McDowell’s Radicalization of Kant’s Account of Concepts and Intuitions: A Sellarsian (and Hegelian) Critique

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Abstract. McDowell’s attempts to find a way out of the grip of some seemingly intractable problems besetting analytic philosophy has led him back to Kant and Hegel. Understanding, with Kant, the role played by concepts in experience will point the way forward, but Kant’s thinking must be released from its own problems which threaten to reduce the contents of experience and knowledge to “facts about us”. Kant’s “subjectivism” must be subjected to an “Hegelian” critique. However, McDowell’s solution to that problem, which involves a radical reinterpretation of Kant’s concept–intuition distinction, introduces new problems. Here I contrast McDowell’s reinterpretation of the intuition–concept relation with a less radical one suggested by Wilfrid Sellars, and based on his diagnosis of the ambiguity of Kant’s notion of intuition. The Sellarsian modest revision of Kant both gives a better account of perceptual experience and helps us better to understand the step that Hegel had taken beyond Kant.

In Mind and World,1 John McDowell engages with a variety of on-going debates within contemporary philosophy. At the most general level he recounts a critical metaphilosophical story about the analytic philosophical tradition, portraying its recent history as locked into a seemingly “interminable oscillation”2 between opposed and equally flawed epistemological outlooks. Part of the solution to this is to be found in Wilfrid Sellars’s mid-twentieth-century critique of the “Myth of the Given”, which had shaken the more traditionally empiricist ways in which early analytic philosophy had portrayed the experiential basis of knowledge.3 While empiricists appealed to the way that the simple givens of experience could constrain thought, Sellars argued that

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2 Ibid., p. 9.
for experience to play the role of an appropriately *rational* constraint on belief, its contents had to be such to enable some sort of *logical* relation to the content of belief. The givens of experience had therefore to be somehow *conceptual*. But the type of anti-empiricist move represented by Sellars’s *critique* became caught up in its own difficulties. In particular, “rebounding” from the Myth of the Given had tended to result in a picture in which the *rationally* constraining role of experience seemed to drop out entirely.

McDowell’s attempts to think through these problems lead him to an engagement with thinkers from the history of philosophy who are normally regarded within the analytic community as of having little to say that is of relevance to these matters—Kant and Hegel. In contrast, for McDowell these two thinkers can show us the way beyond the crippling oscillation of contemporary analysis, although considerable *reinterpretation* of accepted views about them is required. Thus in this latter project, developed in his *post-Mind and World* writings, McDowell makes contact with recent debates within the more specialist fields of scholarly interpretation of idealism. In *Mind and World* itself, the proposed solution to the “oscillation problem” of post-Sellarsian analysis will start with Kant, as it is with Kant’s criticisms of empiricism that we first get a conception of *experience itself* as somehow conceptually shaped, and so capable of standing in the right *rational* relation to the contents of judgments. Kant’s insight was to see that his equivalent of the empiricists’ “givens”—those “bits of experiential intake” that he calls “intuitions” could play no cognitively relevant role in experience without the involvement of the *conceptual* capacities that are prototypically exercised in judgment: “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”.

For Kant, intuitions and concepts must be understood as somehow knitted together in perceptual experience because such experience needs to be understood, as McDowell puts it, as “awareness, or at least seeming awareness, of a reality

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independent of experience”. In that we take rationality to include the “continuing activity of adjusting [one’s] world-view” on the basis of experience, the involvement of concepts in experience is crucial because it is only on the basis of the conceptually mediated relations that one’s world-view would be able to “pass a scrutiny of its rational credentials”—that is, meet the type of logical coherence demanded by the fact that the world-view purports to be a “view” of a single, objective world.

It is such an idea of a world-view subject to “scrutiny of its rational credentials” that is at the core of Kant’s notion of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, but Kant’s philosophy faced a classic problem that threatens the idea of the world we strive to have in view as a “reality independent of experience”. This problem I will call the “projection problem”, and it is often regarded as so deeply embedded in Kant’s “Transcendental Idealism” that it has almost become definitive of the shortcomings of that philosophy. The projection problem results from interpreting our conceptually shaped experience in a subjectivistic fashion, such that the contents of our experience and knowledge are grasped merely as projections of what McDowell refers to as “facts about us”—facts about the way we fashion our representations. McDowell thus tries to tease out an interpretation freeing Kant’s Transcendental Idealism from this crippling problem, and finds the resources for such a non-subjectivistic reading of Kantian idealism in the work of Hegel.

And so, in Mind and World, having started from Kant’s conception of the conceptual shaping of perceptual experience, in Lecture 2, McDowell takes the further, purported Hegelian, step of construing the conceptuality structuring experience as an aspect or feature of the world itself, not just our subjective representations of it. With this McDowell finds himself sharing a terrain with various

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7 McDowell, Mind and World, p. 31.
8 Ibid.
9 Such an idea of a world-view subject to “scrutiny of its rational credentials” is at the core of Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception—a unity reflected in the coherence of our judgments about the world.
contemporary Hegel interpreters, who similarly see Hegel as working in the spirit of Kant and as working his way beyond the limitations of Kant’s actual views.\textsuperscript{10}

Within the widespread debate provoked by *Mind and World* within analytic philosophy, perhaps more than any other it has been McDowell’s “conceptualist” picture of the nature of perceptual experience that has been taken up and contested, with opponents arguing for a role for “non-conceptual content” in perceptual experience. And while this debate has for the most part gone on relatively independently of the historical story he presents there of the path from Kant to Hegel, McDowell’s somewhat odd construal of *Kant* in this context has not passed unnoticed. For example, Robert Hanna has pointed to the peculiarity of McDowell’s characterization of his own “conceptualist” position as *Kantian*. McDowell’s conceptualism does not simply insist on the *necessity* of a role for concepts in perception; rather, it denies a role to any representational content considered *non*-conceptual. But, Hanna objects, with his concept–intuition distinction and his idea of the necessary role played by intuition in perception, surely Kant himself is more naturally allied with the *non-conceptualist* side of the debate. Non-conceptualists need not deny a role for concepts, they simply insist that concepts work in perceptual experience in relation to something *non-conceptual*, and surely this looks like Kant’s own account of experience, with the dual roles played by concepts and intuitions.\textsuperscript{11}

Hanna’s comments draw attention to the way in which McDowell’s understanding of Kant hangs on a particular and radical interpretation of the Kant’s concept–intuition distinction. While other Sellarsians, such as Robert Brandom and Richard Rorty, have for the most part been happy to *abandon* the distinction entirely, McDowell has seen it necessary to preserve the idea of intuitions as “bits of experiential intake” or “ostensible seeings”, presenting the mind with an objective world which can appropriately constrain thought. In his own words, he wants to preserve a “minimal empiricism” because without this Sellarsianism finds itself on the path of the Davidsonian coherentist “rebound” from the Given. But equally such a

\textsuperscript{10} In particular, with the interpretation of Robert Pippin in *Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

notion of “intuition” has to be freed from any suggestion of the “myth of the Given”, and only that line of thought taking us from Kant to Hegel in the way sketched out in the opening lectures of *Mind and World* will allow us to escape the oscillation between the two tendencies of contemporary analytic philosophy.

In the following sections I will examine those aspects of McDowell’s Kant that McDowell sees as leading to the version of Hegel that is required to solve the problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Here McDowell’s interpretation will involve the strategy, found in the post-Kantian idealists themselves, of appealing to the “spirit” of Kant’s philosophy against its “letter”. McDowell’s biggest problem, I suggest, will be effectively that alluded to by Hanna in the context of philosophy of perception—that of maintaining some distinctly Kantian role for “intuitions” in the context of the radicalization of Kant he proposes. But, I will argue, McDowell’s radical reinterpretation of the intuition–concept relation is in fact unnecessary to save Kant from the projection problem, and I will contrast McDowell’s account of the fate of the intuition–concept relation with a less radical one suggested by Sellars himself in his own interpretation of Kant. In the final section I then suggest, in a very general way, how the Sellarsian modest revision of Kant helps us, better than does the McDowellian radical one, to understand the step that Hegel had taken beyond Kant.

1. The Lessons of the B Deduction for Understanding Kant’s Concept–Intuition Distinction

McDowell’s proposed revision of Kant’s critical philosophy that is meant to save it from subjective idealism and put it on the path to Hegelianism focuses on the rewritten “Transcendental Deduction” of the pure concepts of the understanding in the second (“B”) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Along with the following “Analytic of Principles”, the function of this notoriously difficult section seems to be that of demonstrating the *connection* between the “sensible” and “intellectual” conditions of cognition that Kant had, up to that point, treated separately. But Kant’s efforts to perfect the Deduction’s argument structure in the B edition appears to complicate the neat separation of the representational structures of intuition and concept from which the *Critique* had started.
That there are two distinct sets of conditions to which objects of experience and knowledge are subject—two “sources” of human cognition in sensibility and the understanding—and correspondingly two distinct species of representation—intuition and concept—is at the heart of the received view of Kant’s “critical philosophy”. The first appearance of the systematic distinction between concepts and intuitions was to be found in Kant’s “Inaugural Dissertation” of 1770, “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World”, and the general distinction introduced there was reproduced in the opening sections of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. In the Critique, the separability of the faculties of receptivity and the understanding, reflecting the difference in “form and principles” in the earlier work, is expressed by the separation of the two sections within the “Transcendental doctrine of elements”—the “Transcendental Aesthetic” and “Transcendental Logic”—with the latter itself divided into the “Transcendental Analytic” and the “Transcendental Dialectic”. As the “science of all principles of a priori sensibility”, the “Transcendental Aesthetic” purports to explore the form to which sensory appearances are subject when considered independently of their primarily conceptualizable features: “if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it … something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form”. Kant thus examines the forms of our representation of spatial and temporal extension, and in the B edition breaks each down into two distinct expositions [“Erörterungen”] labeled “metaphysical” and “transcendental” respectively. Similarly, in the (Transcendental Logic’s) “Transcendental Analytic” of the B edition, Kant also distinguishes analogous metaphysical and transcendental “deductions” for those pure conceptual forms possessed by objects—the forms from which he claimed to have abstracted in the “Transcendental Aesthetic”.

In the B edition’s Metaphysical Exposition of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant focuses on those features of our spatial and temporal representations that are to be

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13 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A21/B35.

14 Ibid.
explained in terms of the operations of their source—the faculty of sensibility in its activity of representing. In the Transcendental Expositions, on the other hand, he is focused on the link between the features of our spatial and temporal representings and our knowledge of mathematics, an a priori science he considers grounded in those features of our spatial and temporal representings. In a somewhat analogous way, in the B Transcendental Analytic, the Metaphysical Deduction is concerned with the genesis of a priori features of conceptual representation in the faculty of the understanding. As Kant puts it, he means to establish “the origin of the a priori categories … through their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking”.  

15 That is, what can be known a priori about the structure of the objects about which we can make judgments on the basis of experience—the knowledge that Aristotle thought of as knowledge of the “categories”—will be seen to be derived from features of the faculty of the understanding. The Transcendental Deduction, on the other hand, is supposed to exhibit the categories “as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general”.  

16 In a way analogous to the way that the structures elicited in the Metaphysical Expositions of the Aesthetic were linked to the a priori knowledge of mathematics, the structures elicited in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Analytic is to be shown as underlying the a priori parts of physics. The characteristics of the two distinct sources of knowledge, the “receptivity” of our capacity to be sensibly affected by the world and the “spontaneity” of the judgments we make about the world, are reflected in the formal distinctions between the two species of cognitive representation, “intuition” and “concept”, which are the products of those respective faculties. In the taxonomy that Kant gives later in the outset of the second division of the Transcendental Logic, the Transcendental Dialectic, intuition is described as “immediately related to the object [Gegenstand] and … singular [einzeln]”; in contrast, a concept is “mediate” and related to the object “by means of a mark [Merkmals], which can be common to several things”.  

17 Within recent secondary literature, however, attention has been increasingly directed to those parts of the rewritten Transcendental Deduction of B edition in

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15 Ibid., B159.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., A320/B377.
which we find that such a neat separation between the conditions of receptivity and spontaneity is not maintained. Most clearly, perhaps, in an oft-quoted footnote in the B Deduction, Kant writes that “Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension [Zusammenfassung] of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation”, \(^\text{18}\) and he now draws a distinction between the “form of intuition [die Form der Anschauung] that “merely gives the manifold” and the “formal intuition [die formale Anschauung]” that “gives unity of the representation.”\(^\text{19}\)

The “unity” of an intuition, it would now seem, depends somehow on the “transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility”. \(^\text{20}\) Now looking back at the Transcendental Aesthetic from the perspective revealed in such comments, it would seem that the respective “Metaphysical Expositions” were not, in fact, sufficient to establish what is known a priori about space and time, and in particular, not sufficient to establish the a priori basis of the science of mathematics. It is this retrospectively established failure of the Transcendental Aesthetic to establish an independent set of sensible conditions of experience that will be at the heart of McDowell’s reading of the B Deduction, and his radicalization of the received view of the concept–intuition distinction. But his reinterpretation will be so radical, I suggest, that it becomes difficult to see in it a recognizably “Kantian” view at all.

For McDowell, the fundamental problem facing Kant’s version of idealism flows from what I have called the projection problem—the idea that the spatio-temporal form of experience is be understood as a subjective imposition onto the world, an imposition that turns the “spatial and temporal organization of things as objects of experience” into “a mere reflection of a fact about us”. \(^\text{21}\) McDowell sees this as an aspect of Transcendental Idealism that is starkly contrary to what Kant wants to achieve. Rather than establish such a “subjective idealism”, Kant wanted to develop a form of idealism that sits equally with realism about the empirical world. McDowell

\(^{18}\) Ibid., B160n.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., B152, emphasis added.

\(^{21}\) McDowell, Having the World in View, p. 79, fn 14.
thus sees Kant in the B Deduction as trying to ward off such a subjective construal of Transcendental Idealism by trying to show how the conditions of sensibility that had originally been conceived as subjective can be now brought under the conceptual conditions in virtue of which our representations can be logically unified into the representation of a single objective world. The problem, however, is that the initial subjective coloring given idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic in turn adversely affects how the intellectual conditions of experience and knowledge come to be understood: read on the analogy of the conditions of sensible experience they too come to be thought of in terms of the imposition of a type of shareable but still subjective framework onto the world. Thus the basic intention of an idealism compatible with an empirical realism is undermined.

McDowell differentiates his understanding of the B Deduction’s response to the problem of subjective idealism from another possible interpretation according to which the capacity for thought to have objective content is first secured in the first part of the B Deduction and then, in a second step, extended to the intentionality of experience. On such a view “Kant undertakes to explain the objective purport of intuitions—their being immediately of objects—in terms of a supposedly antecedent understanding of the objective purport of judgment—its being answerable to its subject matter”. 22 But besides the problem of the retrograde spoiling of the conceptually achieved objective conditions by those subjective conditions to which the former are applied, this strategy leaves it unanswered how the conceptual conditions of thought themselves are meant to achieve objectivity of our representations in the first place. On McDowell’s interpretation, rather than there being two separate steps in the deduction, Kant aim was to show how the considerations concerning the thinkability of objects and the “objective” conditions of experience found in the Metaphysical Deduction were actually the same as those conditions that had hitherto been taken to be merely “subjective” conditions of the sensory experience of objects.

So, a reading sympathetic to Kant’s intentions, McDowell thinks, must eschew an understanding of the Transcendental Aesthetic as attempting to establish some set of independent conditions for the sensory experience of as yet unconceptualized objects.

22 Ibid., p. 70–1.
And if there are no separable sets of conditions, there can be no separable products of those conditions—no separate “unities” pertaining to aethesis and thought: “The unity constituted by conformity to the requirements of our sensibility, which is the unity of the pure formal intuitions of space and time, is not a separate unity, independent of the unity that consists in being informed by the categories”.\(^{23}\) McDowell points to Kant’s own claim in the Metaphysical Deduction that he interprets as making just this point. “The same function which gives unity to the various representations \textit{in a judgment}” says Kant, “also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations \textit{in an intuition}; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding”.\(^{24}\)

Pretty clearly, the thrust of the argument in the B Deduction is that the products of the faculty of sensibility cannot be considered to function as representations independently of the effects of the understanding. The non-conceptual “forms of intuition” appealed to in the Metaphysical Expositions of the Transcendental Aesthetic, we might say, cannot be considered to be the forms of “intuited” but unconceptualized \textit{worldly objects}. It is in this sense that the unity of intuition is “not a separate unity”. But the modification proposed by McDowell to the “two sources” doctrine is more radical than this, as McDowell interprets Kant’s point as implying that the “unities” of intuition are not simply dependent on the unities of the understanding, but that the two are simply \textit{the same}. McDowell expresses this in a variety of ways. First, in terms of the “unities” themselves: “the unity of intuitions” he says, “is the same as the unity of possible judgments”, and of intuition, he says, “the kind of unity in question is the kind that is characteristic of judgment”.\(^{25}\) McDowell also talks of the logical sameness of intuitions and concepts: “intuitions—cases of sensory consciousness of objects—have logical structures, and they are the same as logical structures possessed by judgments”.\(^{26}\) Intuitions are actualizations of conceptual capacities that, he says, have the same “logical togetherness” in intuition

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 74.


\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 72, note 7, and p. 72.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., p. 94.
as that found among concepts as exercised in judgments and found in their linguistic expressions.²⁷

It is this radical reinterpretation of the nature of intuitions that creates problems for both his interpretation of Kant and his own independent account of the conceptuality of experience. Qua Kant interpretation, all that Kant says about the formal differences of intuitions and concepts as species of representation appears to be retracted. For example, how now are we to capture what Kant himself had meant to capture with his own criticism of Leibniz in the “Amphiboly” of the first Critique when he criticizes Leibniz for his not having regarded as “original” those “conditions of sensible intuition, which bring with them their own distinctions”?²⁸ When Kant describes Leibniz as having treated sensibility as “only a confused kind of representation … and not a special source of representations”,²⁹ would not this criticism apply to McDowell as well? On the other hand, qua theory of the nature of perceptual content, his idea of the identity of the unities of intuition and judgment has given rise to the charge that McDowell, absurdly, thinks of perceptual experience as


²⁸ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A270/B326.

²⁹ Ibid., emphasis added.
“quasi-linguistic”—in Arthur Collins’s witticism, that experience is conceived by McDowell as coming with “subtitles”.30

McDowell of course denies that his account of the conceptual nature of experience implies anything as counter-intuitive as this.31 Such sorts of objections, he replies, ignore that he is talking about “actualization[s] of conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness”. His critics simply disallow the idea that “a conceptual mode of presentation might itself be a sensory mode of presentation” and this rejection rests on just the type of “sharp separation between the sensory and the intellectual” that McDowell contests.32 In more recent work, however, McDowell seems to have conceded that there is something to such criticisms and has retracted the strong idea that the content of intuition is, like that of judgment, propositional.33 Judging is a discursive activity, discursive content is articulated: “In discursive dealings with content, one puts significances together.” But, he adds “this is not how it is with intuitive content”.34 But McDowell’s rejoinder here is puzzling. Is this not just another way of saying that intuition has a different form to the form that characterizes concepts? And yet McDowell gives no indication of having taken back his initial

30 Arthur W Collins, “Beastly Experience”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, 2 (1998), pp. 375–80. “I think that there are overwhelming reasons for thinking that perception is not intrinsically propositional… What can be said or what cannot be said depends on experience, but experience does not come, as though, with subtitles.” Ibid., p. 379.
33 John McDowell, Having the World in View, essay 14 “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”. On the problems that this move introduces for McDowell, see my “Wilfrid Sellars’s Disambiguation of Kant’s ‘Intuition’”.
34 McDowell, Having the World in View, p. 263.
refusal to acknowledge the role of any non-conceptual structure in perceptual experience.

Something, I suggest, has gone wrong in the account of Kant that McDowell constructed in his attempt to bring out the continuity between Kant and Hegel. But McDowell need not have been so radical in his challenge to the received view of Kant’s concept–intuition distinction. In the next section I examine McDowell’s criticism of Sellars’s treatment of Kant’s concept–intuition distinction and Sellars’s appeal to a distinct, albeit ambiguous, “form of intuition” in Kant. Defending and building on Sellars, I go on to argue that the needed “revision” of Kant’s views of the two separate sources of knowledge in the B Deduction is capable of a more conservative reading than that given by McDowell. McDowell effectively reads Kant as taking back the idea that the form of intuition characterized in the Metaphysical Expositions of the Transcendental Aesthetic is necessary for knowledge of independent spatio-temporally determinate objects, whereas Kant can be read as only denying that it is sufficient for so knowing them. Nevertheless, the weaker reading gives Kant sufficient resources for resisting the “projection problem” as he seeks to do. Furthermore, as we will see, the weaker reading also better shows the path via which Hegel sought to save Kant’s basic insights from the projection problem.

2. The Extra-Conceptual in the Representations of Receptivity

In the second of the Woodbridge Lectures, “The Logical Form of an Intuition”, McDowell examines Sellars’s reflections on Kantian intuitions in Lecture 1 of his 1966 Locke Lectures published as *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes*. There, Sellars had raised the issue of the modification of the doctrine of intuition found in those parts of the B Deduction of the first *Critique* with which McDowell himself has been concerned. Sellars dismisses the view that the Transcendental Aesthetic provides a set of sufficient conditions for the representation of space, the view that attempts to “account for the outwardness of outer sense by invoking space as an autonomous form of sensibility, intelligible independently of

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any involvement on the part of the understanding”.\textsuperscript{36} Sellars, McDowell comments, is correct in this: the contested reading “does not fit Kant, and it does not make philosophical sense”.\textsuperscript{37} But McDowell now objects to Sellars for having criticized Kant for not clarifying an ambiguity about the nature of intuition and its purported objects—space (and time)—in the light of the modification to the received view set out in the B Deduction.\textsuperscript{38} The “forms of sensibility”, that, on the received view, supposedly produced an adequate representation of space are, Sellars complains, “never adequately discussed”, and are never clearly demarcated from the forms of conceptual representations that come to be seen by Kant to be necessary to the proper representation of space.\textsuperscript{39} That is, Sellars clearly holds the view that while no longer sufficient for the representation of space, the notion of a distinct form of sensibility, nevertheless, still plays a role in Kant’s account of the overall conditions for the cognition of space. But for McDowell, Sellars’s complaint is misdirected: “Perhaps a properly Kantian conception of outer sense needs no form of sense as ‘sheer receptivity’, but only space in the role that Sellars, rightly in my view, takes Kant to attribute to it: as the form of outer intuitability on the interpretation according to which intuition involves the understanding as well as sensibility”.\textsuperscript{40} There should be no transcendental role afforded to considerations of representational factors that need not be understood “in terms of the actualization of conceptual capacities”.\textsuperscript{41}

On the received reading of Kant that McDowell and Sellars both reject, the Transcendental Aesthetic is meant to map out the structure of pure intuition as a formal structure presupposed by experience that is independent of any structuring provided by concepts. This is supposed to supply objects with a spatio-temporal form responsible for their perceived spatio-temporal relations, to which must be added a further form, the conceptual form that an object must possess in virtue of being

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} McDowell, Having the World in View, p. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 28.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Sellars argues for the ambiguity of Kant’s notion of intuition in \textit{Science and Metaphysics}, chapter 1. I will return to this theme below in section 3.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 30.
\item \textsuperscript{40} McDowell, Having the World in View, p. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 23.
\end{itemize}
thinkable, this latter task being conceived as a separate one for the Transcendental Analytic. But in the B Deduction it becomes clear that the story is more complicated than this, with the initial neat distinction between intuitions and concepts somehow becoming “blurred”. But in developing this point, Sellars and McDowell diverge. Sellars’s comments are consistent with the idea of a modest modification of the received view would have the task of the Metaphysical Expositions of the Transcendental Aesthetic demoted to that of specifying necessary but insufficient conditions for the representation of space and objects in it. McDowell’s strategy, in contrast, represents a more radical attack on the two-sources doctrine itself.

It is worth recalling what it is about the form of intuition that, for Kant, differentiates it from the form of concept, and how that may be related to the specificity of its source. In his discussion of the formal properties of our representation of space in the Metaphysical Exposition, Kant points out that it must be intuitive, as we represent it to ourselves as singular: “For, first, one can only represent a single space [einer einigen Raum], and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space [eines und desselben alleinigen Raumes].”

For intuitive representations, then, particular parts must be understood as contained within the more general whole. Conceptual representation is quite different, however. If one thinks of the analogous relation within the realm of conceptual representation—the idea of conceptual containment—then the more general concepts are contained within the more particular, in the way that the concept “animal”, say, is contained within the concept “human”. At other times, however, intuition is contrasted with concept in terms of its immediacy, presumably the phenomenal immediacy of content present in perceptual experience.

Within the literature there have been various attempts to characterize the peculiarities of Kant’s concept of intuitive representation, but for our purposes I will restrict myself to the “constructivist” approach of Arthur Melnick, for whom it is the nature of the part–whole conception of space in the Transcendental Aesthetic that is

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42 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A25/B39.
43 See Kirk Dallas Wilson, “Kant on Intuition”, Philosophical Quarterly, 25 (1975), for a clear discussion of these points.
crucial. Melnick. “However, spatial expansiveness is not constituted out of parts as elements that constitute its expansiveness. The whole expanse, we may say, is prior to parts.” And this, as we have seen, stands in contrast to what is the case for discursive conceptualization, for here “a whole is always represented as being a multitude of elements. Its very nature as a whole is that it exists by and only by all its elements existing.” Thus Melnick points to those differences between intuitional content and the “articulated” discursive content of judgments to which McDowell appeals in his retraction of the propositionality thesis. What comes into focus here, Melnick suggests, is Kant’s concern with the apparently “continuous” or “seamless” character of spatial and temporal expansiveness. On the basis of comments of Kant himself about our practices of describing spatial extensions, as in drawing lines and constructing figures, Melnick relates such features of space and time as represented to the peculiarities of the subject’s active constructions of spatial representations, as when, for example, one constructs diagrams in geometry. Thus this “seamless” feature of space as continuous he sees as a result of the fact that it is generated in a “flowing construction”, a flowing movement such as the drawing of a line of which the termini can only be thought of as “limitations” to the presupposed continuous constructing movement itself.

Melnick’s analysis allows us to understand how something about the source of a representation may be responsible for something about the resulting form of the representation, and, furthermore, how we might see a resulting “form of intuition” as by itself not sufficient for any scientifically applicable representation of space. That

44 Arthur Melnick, Themes in Kant’s Metaphysics and Ethics (Washington, DC.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), especially Parts I & II.


46 Melnick draws attention to Kant accounting for the “constructions” of Euclidian geometry as examples of the synthetic acts of the productive imagination involving “motion, as an act of the subject”, Critique of Pure Reason, B154–5, quoted Melnick, p. 43. Melnick quotes Kant as saying that such acts of the subject belong “not only to geometry, but even to transcendental philosophy”. Ibid.
is, from the point of view of Kant’s B Deduction, we might say that such an act of carving out a space, while capturing *something* about space as we experience it—its apparently “seamless” part–whole structure—clearly doesn’t do justice to the representation of space that can feature within geometry or physics. Following Kant’s own distinction we might say that while such constructing *activity* may be adequate to “the form of intuition” of space, it cannot be adequate to space as a “formal intuition”. While it might “give the manifold” of space, it cannot supply the “unity [*Einheit*]” to the manifold in a representation of space.⁴⁷ For that, *concepts* are necessary.

We might be now juxtapose such a suggestion about the “form of intuition” to an ambiguity that Henry Allison has noted in Kant’s use of that phrase in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Sometimes, Alison says, Kant seems to mean by it, “the form or manner [Art] of *intuiting*”, and sometimes “the form (in the sense of essential order or pattern) of that which is *intuited*” ⁴⁸ The considerations that Melnick brings to the fore in his hypothesis show how *something* about the intuited might be taken as resulting from the form or manner of *intuiting*, the seamlessness of the *intuited* space being a consequence of the flowing nature of the act of *intuiting*. And it is in this sense that features of spatio-temporal representation might be seen as related to features of their “source”, the basic claim of the “Metaphysical Exposition”. But by the same token, we can see why an intuitive representation considered *merely* in terms of the specific nature of its source could not *by itself* constitute for Kant a representation of space in any representationally *objective* (scientifically applicable) sense of the term—that is, why it would be inadequate for an account of the form of *space* as intuited. For example, space is meant to be unitary and *infinite*, but it hard to see the “space” carved out by individual finite acts of “flowing construction” as necessarily finite regions of a presupposed encompassing space that is itself conceived as both unitary and infinite.⁴⁹ In short, Melnick’s suggestion about the genesis of spatial representation is entirely compatible with the revision to the “two sources” idea that Kant gives in the B Deduction, interpreted conservatively. And

⁴⁷ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B160n.
⁴⁸ Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, p. 115.
⁴⁹ At best, it would provide what is sometimes described as a “potential” infinite, and ascribed as such to Aristotle’s thinking about infinity.
such an understanding of the relation of the representation of space to its source seems entirely compatible, also, with Sellars’s complaint about the ambiguous or “Janus-faced” nature of Kant’s notion of intuition that McDowell seems to deny.\(^{50}\) When intuitions are understood in relation to the operations of the understanding, intuitions may be conceived as informed by concepts. But isolated from considerations of conceptual form, there is still something that can be said about the nature of our representations of space and time that underpins Kant’s criticism of Leibniz and appeals to the two-sources doctrine.

If we are to regard the Metaphysical Expositions of space and time as attempts to account for a set of necessary but not sufficient conditions for intuitions, might not the same be said for the analogous considerations of the Metaphysical Deduction in the Transcendental Analytic with respect to concepts? That is, might not the Metaphysical Deduction of the Transcendental Analytic fall short of establishing the complete set of conditions for thought about spatio-temporal objects in an analogous way to that found regarding the intuition of objects in the Metaphysical Exposition of the Transcendental Aesthetic? If so, the Analytic’s Metaphysical Deduction would need “supplementing” by conditions taken from the Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Exposition in an analogous way to that in which the Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Exposition needed retrospective supplementation from the results of the Analytic’s Metaphysical Deduction.

Indeed, just this seems to be the message of Kant’s claim in the B Deduction that “to think [denken] of an object and to cognize [erkennen] an object are thus not the same … for if an intuition corresponding to the concept could not be given at all, then it would be a thought as far as its form is concerned, but without any object, and by its means no cognition of anything at all would be possible, since, as far as I would know, nothing would be given nor could be given to which my thought could be applied”.\(^{51}\) From the perspective of thought alone, it would be sufficient for it to be without contradiction for it to be “possible”, but there is gap between such logical possibility and transcendental possibility which agrees that the thought conform “with

\(^{50}\) McDowell, Having the World in View, p. 29.

\(^{51}\) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B146.
the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and concepts). Ignoring this distinction, traditional metaphysics gets itself into contradictions. The distinct conditions of sensibility must supplement, as it were, the conditions of the understanding for even the thought of possible objects to be meaningful.

3. Intersecting but Distinct Sources of Representational Form

We might think of what I am suggesting as a modest revision of the received “two source” view as pictured, at least initially, by two intersecting circles representing two intersecting sets of conditions. Call the circles “S” and “U” (for the faculties of sensibility and understanding respectively) and the area of intersection “C” (for “cognition”). On the basis of Kant’s famous formula, “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts blind”, we might describe the two non-overlapping areas $S - C$ ($S$ minus $C$) and $U - C$ as representing “blind” intuition and “empty” thought respectively. Considered in isolation, the intuitive and conceptual conditions are necessary but not sufficient for “cognition”, which on this model is meant as a type of “contentful representation” in which what is represented is something independent of the representation itself. But something nevertheless can be said about the distinctive contributions made to those representations from these two different sources of representation—sensibility and understanding—when considered apart. McDowell would seem to be clearly opposed to such a picture. In contrast, his radical revision of the two sources thesis might be represented by two circles that

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52 Ibid., A218/B266, emphasis added.
53 Ibid., A51/B75.
54 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for directing me to Sellars’s own use of diagrams to attempt to capture these types of relations. See, for example, Pedro Amaral (ed.), *Kant and Pre-Kantian Theme: Lectures by Wilfrid Sellars* (Atascadero, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 2002), especially, lecture 11, “Categories and Intuition in the Schematism and Transcendental Deduction”. With “Figure 6” on page 77, Sellars employs overlapping ellipses to make a point which seems similar to that for which I employ the idea overlapping circles, although there are differences. Unfortunately there is not the space here to pursue this point further.
were fully superimposed. There is nothing equivalent to the areas $S - C$ or $U - C$ for McDowell, as he eschews the idea of any independent aesthetic or conceptual conditions necessary for the representation of objects able to be considered in isolation from the other. His radical thesis, I’ve suggested, leads to both exegetical and internal problems, but it is difficult to understand why the more modest reinterpretation of Kant would not satisfy his needs. Importantly it eliminates the Transcendental Aesthetic as the source of the subjective idealist reading of Kant because there is nothing purportedly objective, such as space regarded “as an object”, for example, that is simply a “mere reflection of facts about us”—facts concerning the manner in which we represent space by our “flowing movements” of Melnick’s account, for example. The projection problem, at least in its most pressing form, assumes a single source for a purportedly objective representation, and that has now been eliminated. In this concluding section I wish to explore this model a little further. I will suggest that it is helpful in capturing more accurately the limitations of and tensions within Kant’s concept–intuition distinction, as well as understanding Hegel’s transformation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. To this end, I want to use the diagram not simply to represent the conditions imposed by the separate “faculties” of sensibility and understanding, but as a way of representing the differences between types of judgments formed by the exercise of those faculties. I will start with the distinction Kant makes in the *Prolegomena for a Future Metaphysics* between judgments of experience and judgments of perception.\(^{55}\)

By “objective” judgments of experience Kant clearly wants to include the sort of judgments found in empirical science: an example is “air is elastic”.\(^{56}\) In contrast, and the “merely subjectively valid” judgments of perception such as “the room is warm, the sugar sweet, the wormwood repugnant”,\(^{57}\) are perspectival judgments of immediate perceptual experience. Kant suggests a type of progression from judgments of perception to those of experience, presumably involving some act of reflection.


\(^{56}\) Ibid.

\(^{57}\) Ibid.
“All our judgments”, he says, “are at first mere judgments of perception, they hold only for us”, but judgments of experience are judgments that we intend “should also be valid at all times for us and for everyone else”. Importantly, when our judgments achieve the latter status “we give them a new relation, namely to an object”. This must give us pause: clearly in the case of judgments of perception there is a relation to “an object” in some sense. When I taste this sprig of Artemesia absinthium and find it bitter, this judgment is in some relation to the sprig and its properties; it is presumably not in the right one. To capture Kant’s intention here we might allude to a “truth making relation”. To say “air is elastic” is to attribute a property to air that makes that judgment “valid at all times for us and for everyone else”. In contrast there is some essential tie to my sensibility, or perhaps the sensibility of the human species, that enters into the “subjective” validity of the bitterness of wormwood or the sweetness of sugar. It may not be true for others, or other animals, or other possible forms of intelligence.

As an initial attempt to represent this situation, we might think of all of our perceptual judgments as initially belonging to the area U, without regard to the distinction between its sub-areas U – C and C. We might then reflect, however, as to whether we would consider that a particular judgment ought to be held to be “valid at all times for us and for everybody else”. An answer “yes”, for a judgment like “air is elastic” should lead us to place it in area C of “cognition”. An answer “no”, given, say, to the judgment about the wormwood, would be assigned to area U – C, the area of “empty” thought. But to proceed in this way requires that we head off a potential objection.

We have so far discussed area S – C and area U – C as if they represented the operation of the faculties of sensibility and understanding in complete isolation from the products of other, and this would not fit this new application. Just as my judgment about this sprig of wormwood is clearly related to an object—the sprig—it obviously involves the intuitions of it, its properties, and so on. But here the judgment is being represented as outside the scope of intuitive content, that is, outside circle S. So rather than thinking of concepts operating in the space U – C as not relating to any intuitions, we might think of them as not relating to intuitions in the right way for

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58 Ibid.
“cognition”. And this now suggests an account for the ambiguity in Kant’s use of the notion of intuition noted by Sellars and others.⁵⁹ Sometimes Kant’s focus is on the “immediacy” of the presentation to me of some thing and its properties in an intuition. In fact, this is how the portion of wormwood and its various properties seem present in the judgment of perception. But this seems to run together concepts and intuitions, making intuitions look like sub-species of concepts. Thus Sellars claims that sometimes by “intuition” Kant means something analogous to a demonstrative concept—a “this such”.⁶⁰ But at other times, he points out, the “immediacy” involved seems intended to be understood not as indicating phenomenal immediacy but as some purportedly causal relation between object and intuition—the type of relation appropriate for “cognition”.⁶¹ Thus it starts to look as if the purported ambiguity in Kant’s account of intuition is related to the different roles that intuitions might play in these different concept types: for proper “cognition”, intuitions must be related to concepts so as to capture the appropriate causal role played by the object in the formation of the judgments, and not merely in the way that the object is phenomenally made present in judgments. But if this is the case, then a more general question seems to be raised: should the very distinction between concepts and intuitions be understood as dependent on this distinction among judgments? If this is the case, there is then no single concept–intuition distinction to play the purportedly foundational role in transcendental idealism that the standard “two sources” interpretation of Kant gives to it, although the distinction will continue to play some role. This, I want to suggest, is effectively the approach to be found in both Sellars and Hegel. Again, it represents a more modest reinterpretation of Kant’s intuition–concept distinction than that found in McDowell.

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⁶⁰ Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, pp. 4–5.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 2.
4. The Primacy of Judgment and the Duality of Judgment Types

The distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience appears only in the Prolegomena and might seem a scant basis on which to base any suggested overhaul of the standard interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, but we find attempts throughout Kant’s career to distinguish different forms of judgment in similar ways. Most obvious in this regard is the distinction from the Critique of Judgment between objective “determinate” judgments and the subjective, albeit universally subjective, “reflective” judgments of taste, but an illuminating example is to be found in an essay from 1763, before Kant had distinguished concepts and intuitions as “heterogeneous” forms of representation. In “Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy” Kant invokes a distinction between what he calls “real” and “logical” negation in the context of a criticism of Leibniz. Logical negation, he says, is just that which holds between contradictory statements, the simultaneous affirmation and denial of some property of a thing: one statement thus affirms that this A is B and the other says that it is not the case that A is B. Here negation is sentential. In contrast, “real” negation occurs “where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other (entgegengesetzt), but not through the law of contradiction.” Such oppositions hold between opposed and reciprocally canceling determinations. Kant’s favored example is that between mechanically

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63. Kant is supposed to have hit upon the idea in 1769.


65. Michael Wolff is one of the few interpreters of Hegel to point to the importance of Kant’s early essay: The introduction of the concept of real negation in this essay, he points out, “was of great (though little understood) significance for Kant’s later philosophy, and also for post-Kantian, Hegelian, and materialist dialectic.” Michael Wolff, “On Hegel’s Doctrine of Contradiction,” trans E. Flynn and K. R. Westphal, The Owl of Minerva 31 1 (1999), 1–22, 12.

66. Or, to put it otherwise, it predicates of A the contradictory predicate, “not B.”

67. Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770, p. 211 (2.171).
opposed forces, which involve, as is the case with another of other examples, opposed *spatial* directions, suggesting a distinction among concepts analogous to the later distinction *between* concepts and intuitions. But Kant also identifies as *real* oppositions those holding between a *credit* and a *debit* of an amount of money, and between amounts of pleasure and displeasure, good and evil, love and hate, and desire and aversion. The “real negation” holding among these antithetical values is essentially a development of the simple term negation from Aristotelian logic, and it appears again in the antithetically opposed evaluative predicates of aesthetic judgments as described in the third *Critique*. What is different about the later treatment of these non-cognitive judgments in the third *Critique*, however, is that they are there not *simply* non-cognitive, but expressive of a new quasi-objectivity—a *subjective universal* validity, grounded in quite different considerations.

What judgments of perception, reflective aesthetic judgments and judgments employing “real” (predicate) rather than “logical” (sentential) negation have in common is that applicability of their predicates to some substance need not testify to the existence of some corresponding “real” property that is responsible for the truth of the judgment. Predicates like “bitter”, “beautiful” and “desirable” do not express concepts that are understood to hold of some objective property in the way that “elastic” is thought to hold of “air”—that is, indicate a property that is meant to explain why the judgment is “valid at all times for us and for everyone else”. But once more, by the time of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant has come to think of a judgment form that can support the demand for such universal validity without it being grounded in objective properties. Nevertheless, like “bitter” and “desirable”, the

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68 For example, a ship sails from Portugal to Brazil, and the miles travelled under conditions of an east wind can be designated by a “+” while those traversed when the ship is blown back by a west wind can be designated by a “−”. The miles traversed westwards by the ship are themselves just as real—just as *positive*—as those traversed eastwards, but one might count them as negative in opposition to the “positive” eastward miles in the contexts of the ship’s journey.


70 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, § 9.
newly conceived “beautiful” is seen to exemplify the “projection problem”, in as much as we are tempted to regard beauty as a “real” property like “elastic”. It is only the “judgment of experience” or the “determinative judgment” that achieves what Kant had earlier described as a “new relation” to an object. And this relation, I suggest, demands a different conception of the structure of the judgment and the respective roles played by intuition and concept in the judgment—a conception that fits judgments that work with “logical” rather than “real” (term) negation.

Judgments of perception along with the earlier judgments employing “real” negation and the later judgments of taste all presuppose a traditional subject–predicate structure, but in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant is critical of the idea that judgment can be understood as a “representation of a relation between two concepts”.71 As Béatrice Longuenesse has pointed out, Kant has an alternative reading of what it is to predicate a concept term P of a subject kind term S. To say this S is P is not simply to join concept P to S but to say that the intuitive content that is subsumed under the subject concept “S” is thereby subsumed under the predicate concept “P”.72 But contrast this with the simpler situation where the traditional subject–predicate structure is assumed to be the correct logical structure, as in judgments of perception. Here I associate the subject and predicate concepts in a way that reflects the joining of intuitions qua phenomenal presences in experience. I experience the wormwood and bitterness qua intuitive phenomenal contents and assert that wormwood is bitter.

The type of analysis of judgment that Longuenesse attributes to Kant had a precedent in Leibniz, who had used a similar alternative to the traditional idea of joining subject and predicate terms by treating each as separately predicated of some hidden “tertium commune”.73 In fact, this type of analysis is close to the way judgments are thought of from the modern perspective of post-Fregean logic, in which

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71 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 140.
it is said that an affirmative judgment has the structure of a conditional. What allows this form of analysis in Kant is the idea of intuition as a “singular [einzeln]” representation analogous to a singular term playing the role of “argument” to a conceptual “function”. In this sense, then, an intuition is clearly not a concept. But while these distinctions are present in Kant they are obscured by his attempt to make the distinction between intuitions and concepts foundational, ironing out the subtle distinct functional roles they play. Hegel had not been impressed by Kant’s foundational “dichotomy” of intuitions and concepts, and in his approach the duality of judgment structures emerges in a more perspicuous way.

Hegel’s distinction between traditional “Aristotelian” and more “modern” proposition-first approaches to judgment structure appears explicitly in his treatment of judgment in the Science of Logic. First he contrasts the approach in which subject and predicate terms are “considered complete, each on its own account, apart from the other”, and another in which subject and predicate terms receive their determination “in the judgment first”, and this distinction becomes the basis not only of a distinction between forms of judgment (“judgments of existence” and “judgments of reflection”), but a distinction between ways of conceiving of inferential relations between judgments (“syllogisms of existence” and “syllogisms of reflection”). Again, clearly the former reflects the approach of “term logics” like that of Aristotle,

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74 The features of Kant’s approach that seem to anticipate Frege’s analysis were pointed out in Manley Thompson, “Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant’s Epistemology,” Review of Metaphysics, 26 (1972), pp. 314–43.
76 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 625.
77 Ibid., p. 627. For Frege or Wittgenstein, for example, the priority of the proposition over its parts is signaled by the so-called “context principle” according to which “[t]he meaning of a word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, not in isolation”. Gottlob Frege, “The Foundations of Arithmetic”, in Michael Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 90.
78 Hegel, Science of Logic, Volume Two, Section One, Chapter 2, A and B.
79 Ibid., Volume Two, Section One, Chapter 3, A and B.
while the latter, which Hegel discusses as the “mathematical syllogism” alludes to the type of “modern” analysis found in Leibniz, where terms are treated in terms of their contribution to the propositional content.  

Hegel’s distinction between these two forms of judgment and the inferential patterns that support them parallels those that structure what Sellars was to call the opposed “manifest” and “scientific” images of the world, and while Sellars sought ways in which these two cognitive relations to the world could be maintained within a type of “stereoscopic” view, Hegel attempted to integrate what he saw as these limited and one-sided types of cognitive functioning into a more concretely conceived idea of communal cognitive life of reciprocally related finite but self-overcoming subjects—what he called the life of “spirit”. Indeed, we might see the door to this transformation as having been opened by Kant himself when, in his later treatment of aesthetic judgments, he came to treat non-cognitive judgments not merely negatively in the third Critique. 

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80 Hegel explicitly treats Leibniz’s non-Aristotelian “mathematical” approach to judgment and inference in the Science of Logic at the transition between the syllogisms of “existence” and “reflection” in Science of Logic, pp. 679–86 (6:371–380). Leibniz’s conceptual calculus was well known to Hegel via Gottfried Ploucquet, who had taught at the Tübingen Stift up until a few years before Hegel’s time there. Ploucquet, who Hegel discusses in this section together with Leibniz, had the Leibnizian calculus to its most consistent form. Hegel’s familiarity with the distinction between Aristotelian term logic and the very different propositional logic is also apparent from his treatment of the Stoics in Lectures on the History of Philosophy. See my discussion in “Hegel, Aristotle and the Conception of Free Agency”, forthcoming in Gunnar Hindrichs and Axel Honneth (eds), Freiheit: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 2011 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2012).


82 Ibid., p. 9.

In conclusion, we might say that McDowell is surely right that the best way to see Hegel as developing Kant’s philosophical insights is to see him challenging the rigid distinction between intuitions and concepts that is found in the “received reading” of Kant. Furthermore, Hegel could do this because Kant had already implicitly done so himself in those passages of the *Critique of Pure Reason’s* B Deduction to which McDowell refers. But Hegel’s development of Kant’s implicit challenge to the intuition–concept distinction left more of the distinction intact than what can be found in McDowell. Moreover, it has more in common with the more modest reinterpretation of Kant found in Sellars that McDowell, unwisely, rejects.