“What might it mean to have a systematic idealist, but anti-Platonist, practical
philosophy?” (contribution to Thom Brooks and Sebastian Stein (eds), Hegel’s
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Paul Redding

SYNOPSIS

It might be thought paradoxical that Richard Rorty, a philosopher with a deep
distrust of metaphysics, could have had such a positive regard for Hegel,
widely thought to be one of the most extravagant metaphysicians in the history
of philosophy. Rorty’s attitude to Hegel was based on the idea that he had
philosophized in a way that could achieve the benefit traditionally thought to
come from metaphysical knowledge—freedom—but without any need for the
truth of his philosophical claims. Linking the writing of Hegel to that of
Proust, Rorty had described Hegel’s practice as redescription—a practice in
the course of which the vocabulary in which we talk about the world is
changed. And as truth is always decided in terms of some particular
vocabulary accepted as normative, redemptive speech acts cannot thereby
themselves be considered true.

While in broad agreement with Rorty’s emphasis on the role of redescription
in Hegel’s method, and with his wish to free Hegel from the constraints of
traditional metaphysics, I argue against Rorty’s account of Hegel’s
redemptive methodology. His account is, I suggest, tied to a misleading
Sartrean interpretation of Hegel’s famous “master–slave” dialectic—an
interpretation that is in fact closer to a Fichte’s use of the notion of recognition
than Hegel’s own. When Hegel’s concept of recognition is understood in
relation to the logic of his concept of the will, a more nuanced account of
recognition is achieved. This is one that coheres with a “redescription” of the
task of metaphysics that portrays it as an inquiry into a modally conceived
actual world. Unlike Rorty’s redescription, this is one that preserves the
relevance of the value of truth and not merely that of freedom for metaphysics.

I. Richard Rorty: modern “ironist” Hegelian

In an essay, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids”, the controversial American neo-
pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty describes a phase of his intellectual life in
which he regarded as “the two greatest achievements of the species to which I
belonged”, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Proust’s *Remembrance of Things Past*. This can seem a strange endorsement on the part of someone who might otherwise be taken to represent a cluster of attitudes not unusual in a western liberal intellectual who had come to philosophical maturity in the aftermath of World War II.

In terms of his actual first-order, non-philosophical beliefs, Rorty probably had more in common with the majority of the analytic philosophers with whom he worked in the early parts of his career in the 1960s and 70s. He believed in science and rejected the claims of religion, seeking and finding in a God-free aesthetic experience the sorts of satisfaction that others sought in institutional religion. One of his early teachers had been the logical positivist Rudolf Carnap, and like such earlier positivists Rorty was critical of traditional metaphysical pursuits with their Platonic aspirations. Indeed, among the writings that brought him first to philosophical attention had been ones staking out a radical *eliminativist* form of naturalism in philosophy of mind.

Moreover, he was likewise wary of political ideologies that, he thought, dressed up a kind of moral–religious commitment in scientific garb and portrayed moral choices as somehow metaphysically necessitated.

Rorty was later to become known for his ruthless use of analytic philosophical tools to deflate the types of claims made by his fellow analysts. His motivations here might be seen as continuous with those directed against the claims of traditional metaphysics. Philosophy was clearly not an empirical science like the type of physics on the basis of which one could intervene into nature and bring it to bear on human needs and purposes. Nevertheless, in breaking with the religious culture with which it had been more intimately tied up in the 19th century, philosophy, especially in relation to the “analytic revolution”, had increasingly portrayed itself as an objective science—if not empirical, then “formal”.

That is, Rorty had come to think of much of what was emerging as the institution of analytic philosophy as both motivated by and as feeding a desire that was closer to a religious than a scientific one—a desire, as he describes it, to hold “reality and justice in a single vision”, the pursuit of which “had been precisely what led Plato astray”. Expressed in linguistic terms, this aspiration might be described in terms of the idea of speaking about the world in *God’s own* language or vocabulary, a view Rorty countered with his critique of the idea of language as *representing* an independent world.

This anti-Platonic insight he had found strongly conveyed in a variety of sources: early American pragmatists such as John Dewey, those within the analytic

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tradition such as Carnap, the later Wittgenstein and Wilfrid Sellars, and philosophers from the rival “continental” tradition, such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. From Rorty’s own point of view, I take it, what separated him from his typical analytic colleagues was that he was simply more consistent in his anti-Platonism, as analysts too often exempted their own commitment to analytic methods and doctrines from the sceptical scrutiny to which they subjected other claims. In particular, they too eagerly acquiesced in the aspiration that would traditionally been understood in terms of the goal of seeing from the God’s eye view, or representing the world in God’s language. Reference to “God” may have been dropped, but the idea of finding logico-linguistic forms that all thought to “limn” reality simply expressed this theological desire in a different way. But if this crude sketch of Rorty qua philosopher and general intellectual is at all along the right lines, then the puzzle becomes: why would such a person take a work of G. W. F. Hegel as one of “the two greatest achievements of the species to which I belonged”? Hegel is widely regarded as perhaps the nineteenth century’s most extravagant metaphysical-cum-religious thinker. Moreover, he is also considered to have contributed centrally to the infrastructure to Marx’s scientific socialism, Marx supposedly having “inverted” Hegel’s God-soaked idealism into a materialist vision of a world driven by the iron-clad laws of science towards an inevitable telos—a kind of heaven on earth in which the class divisions generated by a particular phase of economic history would be overcome. Perhaps, then, Hegel is capable of being read in other ways than those that fed the traditional picture?

What had attracted Rorty to Hegel was exactly what attracted him to Proust: both had created masterpieces of “redescription”—a use of language that was in the service of human freedom. But the project of redescription has surely been a part of modern analytic philosophy. As Michael Beaney has stressed, “analysis” had meant different things at different times in analytic philosophy, but a central dimension of the notion from the time of Russell had been that of translation into a different logical form, in other words, redescription. Early in his career Rorty had devoted himself to the idea of analytic philosophy as having a type of redescriptive methodology, editing a volume entitled The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method. But for the later Rorty, sceptical of any claims of philosophy to “getting things right”, that is, to

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5 Thus Russell famously redescribed intensionally understood categorical judgments as extensionally understood conditionals (“All Greeks are wise” becomes “If something is a Greek, then it’s wise”), and specific judgments about non-existing objects as general qualitative judgments about existence (thus, “The present King of France—is he bald?” becomes “Does existence contain anything both present-King-of-France-ish, and bald?”).

truth, the activity of redescription could only be understood as in the service of freedom rather than truth, for the latter brings with it connotations of an aspiration to speak in the resources of God’s own vocabulary and so represent the world as it “really is” in abstraction from the epistemic resources humans bring to it. In the case of Proust, Rorty makes this connection apparent. For Proust, freedom was conceived as freedom from the constraints that originate in descriptions of Proust himself that are given by others. As he puts it elsewhere, Proust had wanted:

to free himself from the descriptions of himself offered by the people he had met. He wanted not to be merely the person these other people thought they knew him to be, not to be frozen in the frame of a photograph shot from another person’s perspective. He dreaded being, in Sartre’s phrase, turned into a thing by the eye of the other … His method of freeing himself from those people – of becoming autonomous – was to redescribe the people who had described him. … Proust became autonomous by explaining to himself why the others were not authorities, but simply fellow contingencies. He redescribed them as being as much a product of others’ attitudes toward them as Proust himself was a product of their attitudes toward him.

Rorty could link Proust to Hegel in that the Phenomenology of Spirit could be read as a case of Hegel “out-redescribing” virtually all the major philosophers of the tradition. For Rorty, Hegel’s philosophical genius consisted in his capacity of taking philosophical positions found in the history of philosophy and transposing them into new categories—a new “vocabulary”—that suited his own philosophical purposes. Partly, the goal of this was, in becoming freed of the grip of the categories or vocabulary underlying the arguments of earlier philosophers—to see these building blocks of language and thought as products of their historical culture and so to see philosophy as “its time raised to thought”. And the way to do this was to describe them differently. Hegel’s exemplification of this activity of re-description was so compelling that it could, for Rorty, outweigh contrary tendencies, such as the fact that the Phenomenology, in ending in “Absolute Knowing” seemed not only to aspire to the God’s-eye view, but to the claim that it had already been achieved. Hegel thus becomes a powerful exemplification of how the activity of redescription undermines any quasi-theological initial desire motivating it.

Rorty’s strategy for recuperating Hegel thus aimed at allowing the modern disillusioned Hegelian to have the benefits of the practical goals aimed at by metaphysics, such as freedom or justice, without the burden of any metaphysical “Truth” over and above the lower-case “truths” of the empirical world—a

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8 Rorty, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids”, p. 11.
9 This was the approach of Nietzsche, another of Rorty’s philosophical heroes.
metaphysical Truth which could externally constrain our choice of vocabulary in which we express all our first-order theoretical and practical commitments. This, of course, had to be achieved at the expense (although Rorty seemingly didn’t see it as an expense) of a definite “ironism” with respect to the commitment to one’s own vocabulary—presumably that of Hegel’s “absolute knowing”. The redescriber needs to endorse some new vocabulary in order to dis-endorse the old, but also grasp that she is thereby opening up her own vocabulary to subsequent disendorsement by subsequent radical redescribers. In this sense, any individual’s endorsement of her own vocabulary must be freed from any sense of its necessity. Absolute knowing has to be expressed in a decidedly ironic tone.

Rorty has not been alone in his efforts to divest Hegel of “metaphysics” meant in any traditional, Platonic sense. Since the late nineteen eighties and nineties accounts of Hegel from the likes of Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard have attempted to give to Hegel’s philosophy a form that could be believed by those who might be said to broadly share Rorty’s secular, broadly liberal and generally “post-Kantian” anti-Platonic outlook. This essay is written from the perspective of a fellow-traveller of this broadly “post-Kantian” party. Its goal is to understand how one might maintain those aspects of the readings of Rorty and other post-Kantians that aim at construing Hegelianism as an anti-platonist philosophy, critical of the aspiration to speak in God’s vocabulary, while at the same time being wary of the abandonment of philosophical “truth” in the name of “freedom”, a separation that Hegel himself would clearly have never endorsed. Such a reading, I suggest, will need to incorporate some sense of the necessity of own vocabulary and, given Hegel’s undoubted association of truth with “the whole”, a commitment to some idea of philosophy as a systematic doctrine. Furthermore, I suggest this effort is properly linked to exactly that aspect of Hegel’s method that attracted Rorty as so important—the practice of “redescription” or conceptual “redetermination”. Our question thus becomes: How might one approach the centrality of redescription to Hegel’s philosophy without embracing the alternatives of conceptual triumphalism or conceptual “ironism”? To this end I’ll be suggesting a picture of Hegel as a modal actualist in contrast to Rorty’s ironic naturalist. The strategy will be to draw parallels between assumptions underlying Rorty’s thought and ones informing an approach to which Hegel stood as both

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12 In the context of recent modal metaphysics, Arthur Prior employed the term “actualism” to contrast the “possibilist” position espoused by David Lewis who, like Leibniz, considered the actual world as just one of an array of equally real different possible worlds.
follower and critic— that of Kant and Fichte. In short, Hegel’s critical appropriation of Kant and Fichte will, hopefully, point the way towards a critical appropriation of Rorty’s Hegel. Hegel, I will suggest following Rorty, employed redescrip tion not in the service of an attempt to speak of the world in the vocabulary of a being who was not of the world: the goal was not to speak God’s own language. And yet to abandon this goal should not be seen as abandoning the goal of philosophical truth. Redescription can still be employed for the purpose of finding an adequate language for a true account of the actual world for a speaker who essentially belongs to that world and whose knowledge is conditioned by it.13

II Kant, Fichte, Sartre, Rorty and the Struggle for Recognition

The reference to Sartre in Rorty’s account of what is going on in Proust’s redescriptive activity provides an explicit link to Hegel, and in particular, to the famous dialectic of “master and slave” in Chapter 4 of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Sartre had read Hegel in the light of Alexandre Kojève’s account of the “struggle for recognition”—a struggle motivated by a purported “desire for recognition” meant to be fundamental to the human species. In Rorty’s hands this struggle becomes a cultural one, a struggle between attempts to impose a vocabulary on others—to become the creator of the categorical framework within which claims to “getting it right” will be assessed. But if “getting it right” consists of adherence to the norms of a vocabulary, then the imposition of a new vocabulary cannot be seen as an act that can be assessed in terms of correctness—a lesson Rorty had learnt from his teacher Carnap. The transition to a new vocabulary can only be based on pragmatic considerations that have weight for particular agents. In the context of Hegel, this is the Proustian struggle of redescription that Rorty sees as carried out by philosophers with respect to their forebears. Philosophy as activity then needs to be detached from the goal of “getting it right”, the goal of truth, a goal that aims at speaking God’s language.

While widely influential throughout the second half of the twentieth century, this portrait of the “struggle for recognition” as described by Kojève and adapted by Sartre had not been free from criticism as an interpretation of Hegel’s actual views. Kojève had drawn on both Heidegger and Marx, and numerous Hegel interpreters have at various times complained that Kojève’s reading was at best a simplification and at worst a serious misrepresentation. A stronger criticism of the Kojève–Sartre–Rorty rendering of the “struggle for recognition”, however, would be that it reduces

13 Robert Stalnaker makes a similar point about the actualist position vis-à-vis language: “Since we are actualists, we have only the resources that the actual world provides for representing possibilities.” Robert Stalnaker, Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) p. 13.
Hegel’s account to a view that is not only not his own but is one of which he was explicitly critical, and critical for good reasons. Elsewhere, I have argued that Hegel’s account of the master-slave dialectic in *Phenomenology of Spirit* chapter 4 is in fact directed against Fichte’s treatment of recognition.\(^\text{14}\) In short: Fichte had introduced the conception of “recognition” [Anerkennen] in his 1796–1797 work *Foundations of Natural Right*, and while this was a notion that Hegel was going to incorporate into his own philosophy as the basic medium of spirit [Geist], doing this required a much broader treatment of recognition than the narrowly legalistic and abstract, rights-centred notion found in Fichte. For Hegel, one shortcoming of Fichte’s approach was its link to an account of self-consciousness that, consonant with Kojève’s focus on the “desire for recognition”, had its basis in desire.

Seemingly anticipating a certain pragmatist turn within later philosophy,\(^\text{15}\) Fichte had conceived the basic orientation of the mind to the world as a type of striving or endeavouring, although this could not be reduced to any naturalistic conception of striving for satisfaction of desire as in, say, Hobbes or Hume. Following Kant, Fichte had conceived of the finite but rational ego as striving against anything beyond itself that limited or determined it. The model here was Kant’s idea of moral action stemming from the rational agent’s capacity to both will and to hold itself to the moral law, which had its basis in that agent’s own rational capacities. From this perspective, an agent’s own natural inclinations and appetites would come to be counted among the “external” sources of determination against which it strived, and so here we might think of “morality” as conceived by Kant as the “new vocabulary” within which the contents of desire could be redescribed in the service of freedom. Thus the contents of one’s arbitrary desire-based willing, one’s Willkür, must now answer to the moral law as expressed in the Categorical Imperative understood as the expression of a rationally self-legislating will – der Wille. Hegel had characterized Fichte’s conception of this commanding will as desire or appetite generalized [Begierde überhaupt], seemingly intending to portray the practical stance of morality as in fact analogous to the type of natural inclinations against which it was directed. That is, this new moral desire was formally like the one being replaced. It aimed to negate its object as a desire in a way analogous to that that desire aimed at negating the object to which it was directed. This precluded the rational will from having any particular content (characteristic of Kant’s moral philosophy), and had


\(^{15}\) C.f., Fichte’s comments in J. G. Fichte, *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge in the Science of Knowledge*, trans. and ed. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), that “all reflection is based on the striving and in the absence of striving there can be no reflection” (p. 258) and “it is not in fact the theoretical faculty which makes possible the practical, but on the contrary the practical which makes possible the theoretical” (p. 123).
opened up the gates to the return of arbitrary, non-rational content in the context of morality (a characteristic of Fichte’s development of Kant).

Fichte’s idea of the rational will as a negating “Begierde überhaupt”, I suggest, might be understood as anticipating current ways of thinking about the will employing Frankfurt’s well-known distinction between first and second-order desires. Take the example of having a first-order desire to, say, smoke a cigarette, and the second-order desire to be a person without that desire. From the perspective of the agent in the grip of such first-order desires, the practical intention to embrace the second-order desire looks like a withdrawal from something determinate and existent—the brute fact of one’s desire. Fichte had taken over Kant’s distinction between der Wille and die Willkür, with der Wille conceived as a type of legislative function of pure practical reason commanding the lower faculty of desire-driven choice [Willkür] by addressing it in the form of an imperative. From the point of view of me as a rational will, my attempt to disinvest myself from some particular first-order desire just is the attempt to show it as unnecessary, un-lawlike and arbitrary—willkürlich—and this lower desire will be perceived as willkürlich precisely to the extent that it is not supported by reasons—the sorts of reasons that are ultimately articulated by der Wille, the rational law-giving authority on all that is good and thereby rationally desirable. In the capacity for moral judgment so conceived we might therefore see something of the precursor of the Rorty–Hegel’s capacity for “redescription”. Prior to reflection and generalization, desire, qua the voice of inclination, seems to address its bearer as a necessary demand; post-reflection, this necessity has been transformed, what inclination had demanded of me is now grasped as contingent and negatable. Why should I listen to the commands of my own desires? When I grasp them from the point of view of a rationality that commands, I come to see their inessential nature. My liberation from them has come from adopting a God’s-eye point of view on them.

Hegel’s method of “redescription” should, I suggest, be seen as a critical appropriation of the Kant-Fichte position, with Hegel being nevertheless critical of the way in which Kant and Fichte had conceived of this re-determining power of der Wille, and its relation to Willkür. These issues can be seen as addressed in Hegel’s sketch of the logic of der Wille in a few short paragraphs from the “Introduction” to his Elements of the Philosophy of Right.

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In a series of sections in the “Introduction” to his Philosophy of Right, Hegel expands on the claim made in §4 that the spiritual, “das Geistige”, is “the ground (Boden) of “right”, and that the point of origin of right is “the will”, der Wille. Principle α, stated in §5, tells us that will contains “the element of pure indeterminacy, or of the ’I’s pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature, through needs, desires and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved (aufgelöst)”. This is, he goes on, “the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of oneself”.18 This clearly is the dimension of the will that can be thought of along the lines of Frankfurt’s higher-order desire/object desire distinction and Fichte’s related conception of the will as “Begierde überhaupt”. Considered in isolation it appears to instantiate the God’s-eye view. But Hegel was concerned with this exclusively negative characterization being carried over into the higher-order desire itself. For Hegel, as for Schiller before him and Nietzsche after him, this had produced a defective moral psychology. One needs to somehow maintain a positive determination of an affirmed particular content of the will in addition to this negative “dissolving” moment, and the failure of the Kant-Fichte conception here is its failure to provide for some affirmed particular content. In order to live good lives, communities and individuals need to be able to represent the types of lives worthy of being led. As Nietzsche was later to elaborate, Kant’s categorical imperative looks to have the “thou shalt not” character of the Ten Commandments, portraying moral life in terms of a set of prohibitions against a determinate set of evils, with no associated picture of any type of good life, as found in ancient ethics, for example.19

The need to embrace a positive conception of some particular willed content is stated by Hegel as principle β in §6. It asserts that the ‘I’ must also involve the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy and immediate self-identity to “differentiation, determination and positing of a determinacy as a content and object”, and that this content “may further be given by nature, or generated by the concept of the spirit”.20 For Hegel the task will be to show how these apparently antithetical principles, α and β, are to be resolved—to show how der Wille can actually be “the

unity of both these moments – particularity reflected into itself and thereby restored to universality”. While a similar structure can be observed in Fichte, the difference of Hegel’s approach in conceiving the logic of these relations will be one of the defining marks of his practical philosophy. There must be another way of conceiving of the situation, and the relation of Wille to Willkür.

Fichte had conceived of the higher-order Wille as an essentially negating desire; following Frankfurt, we might think of the will as issuing a command not to act on the lower-order desire—a command, for example, to refrain from smoking. But might this higher-order desire not be reconceived as involving a desire with a positive content—for example, a desire to be a non-smoker, conceived in way such that this is a contentful desire? After all, to picture oneself as a non-smoker might be to picture oneself as having capacities for which not smoking is necessary—say, as living a life in capable of a greater range of activities, let’s say becoming a competitive cyclist. Non-smoking ceases to be a matter of refraining from acting in a certain way and becomes an objective condition of acting in other certain ways. This involves just that feature of Hegel’s approach that Rorty points to: his use of “redescription”. The life of the non-smoker is no longer to be described in privative terms from the perspective of the smoker, but from the new perspective of an agent who conceives of his or her non-smoking self differently—that of being a serious cyclist. But this new perspective is just as “worldly” as the old: it only makes sense for an agent engaged in activities in the actual world. Living as a competitive cyclist must actually exclude the possibility of living as a smoker. From the perspective of one’s new identity one doesn’t purport to issue commands to oneself from some position outside it. Rorty’s exemption of any comparison here from all considerations of truth, seems to lean on Hume’s point that competing desires can never per se be subject to evaluation on the basis of truth, but this assumption will not find a place in Hegel’s alternative logic framework. We can see more details of this from his account of judgment given in Book III of the Science of Logic.

Fichte’s third principle is needed to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the first two, a principle which has the I positing both itself and the not-I as somehow opposed. The second and third parts of this version of the Wissenschaftslehre are now devoted to developing the third principle into a system with parts covering both theoretical and practical knowledge that allows us to understand how the first two principles can co-exist.

In Fichte’s first principle, the “I” is portrayed as immediately self-positing and self-determining—a self-identical “I=I” resistant to any determination from any source other than itself. However, if we conceive of I as a consciousness, then we must also conceive of it as confronted by an object other than itself, of which it is conscious—a condition expressed in Fichte’s second principle, “the principle of opposition”. As for Hegel, the task for Fichte will be to show how these apparently antithetical principles are to be resolved, but for Hegel this resolution could simply not be achieved within the Kant-Fichte framework, restricted as it was to the “the understanding”.

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IV. The typology of judgment forms in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*

In the *Science of Logic* Hegel treats judging as an act in which the “concept”—which we are to think of as the concept qua judging subject, the “I”, and not simply some general representation said of an object—is “realized” by “stepping into existence as determinate being [das Treten ins Dasein als bestimmtes Sein]”23—a form of words close to what Hegel uses in principle β in §6 of *Philosophy of Right*, where it is said that the I “steps into existence” through positing itself as determined [Durch dies Setzen seiner selbst als eines bestimmten tritt Ich in das Dasein überhaupt]. Here we might, following Robert Brandom, think of such theoretical and practical judgments as acts in which the I “steps into determinate existence” in the sense of taking on particular theoretical and practical, publically assessable commitments—that is, those commitments concerning ways the world is or should be that essentially make up the agent’s concrete identity as an intentional being.24 Brandom captures the rationality implicit in such acts as residing in the pragmatic norm that any agent’s entitlement to such commitments are always questionable by others, and asked for justification. In turn, he treats the inferential linkages between the judgments involved as determining the very content of the commitments themselves. This capacity for any judgment to be brought into question and potentially given up, we might think, recapitulates Hegel’s principle α, but we might have suspicions as to whether Brandom’s approach can do justice to Hegel’s principle β?25 In this section, I will use Hegel’s treatment of judgment forms in the *Science of Logic* to confirm what we can see in relation to Hegel’s principle β concerning willing: we must understand de re attitudes as irreducible to de dicto ones, such that they are both “aufgehoben” in a content that can offer a redescription that is responsive to considerations of both freedom and truth.

In Book 3 of the *Science of Logic* Hegel explores a variety of conceptual forms that the content of a judgment may take,26 putting them in a series that leads to

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25 Elsewhere I have questioned the purported “Hegelian” nature of Brandom’s assumption that the judgment’s inferential relations are not only necessary but also sufficient for the determination of the judgment’s meaning. See my “An Hegelian Solution to a Tangle of Problems Facing Brandom’s Analytic Pragmatism” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, vol. 23, no. 4 (2015), pp. 657–80.
26 Hegel describes the determinations into which a concept may divide as singularity, particularity and universality, and any judgment will typically divide into two of these determinations, resulting in a taxonomy of various particular judgment
a judgment form—the “judgment of the concept”—that can equally be treated as a complex judgment or as an inferential relation between two judgments, and showing the syllogism to be “the truth” of the judgment. Here, however, I want to focus on an earlier distinction between two judgment forms differentiated by the different conceptions of predication involved. Drawing on a distinction from Aristotle, Hegel distinguishes a predicate understood as inhering in a subject, as typically found in “judgments of determinate existence [Dasein]”, and a predicate that subsumes its subject, as found in “judgments of reflection”. I will treat these as judgments that express de re and de dicto attitudes respectively, and the difference between these two ways of conceiving of predication, I’ll suggest, corresponds to the difference between the “moments” of the will from §§ 6 and 5 from the Philosophy of Right. In short, we should think of the logical form in which a particular willed content becomes determinate for an agent as being analogous to the subject of a judgment of existence, and that in which a willed content becomes available for evaluation and possible negation by its being put in inferential relations to other contents, as analogous to the subject of a judgment of reflection.

With the idea of judgments of existence Hegel has in mind the type of judgments in which certain particular perceivable objects are singled out with the use of definite description such as “the rose”—that is, judgments that express intentional attitudes directed to specific perceivable things or “re”s in the judge’s immediate environment—particular objects a judge can be said to “have in mind” and that might be identified, handled, picked out with demonstratives, and so on. Moreover, what is said about such an object via the predicate of these judgments is conversely thought of as the property found instantiated, in the particular way that it is, in that particular object as perceptually available to that agent. Thus, when saying “the rose is fragrant”, for example, the predicate term “fragrant”, Hegel tells us, is meant to refer to the particular fragrance belonging to that particular rose—that is, the quality that Kant would presumably have thought of as the content of a “singular” [Einzeln]

forms depending on which of the three determinations occupy grammatical positions of subject and predicate in their expressions.

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27 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 593.
28 Ibid., pp. 557–68.
29 Ibid., pp. 568–75.
30 This also corresponds to the conceptions of objecthood (as that to which predications can be applied) represented in the “Perception” and “Understanding” chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit. I have developed this approach in “Hegel’s Anticipation of the Early History of Analytic Philosophy”, The Owl of Minerva: Journal of the Hegel Society of North America, vol. 42:1–2 (2010–11), pp. 18–40.
intuition. Phenomenal properties commonly have strongly motivational dimensions: in Bernard Williams’s terms, they are commonly “action-guiding”, experienced as attracting or repelling. We are typically attracted by fragrant things, repulsed by sour, mal-odorous ones. But as Diotima had pointed out in Plato’s Symposium, the generalization associated with conceptual thought can loosen the compelling quality of such specific instances: when reflected upon and generalized, earlier intense desires can seem but “small” things to be despised. Such “reflection”, I suggest, might reflect other contexts in which terms such as “rose” and “fragrant” function differently and are taken to express de dicto intentional attitudes with a different logical form in which the predicate is understood as subsuming the subject along with many other actual or possible items.

Hegel analyses the subsumptive judgments of reflection in ways that are closer to the analyses of analytic philosophy. These judgments explicitly take quantifiers, for example, and it is clear that in using a universally quantified judgment such as “all roses are fragrant” I need have no particular instance of a rose or particular fragrance in mind. Indeed, in the use of “all roses” I could be referring to roses that I’m not and never will be familiar with—possible roses that do not as yet exist, or perhaps ones that will never exist, and clearly, I cannot have their particular fragrances in mind. I am “reflected” out of any particular relation to any particular rose—seemingly suspended in some conceptual space leaving me equi-distant to all the roses that fall under the scope of my general description. Not surprisingly, the negation of the reflective judgment “it is not the case that all roses are fragrant” does not explicitly posit the existence of mal-odorous ones. The roses referred to may simply be without odour. The mutually excluding features of properties required for the pair being a smoker and being a competitive cyclist here go missing.

In short, what is important in the case of reflective judgments is that the content expressed has a determinate “truth value” conventionally understood—its being either true or false timelessly. That is, what is essential to the “dictum” negated in the negated de dicto reflective judgment is a property conceived in such a way that allows a judgment to stand in inferential relations. In contrast, in the case of a de re judgment like “this rose is fragrant” or a contrary such as “this rose smells sour”, it is explicit that questions of truth or falsity are context specific. Tomorrow this rose might have changed, its initial fresh fragrance having been replaced by a different,

32 “The predicate is determined in the subject, for it is not a determination in general but the determination rather of the subject. ‘The rose is fragrant.’ This fragrance is not some indeterminate fragrance or other, but the fragrance of the rose. The predicate is therefore a singular.” Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 560.
33 See, for example, Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: William Collins, 1985), ch. 6.
sickly one.\textsuperscript{35} In contemporary ways of putting it, \textit{de re} beliefs do not have fully propositional contents—to understand \textit{what} proposition is expressed in an utterance of the sentence “the rose is fragrant” requires background information—for example, information as to the time and place of the utterance, so as to determine \textit{what} rose is being referred to, and so to understand \textit{what} propositional content is being expressed. To understand \textit{what} was said one \textit{had to be there}! But while such judgments may be incomplete from the point of view of a disembodied God, why should we think this to be necessarily the case for subjects in the actual world. After all, \textit{everyone has to be somewhere}.

This distinction, while typically applied to “theoretical” attitudes, can be applied to practical attitudes as well. We commonly think of agency as the capacity to \textit{change} the states of some object. My phone rings and I lift the receiver, making a judgment that was formerly true—that the receiver is sitting in its cradle—now false. This coheres with the “\textit{de re}” nature of my practical intention to answer the phone—that is, \textit{that particular phone} that is in my immediate environment, the one with which I \textit{can} interact. Just as the \textit{physical} properties of such objects can be in causally relevant relations to our perceptual states, we can similarly bear such relations to the \textit{properties} of those objects.\textsuperscript{36} From a practical point of view, the fact of a phone’s ringing is perceived as action-guiding. It “says”, as it were, “answer me!”, just as for the smoker, the alluring cigarette can say “smoke me!”. Reflection can, in some sense, counter this. When construed as a mere \textit{instance} of a class, ringing phones, I can question the norm involved: should ringing phones necessarily be answered? Similarly when I reflect on \textit{this} alluring cigarette, I can raise the question: Should cigarettes be smoked? Should immediate desires be acted upon? Kant was well aware of how thinking of the consequences of acting in a certain manner could impact on the original desire that motivated that particular action. This is a type of re-description, but it is \textit{not} one that produces a desire that motivates a contrary action. Hegel was attuned to the need to take re-description to this further level—to replace one action-guiding description by another, but one that reflecting reason has had \textit{some} hand in


\textsuperscript{36} I address this issue in relation to the structure of the practical intentional attitude of the slave in Hegel’s “master–slave dialectic” in the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} in “The Role of Work within the Processes of Recognition in Hegel’s Idealism”, in Nicholas H. Smith and Jean-Philippe Deranty (eds) \textit{New Philosophies of Labour: Work and the Social Bond} (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), pp. 41–62.
choosing such that it better fits into a realistic conception of what it is to live a reasonably coherent life and be actualize a reasonably coherent self.

V. The dynamics of *de re* and *de dicto* judgments

In Hegel’s presentation of *de re* judgments of existence and *de dicto* judgments of reflection in the *Science of Logic*, with their conceptions of predication as “inherence” and “subsumption” respectively, both are “aufgehoben” within further, more complex, explicitly modal judgment forms, and, further on, more encompassing syllogistic forms. I interpret this as reflecting on a series of further conditions required for any subject to possess and exercise the capacity to reason with such judgment forms, such as belonging to a community of agents in which each can mediate their located experience with that of differently located others. But at this point I am interested simply in the relation between these two initial capacities, and whether we talk of this in terms of the notion of “Aufheben” or, as in §7 in the *Philosophy of Right*, in terms of the “unity” of both these moments, it is clear that Hegel thinks that these two capacities, with their distinct content-acquiring and form-conferring dimensions, must be both somehow integrated to the succeeding capacity for the self to rationally determine itself. The failure to do justice to the particular *de re* contents of principle β is precisely the problem of the Kant-Fichte approach. It cannot be that *de dicto* forms simply unilaterally supersede *de re* ones without loss, as this is just the assumption found in Kant’s conception of the unilateral *subsumption* of the objects of *die Willkür* under principles of *der Wille*.

To bring this issue of the relation of *de re* and *de dicto* forms more clearly into focus we may look to a difference within contemporary approaches to the relations between these forms. Typically within analytic philosophy, following the approach of Quine, the *de dicto* form of intentionality is treated as primitive, and *de re* forms are treated as derivative from *de dicto* ones. In contrast, Tyler Burge has argued against Quine that while such analyses may hold for the ascription or attribution of intentional states to others, they do not go to the nature of the actual psychological states themselves that such ascriptions are meant to capture. When one considers the states themselves, he argues, and in particular, think here of perceptual states as the paradigms of *de re* attitudes, the natural tendency will be to treat *de re* states as primitive rather than derivable from *de dicto* ones. *De re* contents should be thought of as typically involving a demonstrative element that ties the agent to some particular worldly context. *De re* contents are thus not fully conceptual in the conventional

38 Burge, “Belief *De Re*”. 
sense, not elements of standard “propositions” thought of as having an eternal truth value. Moreover, he goes on to argue for the stronger thesis that the capacity to have and exercise de dicto intentional states, in fact any intentional states at all, presupposes the capacity to have these not-fully-conceptualized de re ones.

To refuse the reducibility of located de re attitudes to abstracted de dicto ones in this way need not, of course, commit one to the opposing thesis that reduces de dicto attitudes to de re ones. Rather, the non-reducibility of de re attitudes is compatible with the idea that each is necessary, but not sufficient, for rational intentionality, and that they must somehow work together. In the Science of Logic, the non-reducibility of the de re dimension of judgment is apparent when we follow the passage from the judgment of reflection to the superseding “judgment of necessity”, as the de re features of the surpassed judgment of existence now reappear in that the subject term comes to designate some particular genus. While the earlier subsumptive judgment of reflection had expressed nomological regularity in the form of universally quantified judgments about “all plants” or “all men”, for example, the judgment of necessity expresses judgments about “the plant as such” or “man as such”—that is, it grasps the particular genus in terms of its essential properties. In the following judgment of the concept, the role of the genus characterising the particular is preserved, but now in a different way that appears to explicitly hold on to the dimension of singularity of the experienced object that exemplifies the genus.

This circular pattern manifested by the transitions in Hegel’s Science of Logic stands in obvious contrast to the type of Platonic “ascent” characteristic of Plato’s Symposium, or, closer to Hegel’s time, of Leibniz’s idea of a step-wise progression from clear and confused ideas to ones that are increasingly “clear and distinct”, a progression that is set on a path towards God’s knowledge which is pictured as entirely clear and distinct. But even from a theological point of view Hegel thought this to be a misleading Vorstellung. The modern (protestant) Christian God, for Hegel, had to become part of the actual world to live up to its own concept as God. Even God did not have the unmediated “God’s-eye” point of view, or speak the type of language that Leibniz pictured as that befitting a being liberated from all particular corporeal and located existence. The circular pattern of conceptual redetermination for Hegel is meant to more adequately bring out the structure of the actual world for a subject who belongs to that world. Divine representation is not abandoned in the name of a freedom that is disengaged from truth.

In the first sub-type of the judgment of the concept that succeeds the judgment of necessity—the assertoric judgment—one once again finds an immediate perceivable object analogous to the judgment of existence. But in contrast to that earlier simple qualitative judgment, the predicate of the new judgment form is an evaluative rather than a descriptive one—“an ought [ein Sollen] to which reality may or may not conform.” Thus in judgments such as “this house is bad, this action is good”, the subject is posited as “a concrete singular, [ein konkretes Einzelnes]”, and it is this determination of singularity which distinguishes this judgment form from the preceding judgment of necessity. There, the universal had “obtained completion itself in its particularization [Besonderung]”, but had failed to achieve the determination of “singularity, [Einzelheit]” that is present in the more developed assertoric judgment. In short, the judgment of necessity was a general de dicto judgment of which the subject was any mere instance of a house as such. What distinguishes the judgment of the concept is that it has returned to de re form, the subject of which is a specific thing—this house, not simply any house.

Qua singular, the thing is thus not conceived simply as a “particular” exemplification of a kind: when one makes an evaluative judgment about a house, say, one cannot simply subsume that house under some determinate concept that can be understood in abstraction from the particular objects experienced. As in Kant’s aesthetic judgments, it is the particular way in which the more general determinants of “goodness” are exemplified in this house that is crucial, and like Kant, Hegel portrays the initial manifestations of these evaluative judgments as subjective and without truth. They are problematic because based on some bare subjective assurance [Versicherung], which is able to be “confronted by an opposing one [entgegengesetzte].” But this confrontation leads the judges to attempts to justify their judgments, and say why the particular house is good or bad. We see this in the transition from the second sub-type of the judgment of the concept (the problematic judgment) to the final sub-type (the apodictic judgment), for which Hegel gives the example, “the house, as so and so constituted, is good”, or, as he labels the structure in the Encyclopaedia Logic, “this—the immediate singularity (Einzelheit)—house—the genus—being constituted thus and so—particularity—is good or bad.” Such a judgment whose mediating term gives its justifying grounds, making explicit why the house is good, appeals to some rule or principle (the thing’s normative essence) and could thus be set out as a syllogism:

41 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 582.
42 Ibid., p. 583.
43 Ibid. That is, this is Hegel’s equivalent to the type of judgment that Frege considers the fundamental atomic judgment in which the concept applies to an individual object.
44 Ibid., p. 582.
46 Ibid., p. 585
47 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 179.
Rule: Houses are essentially constituted thus and so.
Case: This house is (is not) constituted thus and so.
Result: This house is good (or bad).

While the appearance of conceptual structures such as these is sometimes
taken to signal Hegel’s espousal of a type of Aristotelian essentialist realism about
kinds, such a metaphysical reading is, I suggest, mistaken. As the example of the
judgment of the house brings out, the judge must be a worldly one, in proximity to a
particular house, by which it can be affected. The Aristotelian realist position on
essences conceives of the essential form of the “house as such” as shining through
any exemplar. But for Hegel it requires a specific house that can serve as a normative
model for the good house—a specific house by which one can be affected. I take this
as all evidence for a reading of Hegel as a “modal actualist” for whom the scope of
metaphysical knowledge is the actual world to which the subject him or herself
belongs.48 Of course the actual, to be understood as actual, must be able to be
contrasted to the possible, but for the actualist, the possible cannot exist “outside” the
actual for the actual is all there is. The possible must be, therefore, as Hegel says in
the Encyclopaedia Logic, the “reflection-into-itself” of the actual, giving the actual a
“concrete unity” that contrasts with the abstract and unessential essentiality” of the
possible.49 Actuality must be understood as “the more comprehensive, because it is
the concrete thought which includes possibility as an abstract element”.50

Such a conception of the actual as the object of philosophical knowledge must,
I suggest, be understood as contrasting with the traditional Aristotelian goal of
metaphysics as knowledge of the necessary or essential that, as Hegel pictures it, is
understood as “shining through” the merely contingent, non-essential appearance.
Philosophical knowledge is knowledge of the actual world as actual, and as such has
to be understood as always had from a reflectively mediated perspective within it. In
this sense it is committed to truth about the actual, in contrast with the mere
“correctness” of claims that coincide with isolated facts within the actual.51 Rorty, in
his reading of Hegel shows himself to be committed ultimately to a form of amodal
naturalism, but the Hegelian actualist is not restricted to the natural in this way. The

48 For a recent account of Hegel’s logic that takes it in the direction of an
actualist metaphysics, see Rocío Zambrana, Hegel’s Theory of Intelligibility
(University of Chicago Press, 2015). I expand on this theme in my review, “Rocio
Zambrana, Hegel’s Theory of Intelligibility” in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,
49 Ibid., § 143. So, possibilities belong essentially to the actual world, but, of
course, each particular possibility is not itself essential, only possible.
50 Ibid., § 143 addition. For a good account of Hegel’s treatment of the category
actuality see Karen Ng, “Hegel’s Logic of Actuality”, Review of Metaphysics, 63
actualist is free to conceive of the non-reducible existence of actual minds without any commitment to their being necessary components of reality in the traditional sense. Hegel’s \textit{recognitive account} of mindedness, the account that Rorty attempts to reduce to a quasi-natural “struggle for recognition”, I take to be central to his actualism.\footnote{Hegel’s actualist metaphysics is still a type of \textit{idealism} in the sense that the existence of \textit{abstracta}, such as possibilities, requires the existence of actual minds, conceived as having the capacity of conceiving and acting on such \textit{abstracta}. Similarly, such minds are themselves only conceivable in relation to \textit{abstracta}, as it is those capacities that define them as minds.}

VI. Recognition underlying any “\textit{struggle for recognition}”.  

In Chapter 4 of the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} Hegel’s argument had unfolded against a conception of self-consciousness on the model of how one immediately finds oneself in the phenomenal states thought of as appetitive ones and that one takes as defining one’s identity—a stance he calls “self-certainty”, and that parallels the “sense-certainty” of theoretical intentionality explored in Chapter 1. There is a compelling sense in which one is aware of oneself in one’s appetitive states, but there is a definite “content externalism” implicit in Hegel’s approach that brings different desirers into conflict over common objects. Thus we are given a glimpse of the type of Hobbesian life and death struggle found in the realm of nature understood as a struggle for survival. Against this picture, however, we are shown a possibility for a resolution of such struggles seemingly unlike any found in nature—in this case the establishment of an institutionalized social relation of a master to a slave who has capitulated in the struggle, trading particular objects of desire for life itself. So it is not any desired object (marked, as it is, by a type of essentially negative existence) that conveys back to the original desirer a conception of itself—it is the other agent: the master understands himself as master of this slave, the slave as slave of this master. As such, this relation can no longer be thought of as a natural one but as a crude and primitive version of a \textit{spiritual (geistig)} one in which agents hold themselves to rules mediated by the role of the other. Moreover, measured against the reciprocity that is part of the essence of the recognitive relation, the master-slave relation will be grasped as self-contradicting and thereby self-undermining. The resolution of this contradiction will be a transformation of this crude social form into some other “higher” form, which can somehow mediate the contradiction unleashed in the former, but it in turn will be beset by similar contradictions and will be subject to the same dynamic.

That is, the sequence of scenarios of recognition that we now trace through the forms of life in Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology} provide contexts in which an I struggles to
achieve unity with itself—to be “bei sich”—in an other. Thus the proper relata of a rational will that allows this must be another will, and it is in this sense that it is “das Geistige”—the realm of human recognitive interactions that is “the spiritual”—that is the “ground” of normative human relations, the ground of “right”. Such a conception of recognition at the heart of “das Geistige” can therefore no longer be reduced to Rorty’s Kojèvean struggle for recognition in which agent attempt to achieve freedom by imposing their normative criteria on each other. Moreover, such a Rortarian struggle must itself be recognized as an inadequate and limited instance of the recognitive interaction that for Hegel is the ground of the normative. Hegel expresses this in terms of the self-contradictory nature of the struggle between master and slave, a contradiction between a concrete instance of a recognitive relation and the “universal” it expresses. But I suggest that we now have a way of understanding the framework alluded to here in a way that could be free from the worry of Platonic metaphysics.

Hegel appeals to what he sees as the inherent logic of our actual rational practices, a logic in which the pragmatic functions served are reflected in the categories of the language employed. It is a logic that cannot be independently cognized in the manner of Kant’s “transcendental logic”; it must be discoverable in our practices and their history. So rather than assume that Hegel’s path is that of a retreat from Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysics to such metaphysics itself, we might see him as developing Kant’s implicit account of the power of “redescription” in the effort to free it from the problems that impede it. Hegel may be a master of redescription, but in relation to Kant’s his redescription is meant to capture what is valuable in Kant’s and so taken as the essential core of Kant’s Copernican revolution, freeing it from the residual pre-revolutionary metaphysical assumptions that accompany it. This is not simply to impose a “new vocabulary” that disendorses the old; rather it endorses the essential function of the older thought by attempting to capture it in a vocabulary that better captures this function. In this it aims at truth.

Hegel is of course critical of the emptiness of Kant’s formal practical solution to an unrealizable metaphysics, and of his account of a theoretical knowledge of the world’s systematic appearances, and Rorty is right in thinking this does not lead back to the traditional metaphysical aspiration of “absolute knowing” qua seeing from the “God’s-eye view” or speaking in God’s vocabulary. The alternative Rorty misses, however, is a systematic view of the actual world in which the subject, while finding itself subject to the conditions of its worldly location, is capable of local, but not global, “transcendence” of those conditions. This can be thought of as an appropriation of Kant’s critique of metaphysics, but now translated from Kant’s epistemological register to what we might think of as a modal one. In adopting a skeptical attitude to metaphysical knowledge Kant had remained in the thrill of a traditional conception of what metaphysical knowledge as knowledge of the necessary, but Hegel, the master redescriber, has recast metaphysics as a knowledge
not of the necessary as opposed to the contingent, but of an actual that necessarily contains possibility with it. Freedom is to be gained not by the mere victory of a vocabulary that disarms the objectifying vocabulary of some other, in the manner of Proust, the victory of a vocabulary that the victor must regard in an ironic, naturalistic mode. Freedom is rather to be gained by grasping real possibilities that exist within the actual, possibilities that can thereby be realized to create a new actuality, via participation in a socialized cognition in which others are, in the style of Kant, recognized as free minds and not as objects of nature. In short, on a properly Hegelian reading of the inadequacies of Kant, we might see Rorty’s own critique of Kantian formalism as relying on the same general formal assumptions that underlie the Kant-Fichte approach to the will.

I have argued that tracing the general outlines of Hegel’s alternative to Kant allows us to understand how the more substantive claims about the structures underlying and enabling freedom can be understood without the sort of traditional metaphysical commitment that Rorty fears. Read as a “modal actualist” in the way I have suggested, Hegel presents us with a mode of philosophizing that is not out of step with the general attitudes that Rorty had brought to his reading of Hegel, nor, I take it, out of step with the basic outlook, with its suspicion of the tradition of “metaphysics”, that has been characteristic of much of the history of analytic philosophy over the last century. While Hegel’s can be thought of as the re-establishment of a type of metaphysics that replaces Kant’s metaphysical skepticism, it is a metaphysics of the actual, and not an instance of the type of metaphysics of which Kant had been critical.