules or norms to which each particular act of the will answers. It will be seen as a struggle, as it were, over the power of legislating the rules of the interaction or game to be played. This, of course, is all very abstract, and in the following I will try to flesh out some of these ideas in terms of the very simple social arrangement with which Hegel’s story of the struggle for recognition concludes—the simple, dyadic relation between master and slave which provide in Hegel’s account the first shape of mutual recognition.17

The struggle for recognition, for the recognition as having one’s will regarded as authoritative, will have been resolved when one of the antagonists has accepted the role of being an effectively will-less instrument of the other’s will. From Hegel’s perspective, there is already a contradiction at the heart of this arrangement. The slave has accepted the role of will-less instrument of another, but paradoxically, this can only be seen as an act of will, as the slave has made a choice (one might think, an eminently rational one), trading freedom for being absolved from the immediate threat of death. Hence to be a slave is to continually will the state of will-lessness. We will later see something of the mechanisms by which this contradiction is manifested and resolved.

With this simple pattern of social life established, we may ask after some of the minimum requirements for the master-slave relation to function. At the very least, it might be said, this institution requires the capacity for the master to convey his will to his slave—this community will have to be a linguistically mediated one. There may be hierarchical patterns of social life in non-language using animals, but there could not be, we might say, ones with the institution of slavery with its conventionally defined social roles. Looking at the roles from a linguistic point of view, we might think of the respective roles of master and slave here as differentiated by the type of speech act that each can employ. Most simply put, only the master can utter imperatives. Only the master can say to the other, something like “cook me a fish!”.

By this is meant, of course, not that only the master can produce that set of sounds or string of words, since anyone who knows the language can string such sentences
together. The point is, rather, that only the master can perform the act whose normative consequence is that the one to whom it is directed thereby acts in a certain way, the way specified by the content expressed in the sentence.

It is the normativity of the patterns of a life so conceived by Hegel that makes the facts of social life irreducible to those of the natural world, and here Hegel departed from Aristotle. Aristotle had thought of slaves as made slaves by their nature, but from an Hegelian perspective the characteristics of master and slave cannot be reduced to natural properties but rather require the existence of something more like normatively defined social statuses—something like differential sets of “rights” and “duties” specified by the rules of the institution. In Anscombe’s terminology, the “facts” making up this form of life will be “institutional” ones—facts that hold only in virtue of their being recognized to hold—not “brute” facts about the natural world, facts that hold “anyway”, independently of their being so recognized. Moreover, the concepts that articulate such facts—in our simple model, concepts such as “master” and “slave”—have that peculiar normative “thickness” that Charles Taylor and others have appealed to in the domain of practical reasoning. To recognize another as one’s master is to adopt a certain action-guiding orientation to them, the attitude appropriate to their slave, just as the inverse holds for the case as recognizing another as one’s slave. It is because practical consequences flow from the application of concepts in these interactions that Hegel refers to them as logical patterns of inference—“syllogisms”. But for Hegel important consequences follow from the fact that these forms of institutional life are instantiated in otherwise natural beings about whom there are relevant brute or natural facts.

With the basic parts of this simple model in place, let us reflect on some of the minimal non-linguistic capacities that would be needed for a slave to act appropriately within this type of institution—for example, to be able to act on the order “Cook me a fish!” . First, as is obvious, the slave would have to have a certain set of capacities or skills, most obviously the one’s making up the technique of cooking, but beyond those, techniques for catching fish, and so on—techniques that are linked instrumentally in terms of the relation “for the sake of”. And it is difficult to see how such skills could be successfully deployed without the capacity to make certain type of perceptual judgments, like the perceptual judgment that some particular fish was,
in fact, cooked. Put simply, the slave would have to be able to differentiate cooked from raw, i.e., *cookable* fish. What might we now say about the interrelation of these skills?

First of all, it is now common for philosophers to think of different types of intentional attitudes, such as theoretical and practical ones, as able to have common cognitive “contents”, contents that can be understood as conceptual. From this point of view, we might say that the order “cook a fish!” and the assertion “the fish is cooked” have a *common content* and that the difference between the two utterances is to be captured in terms of the different *attitudes* that can be maintained to such a content, the attitudes of willing, on the one hand, and perceiving or knowing, on the other. Thus Elizabeth Anscombe, for example, differentiates the attitudes of “taking true” and “making true”, the attitudes that would be consequent to receiving an assertion or an imperative respectively.\(^{20}\) That is, normally the hearer of the assertion, “the fish is cooked” would take a certain content to be true, that is, believe it, while normally the hearer of the command “cook me a fish” would bring about the circumstances in which this same content had *become* true. I think that there is clear evidence in Hegel that he considers the contents of thought as separable from the various intentional attitudes to those contents in this type of way, and this, I believe, is central to his idealism.\(^{21}\)

There is a further consequence of being able to conceive of a separable ideational content in this way in that it allows the representation of those “for the sake of” instrumental relations between actions alluded to above. Working requires the type of practical reason that can allow me to reason from an end, say that of cooking a fish, to a means, say, catching it. The slave has learnt to hold his behaviour to the content of imperatives, and we might think of reasoning practically as involving a type of inference from one imperative (“cook a fish!”) to another (“catch a fish!”). Hegel, I believe, had developed a particularly powerful logic for capturing this type of complex reasoning implicit in practical activity, and for it he needed to combine elements of Aristotelian term logic with the quite different patterns of propositional logic.\(^{22}\)
The Negating Structures of Perception and Work

In line with his appropriation of Aristotelian logic, Hegel adopts an essentially Aristotelian approach to the categorial structure of objects of perception. In perception we grasp an object as an instance of a kind, which in turn is relevant to the sorts of predicates that can be said of it (but not, of course, at the same time).\textsuperscript{23} Thus, in a judgment such as “this fish is cooked”, the \textit{kind} term involved (that it is a fish, and not, say, a rock) is relevant to the fact that the predicate “cooked” and its contrary “raw” can be said of it. Moreover, for Aristotle, the terms that can be predicated of such kinds typically come in groups of contraries—ideally, \textit{pairs} of contraries. We have of course seen this phenomenon before, in the pair of predicates “master” and “slave” itself. Each term is the “negation” of the other, in the sense that the application of one term excludes its contrary. Moreover, we see this account of the structure of the perceptual object recur in the context of the master–slave dialectic as the structure of the object \textit{worked upon}. So, just as a perceptual object will have the structure exemplified by say, this fish which I see to be cooked and not raw, the object worked upon will have just the same structure, but here, “raw” and “cooked” are the end points between which the work effects a transition. To put it another way, to \textit{perceive} an object as an instance of a kind is to \textit{conceive} of it as suitable to a certain type of treatment, and to perceive it as instantiating one of an array of contrary properties is to \textit{conceive} of it in terms of an array of possible states into which it \textit{may} be transformed.

In thinking of these logical issues we might be guided by the first three chapters of the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} where Hegel distinguishes what are effectively three different conceptions of objecthood—sense-certainty, perception, and the understanding. In the attitude of “sense-certainty”, the world is conceived as made up of simple givens of sensory experience with no internal complexity. Unlike the objects of perception, they have no internal logical form, and so can only function within reasoning in a very limited way—perhaps as simple candidates for being endorsed or disendorsed. It is clear from the way Hegel later treats the orientation of “desire” or “appetite” (\textit{Begierde}), that he thinks of the world of the desiring–consuming subject—in this context, the master, in much this way. That is, while the slave needs to have a conception of the objects on which he labours as having the
internal logical articulation mentioned above, for the master, the world can be considered to be made up of objects defined in terms of the simple sensuous qualities that make them suitable for the satisfaction of simple immediately felt desires. This difference will turn out to be crucial for the eventual outcome of this form of life.

Again, we might understand these distinctions against the background of Aristotle’s approach. Aristotle distinguished human practices from mere animal movements. The movement of an animal will be explained in terms something like those of Hobbes or contemporary “belief–desire” forms of analysis. As he puts it in *On the Movement of Animals*: “I want to drink, says appetite; this is drink says sense or imagination or thought: straightaway I drink. In this way living creatures are impelled to move and to act, and desire is the last cause of movement.” Humans, of course, share in this animal soul, and hence realize these types of movements, but what marks them off from non-human animals is their possession of the rational soul that allows them to engage into two further types of acting, *poiesis* or making—a type of action with an external goal—and *praxis*, a type of action, the intrinsic worth of which makes the doing of the action itself as the goal. For Aristotle, there is a clear hierarchy between these two forms of action: human life, he says in the *Politics*, consists in “doing things, not making things”, a relative valuation that one might expect in a slave-holding society like that of ancient Athens.

As we have noted, Aristotle thinks of slaves as slaves by their nature, and the *poietic* activity of slaves is likewise thought of as close to the processes of nature. Thus the slave is considered to be motivated by the mechanisms similar to those operative in animals, having his behaviour directed by appetite and perceptual imagery rather than reason. Next, the transformative processes of *poiesis* are regarded as themselves akin to the teleological processes of nature. Thus, as Geoffrey Lloyd has pointed out in his study of Aristotle’s use of the term “*pepsis*” or concoction, this is clear in Aristotle’s conception of the activity of cooking, as it is seen as a type of extension of natural “peptic” processes such as chewing and digesting, all of which are directed to bringing the flesh of an animal to its most perfect state, that is, most perfect state *vis a vis* its role in the life of a human being. For Aristotle, it is the situation of being *freed* from the need to undertake this nature-
bound type of work that is what allows the flowering of the mind to take place among the free citizens, the masters.

In Hegel’s account of the master-slave interaction, the slave’s *poietic* activity will be afforded a much more significant role. While Aristotle had tended to denigrate the status of productive work and think that it was the liberation from it that allowed the life of the mind, in Hegel’s story, this will in its essential respects be reversed: it is just the master’s “freedom”, purchased by the unfreedoms of others that will *subvert* any capacity for a free and rational life of the mind. The master is a non-labouring consumer, whose desire is closer to that of the non-human animal—one immediately expressed in the negation, that is, the consumption, of the objects of the world. The slave, of course, cannot act on his impulsive desires, as he has to negate or suppress his own natural desires and replace them with the actions required to serve the master’s *conceptually conveyed* will. This adds a layer of complexity to the forms of recognition and, importantly, self-recognition that can occur in this society. And not only does it reflect systematic differences marking off Hegel’s approach as a distinctly “modern” one, it also points to the degree that Hegel’s idealism accommodates the idea of processes working below the level of the overt conceptualisations articulating the manifest view of the world, and the extent to which Hegel is able to maintain a distinction between the capacities of the bearing of a conceptualized social role and the “rules” constituting that role.

As we have seen, the master–slave relation is at its basis an institutionally defined recognitive relation. In behaving towards his master as a master, the slave is continually acknowledging the rightness of the master’s bearing of this status, and the same can be said of the behaviour of the master towards the slave. But each can then recognize himself in the other’s recognition, and thereby achieve a type of self-consciousness—the master understanding himself as a master, and the slave as a slave. But identity cannot be as simple as the apparently dyadic relation between the concepts “master” and “slave” suggests, since all relations for Hegel are mediated or triangulated. Thus the slave’s relation to the master is mediated by the objects that the slave labours upon, as labouring for the master is just what defines the relation of master and slave. This mediation means that while the slave is addressed by the master as a slave, and so recognizes himself in that address as a slave, there are other
relations that can contribute to the form of self-conscious of which the slave is capable, relations that can allow the slave to recognize himself in ways that come into contradiction with his self-identity as a slave.

Importantly, what is available to him is that of being the agent who does the transforming of the object. Thus, in the course of being a slave, and acting like a slave, the slave gains a conception of himself in virtue of the world-transforming work that is carried out, such as when one gets a sense of oneself in the perceivable products of one’s activities, for example, as when one grasps oneself as a skilled cook. Here it must be remembered that the “perceived” object has a particular logical structure in which the inhering sensible qualities are regarded as excluding or negating their contraries. Hence there is something concrete within which the slave can recognize the purport of his own agency. Importantly, the self-recognition here is in no sense an empty formality, as work is not merely an activity of the transformation of objects, it is also an activity of self-transformation, an acquiring of skills and dispositions that become partly definitive of one’s character and identity, and so an objective source of one’s sense of who one is. In transforming objects for the master, the slave transforms himself, and since, from the Aristotelian point of view, the soul is the form of the body, the slave transforms his “spiritual” capacities, his soul. And, of course, the dimension of personhood that is coming into focus here is the converse of that constituted at the institutional level. Rather than what is captured by the concepts of servitude and dependence, it is the dimension of mastery that is central here. And a type of ownership is coming into focus, the inalienable property relation existing between the slave and his own capacities, that will contradict the very idea that one individual can own another. The overtly dyadic form of the master–slave relation, therefore, conceals a deeper and contradictory reality.

What I want to point to here is more the underlying dynamics of Hegel’s idealist analysis and how he appeals to the immanent dynamics of the institution itself to find the norms for its critique. It should be clear that Hegel’s criticism of the institution of slavery is in no way a “formal” one that simply condemns it as being incompatible with the “essential” freedom of human beings. Slavery is a self-contradictory state in a more substantial sense, in that it is a necessarily self-undermining state. It is a form of interaction which comes with a justification concerning the natural superiority of
the master that is in contradiction with the reality that develops within its constraints. That is why the common interpretation of Hegel’s idealist slogan that “the rational is the real and the real is the rational”, the interpretation that equates “real” with the prevailing status quo is so misleading. The nature of “the real” is not to be found in the superficial representations that social life produces in order to justify itself. Discovering “the real” requires the type of analytic unpacking of the categorial structure of these justifications to discover the pragmatic conditions within which they can have any meaning at all, and typically, as in the case we have seen, this pragmatic ground of the normativity of our claims can be seen to contradict the claims themselves. Kant thought that the contradictions that emerged when reason was pushed beyond an application to empirical reality indicated the limits of the role that reason could play. Hegel thought that the contradictions reflected the contradictory state of that reality itself.

The Relevance of Hegel’s Analysis for Today

Hegel himself said that philosophy was “its own time comprehended in thoughts”, and his time was effectively the turn and first decades of the 19th century. Much has occurred in the world, and especially the world of work, since then. It would be unrealistic, I think, to assume that we could find applicable solutions in Hegel’s writings to problems that could hardly have even been foreseen two hundred years ago. But conceiving of a problem in the right way is at least the first step on the way to finding a solution, and in Hegel we find many percipient clues for how to conceive of problems that seem endemic to the 21st century. Let’s consider, for example, the problems that are seen as following from the instrumental relation to nature that seems dominant in modernity.

Consider, for example, the criticisms of the scenario of human emancipation through work that are found in Hannah Arendt, a thinker whose neo-Aristotelian proclivities show in her attempt to re-establish the priority of praxis over poiesis. In short, Arendt had made a tripartite distinction between labour, work and praxis that was in someways akin to Aristotle’s between animal movement, poiesis and praxis, and in some ways different. Effectively, Aristotelian poiesis is split between the practices designated as “work” that leave a structure within which public life will be
shaped, such as building a city, and those that only leave something for consumption—labour—activities such as cooking a fish for consumption. The Greeks were correct, she thinks, in associating the latter with animal existence, and this is at the heart of a somewhat damning critique of modernity. What the modern capitalist economy has done is to have geared production to generalized human consumption, and so the world of work had been colonized by the world of labour. But even when “work” is distinguished from labour as not reducible to the realm of nature and necessity, it is still to be regarded as subordinate to praxis because of its instrumental nature. As in Aristotle’s analysis, in work the ends are given to an activity from without, while in praxis, the activity is undertaken for its own sake. In work there is a type of universality that goes along with the externality of the objective that levels the individuality of the worker.  

Arendt’s critique of the project of collective human liberation through work was partly directed against Marx, and we might think that it applies equally to Hegel as well, but this, I think, would be a mistake. Especially following Kojève’s Marx-influenced reading of Hegel, there has been a tendency to over-generalize the lessons of the master–slave section of Chapter 4 in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and to see the human subordination of nature through work as the enframing narrative of the development of free and rational spirit. But the categories articulating the world of the master and slave are themselves not adequate to the reality that is developing within its boundaries. Consider Henry Harris’s comments on Kojève’s reading, for example, where he points out that the master–slave dialectic is enframed within the limited form of cognition that is the analogue (for self-consciousness) of “perception”, and so this dialectic cannot be generalised to the shape of the movement of the Phenomenology as a whole. The very dyadic distinction between independence and dependence or subjectivity and objectivity that is modelled in the master–slave relation will be undermined, as the contradiction at the heart of this relationship becomes manifest. Hence, the master-slave relation shouldn’t be seen as a distinction that ends up being reproduced at the level of the relation of human to non-human nature. Kojève’s reading of Hegel essentially belongs to the genre of “anthropological” readings of Hegel which, following the “left Hegelian” lead of Feuerbach and others, had put the focus on the expression of a human essence predicated on a generalized liberation from nature. However, I suggest, this does not
reflect Hegel’s own account. And yet this does not imply that the opposing “right” theistic reading of Hegel was correct, after all, since the mutually excluding determinations of theism and atheism are yet again instantiations of that same dichotomous structure of which Hegel is attempting to show the limits.

There are too many dimensions to this nexus between the more romantically oriented critiques of instrumental reason to which Arendt belongs and Hegel’s already complex views to be expanded upon here, but a few points might be usefully made. Importantly, Hegel was one of the first philosophers to acknowledge the modern emergence of “civil society” as a distinct public realm centred on a type of production that was geared to the satisfaction of basic needs—what he called the system of need. Moreover, it is clear that he grasped the profound changes that this was to have for the nature of work. Given the role of work in the transformation of the body and the conception of the soul is the form of the human body, it is clear that he thought of the changes brought about by the modern economy in the nature of work as having implications for changes in the human soul. Indeed, we might see some of these changes as signalled by Hegel’s understanding of the logic of work and activity more generally that is already implicit in the master-slave dialectic.

I earlier alluded to the modern conception of activity as a type of “making true”, and it is this that allows actions to be grasped as chained in relations of ends and means. For example, if the objective is to make it true that \( r \), and if we know that if \( q \) then \( r \), and also that if \( p \) then \( q \), then we have a prima facie reason to do \( p \). Here we might talk of “execution conditions” for commands that are analogous to assertability conditions for assertions, and think of actions as linked in relations of practical inference analogous to the way we inferentially chain beliefs. But the possibility for this type of mediation had been implicit in the very relation between master and slave. Once the gap is opened up between impulse and action that is consequent upon the master’s commanding the slave, this gap can be progressively mediated by intervening steps.

It is this ever widening gap, of course, that is complained of by the more romantic critics of instrumental reason. As the division of labour increases, the output of each person’s work will in general be likely to be directed towards the production of the
execution conditions of someone else’s activity. That is, the output of labour is no longer the perceptible object as it is in the type of work we think of as craft—an object that manifests the very transformations involved in its very production. This is the world where the value of work is measured in very abstract ways such as in relation to the satisfaction of “key performance indicators” or in terms of symbolic status conferred by its monetary equivalent. It is not the sort of value that can be simply recognized in the transformations of an object, such as that perceived in the products of craft activity. The modern capitalist economy is in some sense a realm in which everybody is theoretically equally master and slave to each other, and Hegel is well aware of the contradictions that exist at the heart of it. Thus while acknowledging the modern market’s ability to meet human need in ways that are historically unprecedented, Hegel also recognized the degrading effects of the modern economy, and the corrosive effects this system has had on the human soul. One source of this comes from the production of extremes of wealth and poverty generated by the form of life itself. As with his rejection of Aristotle’s claim that slaves were slaves by nature, Hegel is crystal clear that in modernity, the disparity of wealth and power are not the result of the “natures” of the rich and the poor. However, aside from the question of poverty, Hegel is aware of the malady that is now spoken of as “affluenza”. While the type of craft work involved in the production of an object of recognizable value is essential to the workers’ grasp of themselves as individual agents, this is endangered when the worker becomes just a cog in a wheel within a larger complex mechanism. Without meaningful work, we have nothing in which to see ourselves other than the objects of our desire. Affluenza, after all, is just another term for the existential problems besetting the situation of the original master.

Hegel had attempted to remedy these problems, by projecting into the infinitely mediated realm of civil society with its needs-based individualising tendencies, the opposed recognitive structures that were to be found in the more “immediate” realm of the modern bourgeois family. These may indeed be thought to be no longer appropriate for the world of work at the start of the 21st century. Nevertheless, I want to suggest that the basic conceptual tools he provided for the diagnosis of the depth structure of modern life and its problems are still as relevant as ever. At least within much contemporary philosophy the conception of practical activity and practical reason, despite the technical sophistication with which it is pursued, is still
fundamentally based on a Hobbesian conception of the individual will. Hegel’s counter-conception, and its elaboration in his cognitive approach to human thought and action, still stands as an under-explored and powerful alternative.\textsuperscript{40}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Alexandre Kojève, \textit{Introduction to the Reading of Hegel}, trans. James H. Nichols Jr., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). Kojève’s account was originally given in his lectures on Hegel in Paris in the 1930s, the subsequent popularity of his account owing much to the transmission of his views by authors such as Sartre and Lacan.
\item What distinguishes us as self-conscious beings from the rest of nature is that we are driven by a peculiar type of desire, the desire for recognition leading to struggle’s over recognition.
\item Habermas, “Labor and Interaction” p. 162. Honneth, \textit{The Struggle for Recognition}, p. 62. Honneth’s summation here indicates how much this view incorporates the Kojèvean reading of the \textit{Phenomenology}: “The \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} allots to the struggle for recognition – once the moral force that drove the process of Spirit’s socialization through each of its stages – the sole function of the formation of self-consciousness. Thus reduced to the single meaning represented in the dialectic of lordship and bondage, the struggle between subjects fighting for recognition then comes to be linked so closely to the experience of the practical acknowledgment of one’s labour that its own particular logic disappears almost entirely from view” (pp. 62–3).
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10 Hobbes effectively identifies the will with an empirical bodily appetite or aversion: “In *deliberation*, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the act, not the faculty, of willing”. (Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668*, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), ch. vi, §53). In distancing himself from the *faculty* of willing, Hobbes was setting himself against the scholastic view going back to Aristotle of the faculty of the will—“*voluntas*”—as a type of rational power *causing* the action (ibid., ch. xlii, §28). Instead, Hobbes introduces appetite and aversion as quasi-mechanically acting affective
states, causally brought about by perceptual interaction with the world and manifesting themselves in particular actions. This means that freedom for Hobbes cannot be identified with any notion of a rationally self-determining will that is presupposed by the Christian Platonist tradition.

11 See, for example, Michael Wolff, Das Körper-Seele Problem: Kommentar zu Hegel, Encyclopädie (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992).

12 The givenness of desire is usually taken to be the mark of “instrumentalism”. As Christoph Fehige expresses it, “desires—in the sense explained, in which “desire” captures what it is for something to matter to somebody—have the last word. Every such desire, and nothing but such a desire, counts. These desires are “given”, not just in the sense that their existence or non-existence need not always be in our power, but also in the sense that, if such a desire is really there, no rational critique can set its normative force to zero.” Christoph Fehige, “Instrumentalism”, in Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 66. Millgram makes a similar point: “Instrumentalism is the view that all practical reasoning is means–end reasoning. It says that there are various things you want, and the point of practical reasoning is to figure out how to get them. ... Instrumentalists think that practical reasoning proceeds from desires that are not themselves revisable by reasoning. These are desires that you just happen to have, and we can say that they are arbitrary.” Practical Induction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 2.


16 Allegra de Laurentiis, “Hegel’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Psyche: A Qualified Defence” in Katerina Deligiorgi, Hegel: New Directions (Chesham: Acumen, 2006). But Aristotle’s essentially embodied account of the finite human soul in De Anima of the was caught in a long-recognized problem concerning the relation of the individual soul to divine disembodied nous or “intelligence” coursing through the world (Aristotle: On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath, trans. W. S. Hett (Cambridge Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 2000)). In De Anima (413b24–9), Aristotle seems to introduce a dualism into the mind both relation with the notion of nous. See, for example, K. V. Wilkes’s “Final embarrassed Postscript” to her resolutely non-dualist reading of Aristotle’s “ψυχή” in “Psuchē versus the Mind” in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). To the extent that humans were capable of nous, they thus seemed
to be capable of a type of disembodied thought that was out of step with the more corporeal approach of De Anima. At its most general level, we might say that Hegel's proffered solution to this problem was to similarly "embody" the processes of divine nous or spirit in the corporeal world as well, by making its processes immanent, in the first instance, not in individuals but in historically evolving communities of interacting and communicating individuals, that is, individuals linked by relations of recognition. Embodying nous or "spirit" (Geist) in this way can sound utterly mysterious until we remind ourselves that the contents of the divine mind were the platonic ideas which Kant had interpreted as rules rather than transcendent immaterial prototypes—rules to be followed, in the practices of theoretical or practical reason. It was these rules then to which Hegel gave concrete existence by giving them a material basis in the normative processes constituting the life of actual societies.

17 Cf. H. S. Harris, Hegel's Ladder, I: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), p. 377 n 25. I will use the terms "master" and "slave" rather than the more general "lord" and "bondsman", which are more appropriate to the condition of serfdom, in order to retain the more classical connotations.


20 Harris uses the same terminology in relation to Hegel. Hegel's Ladder, vol 1, p. 366.

21 A comparison to Frege's treatment of negation is useful here. Frege claimed that negation must be an operation that applies to complete propositions as in order to understand a proposition in non-assertive contexts such as interrogatives and hypotheticals we must understand the content independently of the question of its actual truth or falsity. (Gottlob Frege, “Negation,” in Michael Beaney, The Frege Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)pp. 347–8.) In his comments on the law of the excluded middle, which in Aristotle is expressed as "of one thing we must either assert or deny one thing," Hegel argues for the existence of a “third” that is “indifferent” to the opposition he describes as A and not A, which we are presumably meant to read as the supposedly exclusive assertion or denial of a predicate of some thing. This third is A itself without the “+” or “−” that, in Hegel's notation, mark the affirmation or denial of A. (Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 438–9.) Hegel describes this third as "the unity of reflection into which the opposition withdraws as into ground," a unity which looks analogous to the Fregean idea of a propositional content that must be able to be understood in abstraction from its being judged to be actually true or false. I treat this in more detail in Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 7.

22 See my Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought.

23 In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel had developed this account of the perceptual object in the context of Chapter 2, "Perception". Hegel's primary task there had not been to
give a type of phenomenological account of the nature of perception, but rather to examine a
certain conception of the nature of what is. What he there calls “Perception” concerns a
certain normative standard for what is to count as real, and he shows that this conception is
self-undermining, and is in turn replaced by another standard, that he calls “the
understanding”. However, it seems legitimate to extract from that chapter a general
conception of Hegel’s phenomenology of the perceptual object.

C.f. Harris, “The self-certainty of simple desire tells us (and the other animals) that
consumption and enjoyment is the “truth” of the Sachen of Sense-Certainty.” Hegel’s Ladder,
vol I, 366.

Even here, however, the good that the animal seeks is regarded as objective, and the
animal’s action is regarded as expressing an intention or purpose. This is behind Aristotle’s
criticism of Democritus’ account of animal movement in De Anima, Book I.

University Press, 2002), 1140 a 1-23.

Aristotle, Politics, 1254 a 7–9, to which Aristotle adds, “hence the slave is an
assistant in the class of instruments of action”.

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1095 b 19ff. The closest one finds to a modern
belief—desire account of explanation of action in Aristotle is actually that applied to non-
human animals. For a helpful discussion of the relation of human and animal desiring in these
chapters see Henry S. Richardson, “Desire and the good in De Anima”, in Nussbaum and
Rorty (eds), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima.

G. E. R. Lloyd, “The master cook”, in Aristotelian Explorations (Cambridge:

Now, by working for another, the Slave too surmounts his instincts, and—by thereby
raising himself to thought, to science, to technique, by transforming nature I relation to a

Similarly, the relation between the slave and the object worked on is mediated by the
slave’s relation to the master, because the slave acts on the expressed will of the master, not
on his own desire.

Considerations such as these indicate how seriously Hegel takes the idea that “spirit”
is ultimately embodied in the flesh and bones of the individuals who make up the social world.
(In fact we might conjecture that the Aristotelian unilateral privileging of praxis over poiesis is
connected with the anomaly of his treatment of divine nous in contrast with the more
embodied treatment of the human psuche in de Anima.) It is said that in traditional societies
such as those of the ancient Greeks, individuals tend to conceive of themselves entirely in
terms of their social roles, and this, in some sense, is even expressed in the formal structure of Aristotle’s logic, as individual things are always reasoned about in terms of their instantiating some kind. But Hegel is aware that there are processes at work that result in individuals being such that they do not simply instantiate the normatively defined characteristics. If we think of the slave merely as an instantiation of a generic concept we are recognizing the slave within the structures of perception, but if we understand the slave as an element within a dynamic system of interacting elements we will be cognizing him with the resources of “the understanding”. But this is still not to appeal to anything outside the scope of conceptuality in the way that Hobbes so appeals to forces given from the world to instrumental reason. It is not as if there is some determinate but non-conceptualized individual reality to which the concept “slave” fails to correspond. It is rather that a concept like “slave” has to be considered in relation to its various structural determinations, one of which is as designating the slave in its singularity rather than as an instance of a universal. While to some extent we the proper expression of what is peculiar to the individual itself needs an appropriately shaped conceptual role, one that, Hegel thinks, is only generated after the collapse of the classical polis—first at an abstract or formal level, with the legal notion of individual rights in Rome and the universal scope of the Christian religion, and next, with the liberation of the labouring process from the fixed social statuses of the ancient institution of slavery.


35 We might think of her implicit approach to Hegel as a manifestation in the realm of the analysis of work of the type of criticism that accuses him of a logocentric “subsumption” of the individual by the universality of the “concept”, a concept conceived along Platonic lines as the prototype of some artefact to be fabricated.


37 We might here consider the comparison between the respective analyses of Hegel and the most famous social theorist to emerge from the left Hegelian camp, Karl Marx. Marx might be regarded as having attempted to “naturalize” Hegel’s analysis by transforming an explicitly idealist form of philosophy into a somewhat naturalistically conceived scientific theory. Marx correctly perceived that Hegel thought of philosophy as operating at the same level as religion, and extended a type of reductive analysis of religion to that of philosophy as well. In Hegelian terms this is to collapse the type of reasoning that properly belonged to “Reason” or *Vernunft*, back into the framework of “the understanding”, or *Verstand* and that transformation radically changes the understanding of the historical narrative involved. Marx understood historical materialism as an explanatory theory somewhat akin to Darwinian evolutionary theory, but Hegel’s narrative was not meant to be explanatory in that sense.
Rather, it was mean as something more akin to a retrospective genealogy in which the consideration that is to the fore is that of grasping where the norms that we take as authoritative came from and grasping the sorts of transformations they have gone through on the way to being our norms. An explanatory account would explain those norms away because they are not grasped as the norms of the subjects, us, doing the explaining. It is this claim to the irreducibility of the normative structure of spirit to any non-normatively material nature is what opposes an idealist like Hegel to materialists like Hobbes or Marx. But, as I have tried to suggest, this doesn’t imply an account of the logos that can be isolated from the material basis of the lives of the individuals in which it is embodied.

38 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, § 195 & §§ 244–5.


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