The Analytic Neo-Hegelianism of John McDowell and Robert Brandom

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The historical origins of the analytic style that was to become dominant within academic philosophy in the English-speaking world are often traced to the work of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore at the turn of the twentieth century and portrayed as involving a radical break with the idealist philosophy that had bloomed in Britain at the end of the nineteenth. Congruent with this view, Hegel is typically taken as representing a type of philosophy that analytic philosophy assiduously avoids. His writings are regarded as indirect, metaphorical, and “darkly Teutonic.” whereas analytic philosophers usually think of themselves as prizing the clarity of plain speech except when making use of the precision of scientific logical notation. This analytic directness, furthermore, is usually seen as consonant with the increasingly “naturalistic” outlook of analytic philosophy, especially as practiced in the United States. In contrast, Hegel is seen as regarding philosophical thought as mysteriously engaging with a content that is somehow generated out of the mind’s (or “spirit’s”) own activities, linking philosophy more to art and religion than natural science. Moreover, even if the details of his criticisms have been largely forgotten, it is usually accepted that Russell showed Hegel’s bizarre metaphysical doctrines to be based on some fundamental logical mistakes.¹

Analytic philosophers might then find it odd when members of its clan refer to Hegel in positive terms and indeed try to relate contemporary developments within analytic philosophy to Hegelian precedents. Nevertheless, in the last decade of the twentieth century this happened in the case of two important analytic philosophers, John McDowell and Robert Brandom. If nothing else, the claims of McDowell and Brandom suggest something of the complexity of the relation that analytic philosophy actually bears to its philosophical past and in particular to the idealist tradition of the nineteenth century. We are reminded that analytic philosophy was fed not only by earlier forms of empiricism and common sense realism but also by the rationalist and arguably Kantian orientation of the founder of the logic on which it has always drawn, Gottlob Frege.² Indeed, Frege and Wittgenstein are now sometimes spoken of in
relation to those distinctly “continental” roots of analytic philosophy that coexisted with those established in the soil at Cambridge by Russell and Moore.  

McDowell and Brandom both appeal to the Kantian heritage of analytic philosophy, but in extending this heritage to Hegel they go far beyond other more modest attempts to reconcile analytic philosophy with Kantian idealism. Kant has always maintained a certain authority within the analytic world – within moral philosophy, especially – but Hegel? In what follows I will sketch something of the respective paths that have taken McDowell and Brandom from issues at the center of analytic debates to the devil’s lair and after that will offer some thoughts about the possibility of further reconciliation of these seemingly antithetical approaches to philosophy.

John McDowell: From the Problems of Empiricism to Hegel’s Absolute Idealism

McDowell commences his major work of 1994, *Mind and World*, by alluding to a dilemma that has been at the center of many analytic philosophical disputes throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Analytic philosophy has been afflicted by an “interminable oscillation” between two opposed and equally untenable positions. One attempts to secure thought about the world in some passively received “givens” of perceptual experience; the other, rejecting the idea of “the given,” leaves the application of concepts in judgment seemingly unconstrained.

In 1956, the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars had provided what many consider to be the definitive critique of the first position. Empiricists had traditionally tried to justify perceptual judgments by grounding them in the mind’s capacity to passively record the bare givens of experience – an idea found in both Russell and Moore with the notion of “sense data.” But Sellars argued that it was useless to try to base the justification of judgments on something that was nonconceptual: a judgment, having propositional content, can only be justified by something to which it bears the right logical relation – something that itself has propositional content. Later, Donald Davidson was to make the same point with the idea that the only thing capable of
justifying a belief was another belief. Any notion of nonconceptual bare presences known with certainty and capable of grounding knowledge has to be given up.

However, although McDowell endorsed Sellars’s classic criticism, he nevertheless pointed to the inverse danger awaiting the critic of the given, one he saw threatening in the work of Davidson himself. Abandoning the idea of a nonconceptual given capable of rationally constraining the application of concepts in perceptual judgments can lead to the embrace of an equally implausible position in which concept application is simply unconstrained. Thus for the critic of the given, “exercises of concepts threaten to degenerate into moves in a self-contained game.”

Davidson had attempted to hold onto the idea of the world’s constraining “friction” on thought by stressing the causal constraints exercised by the world on judgment, but this, claimed McDowell, could not capture the normative role that experience plays in providing thought with its objective purport. What is needed is a way of maintaining the idea of experience as exercising rational and not simply causal constraint on belief. Hence McDowell appealed to a “minimal empiricism” free of the “mythical” interpretation of the given as some nonconceptual “ultimate ground” or “bare presence” to which we can gesture in justifying our claims. Experience, then, if it is to be capable of providing rational constraint on thought must be already thoroughly conceptual, and it was this idea that pointed McDowell in the direction of Hegel.

According to McDowell, Hegel’s predecessor, Immanuel Kant, had been on the verge of a philosophy that would be free from the type of intolerable oscillation besetting contemporary analytic philosophy, but with his idea that a form of nonconceptual representation – “intuition” – was required to provide concepts with their empirical content, Kant was himself still ensnared in a version of the myth of the given. This was because he regarded empirical intuitions as issuing from the impact of a supersensuous reality beyond the mind – a reality to which concepts could not stretch. Hegel, however, following the critique of Kant by Fichte and Schelling, had rejected the dualism of intuition and concept, and along with this had “urged that we must discard the supersensible in order to achieve a consistent idealism.”

It is common for analytic philosophers to regard the German idealists’ abandonment of Kant’s idea that concepts must be constrained by some nonconceptual given as precisely the move that leads to the result that McDowell captures with the metaphor of thought’s “frictionless spinning in a void,” but on McDowell’s account that reaction is indicative of an approach held hostage to the
myth of the given. In fact, Hegel’s approach shows just how thought can be
eresponsive to the world in virtue of what is presented in experience. Following Hegel,
claims McDowell, we must think of the world itself as “made up of the sort of thing
that one can think,” and to think of the world in this way requires us to reject the
image found in Kant that the “the conceptual realm has an outer boundary” beyond
which concepts cannot stretch. This is just what Hegel did in his “Absolute Idealism,”
and when we grasp this philosophy as capable of showing us the way beyond the
oscillation of analytic philosophy, “we have arrived at a point from which we could
start to domesticate the rhetoric of that philosophy.”

Perhaps the most obvious parallel to the Sellarsian “critique of the myth of the
given” that can be found in Hegel is the theme that runs through the first three
chapters of his Phenomenology of Spirit, in which Hegel aimed to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the idea that knowledge can be founded on the pure givenness to
consciousness of “objects” of various kinds. In the first of these chapters, “sense-
certainty,” the particular object given to consciousness is meant to be a simple
nonconceptualized singular item, perhaps something akin to Kant’s idea of an
empirical intuition considered in isolation from any concept or its early analytic
equivalent, the “sense datum” postulated by Russell and Moore and supposedly
known immediately in “acquaintance.” Not surprisingly, Hegel’s way of proceeding
here was different to that of Sellars, but there are clear correspondences, with Hegel
attempting to show that the very idea of a singular presence as knowable in its
“singularity,” and hence nonconceptually, collapses in contradiction, with the object
of sense-certainty coming to be replaced by a more complex object purportedly given
in experience. The epistemological outlook of sense-certainty had conceived of the
pure “this” as given in an immediate way without the participation of any general
concept, but effectively drawing on the rationalist idea of the difference between
perception and apperception, Hegel suggests that such a “this” is at the same time
taken by the experiencing subject as an instance of a more general category – we
might say, taken as an instance of “thisness.” In the object that comes to replace it –,
the object of the shape of consciousness that Hegel calls “perception” (Wahrnehmen)
– the fact that it instantiates some general kind is made explicit, and so this object is
effectively conceived as an Aristotelian substance – what Aristotle had referred to as a
“tode ti,” a “this such.” The implicitly conceptual nature of the content of sense-
certainty has been replaced by the explicitly conceptual nature of the content of perception.

In Hegel’s account the concept of such a pure self-subsistent object of “perception” with its particular categorical constitution undergoes a similar collapse and is replaced by a conception of something much more like a theoretically posited object found in modern scientific explanations of the world – the notion of a “force,” for example. This outlook Hegel calls “the understanding.” Thus what ultimately exists for the understanding are no longer simply everyday things perceived as instances of kinds: the understanding’s “objects” are not “perceived” directly at all but posited as explanations of certain observable effects. Indeed there seems something characteristically “modern” in Hegel’s “understanding,” and the contrast between “the understanding” and “perception” appears to align with the difference that Sellars talked of in terms of different “scientific” and everyday “manifest” images of the world. Although the contents of both perception and the understanding are “conceptual,” they are nevertheless conceived as conceptual in different ways. Perception is conceptual in that its object will be conceived as a “this such” – an instance of some conceivable kind. In contrast, the content of the understanding, I suggest, is primarily propositional.

One of the founding texts of analytic philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, commences with the claim that the world is made up not of objects but of “states of affairs” or “facts,” and this seems to signal at the level of logic a distinction similar to that which Hegel attempts to capture with his distinction between the contents of perception and the understanding. Aristotle had thought of the world as made up of objects (“primary substances”) that instantiated “kinds” and that were individuated by differentiating attributes. Hence he employed a “subject–predicate” or “term” logic, the basic units of which referred to the kinds of things objects instantiated on the one hand and the attributes that distinguished those instances on the other. In contrast, the Stoics had thought of the basic units of logic as whole propositions (a content that could be true or false) rather than separate terms. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Gottlob Frege managed to unify these hitherto separate “term” and “propositional” logics in his revolutionary predicate calculus, and Wittgenstein’s conception of the world as basically one of “facts” or “states of affairs” reflects this logical revolution. In short, for Wittgenstein and Frege, the “objects” of the world are no longer conceived as “Aristotelian” (that is, instances
of kinds) but as components of “facts” or “states of affairs.” Hegel was philosophizing well before the changes in logic from which the modern analytic movement emerged, but I suggest he signals the type of change that was in the air with his distinction between the objects of perception and the posits of the understanding. McDowell, following Frege and Wittgenstein in their approach to logic, fails to capture Hegel’s distinction.

In accordance with the *Tractatus*’ injunction, McDowell thinks of the components of “the world” as thinkable “facts,” but he also thinks of such propositional contents as just what the mind is open to in *perceptual experience*. That is, McDowell follows Hegel’s criticism of sense-certainty in affirming the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, but he ignores the differences in the ways in which cognitive content can be conceptual that Hegel signals in the difference between perception and the understanding. For McDowell (but not Hegel) perceptual content is not only conceptual but also propositional.

Assuming the modern Fregean approach to logical form, McDowell requires that the contents of perceptual experience are propositional for his minimally empiricist attempt to retain some experientially given rational constraint on judgment. This need disappears, however, in Brandom’s account, as in his Hegelian development of Sellars’s thought, the constraining influence on thought played by the world via perceptual experience is replaced by constraints exercised by others when they hold one’s utterances to socially instituted norms. At this point then we might switch our attention to Brandom’s version of “Pittsburgh neo-Hegelianism” in order to pursue further the purported parallels between contemporary analytic philosophy and Hegel’s idealism.

**Robert Brandom: From the Problems of “Representationalism” to Hegel’s “Inferentialism”**

In 1994, the year of the publication of *Mind and World*, Robert Brandom, a colleague of McDowell’s at the University of Pittsburgh, published a work, *Making It Explicit* that also made strong claims as to the relevance of Hegel for analytic philosophy. In developing his appeal to Hegel in that book, however, Brandom has invoked quite different aspects of Hegelianism and drawn on rather different consequences from
Sellars’s critique of the myth of the given than those leading to McDowell’s “minimal empiricism.”

Making It Explicit is fundamentally a work in philosophy of language and philosophical semantics, and among its heroes are the key thinkers of the “continental” roots of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Influenced not only by Sellars but also by Richard Rorty’s deployment of Sellars’s ideas in his 1979 critique of analytic philosophy, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Brandom refers to Hegel as the forebear of his own attack on the dominant “representationalist” paradigm within analytic philosophy’s attitude to meaning. Representationalists classically think of words as names for worldly things, events, or states of affairs. However, the representationalists’ picture, claims Brandom, has been undermined within analytic philosophy along with the myth of the given, and in contrast he puts forward his so-called “inferentialist” approach to the semantic content of words.

Like McDowell, Brandom philosophizes in the wake of Frege’s revolutionizing of logic in the late nineteenth century, finding the origins of his own inferentialist semantics in Frege’s early approach to semantics from which Frege himself retreated in later work and which has been overlooked by most of his analytic followers. For an inferentialist the meaning of words is seen as coming not from any one-to-one “representational” relation existing either between the words and things or properties (as with Aristotle) or between the contents of judgments and “facts” (as with most followers of Frege), but from the patterns of inference within which asserted sentences stand. Brandom focuses on Frege’s “context principle” – the principle that “the meaning of a word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, not in isolation” – that had been exploited by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Starting with this idea that the primary semantic units in language are not individual words but sentences with full propositional content, Brandom then, following Wittgenstein in his later writings, thinks of sentences as in turn gaining their meanings by the roles they play in “language games.” This move not only broadens the contexts appealed to in the “context principle” but makes it clearer that the meaning of structures such as sentences are to be thought of in terms of the pragmatics of language use and brings analytic philosophy into contact with the naturalistic pragmatism of American philosophy, a pragmatism that itself in its nineteenth-century form had been influenced by the thought of Hegel.
Sellars also had looked to the role played by sentences in language games, but his interest was in the somewhat rationalistically conceived language games involving the making of assertions and the asking for and giving of reasons for them. To give reasons for my assertion of sentence $S$ is to place the content of $S$ in an “inferential” relation to that of the sentence that I offer as its reason, an understanding that gives Brandom a way of widening the context of the “context principle.” The word may have a meaning in the context of some $S$, but $S$ itself has its meaning in the context of a wider slab of actual or potential discourse, the totality of linked sentences that stand in inferential relations to $S$. Not only do words not stand in one-to-one or one-to-many relations with objects, properties, or relations, neither do sentences stand in one-to-one or one-to-many relations with “facts” or “states of affairs.” The network of meaning-giving relations connects words in virtue of the inferential relations standing between the sentences within which the words appear, an image found in Quine’s widely influential image of the “web of belief.”

This standpoint now provides a perspective from which the history of modern philosophy looks very different from standard accounts given within analytic philosophy. If one favors an inferentialist semantics over a representationalist one, then it will be the views of Leibniz rather than, say, Locke, that will appear as an early anticipation of the correct view. From among Leibniz’s inheritors, Brandom points to Kant as the thinker who most clearly grasped the “primacy of the propositional” in semantics – the idea that the “fundamental unit of awareness or cognition, the minimum graspable, is the judgment.” But Kant’s version of rationalism, in its appeal to the role of empirical intuitions, still held onto the idea of something (some mental equivalent of an independent subsentential unit of language) given – a notion in tension with Kant’s insight into the primacy of the propositional. But from the inferentialist perspective, the idea of needing to secure the empirical content of a concept by appeal to something like the intuitions with which it is linked becomes redundant.

The idea that concepts gained empirical content in virtue of the fact that they were found in judgments that were inferentially linked within a network of judgments, thinks Brandom, had been implicit in Kant’s notion of the unity of judgments within the “transcendental unity of apperception.” However, the inferentialist move was only made explicit by Hegel, who abandoned Kant’s dualism of intuitions and concepts and so was able “to complete the inversion of the traditional order of
semantic explanation by beginning with a concept of experience as inferential activity and discussing the making of judgments and the development of concepts entirely in terms of the roles they play in that inferential activity.” Such an inferentially mediated conceptual holism is just the outlook expressed in Hegel’s classic claim that “the syllogism is the truth of the judgment.”

Once more the easiest way to initially align Brandom with Hegel is to appeal to the opening chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. As we have seen, Hegel’s transition from sense-certainty to perception involved a radical change in the categorical structure of the very object supposedly “given” to a passively conceived receptive consciousness, and further changes are found between the objects of perception and the understanding. I have described the objects of Hegel’s “perception” chapter as classically Aristotelian – a perceptual object is an instance of a kind about which some perceivable property is predicated in such a way that such a property is seen as excluding some contrary properties. Aristotelian “term” logic, however, is not so easily adapted to the sorts of judgments involved in the more mediated structures of the understanding. Rather than single contentful judgments being at issue as in perception, in the understanding what comes to the fore are the inferential relations between judgments, and here a propositionally based logic is more appropriate. (One should recall that the items connected in Aristotelian syllogisms are the terms into which propositions or judgments are resolved rather than those propositions or judgments themselves.)

As earlier noted, in Hegel’s time there had been no simple way to formally represent the resolution of a proposition into its constituent parts such that “propositional” and “term” logics could be in some way unified. Unifying such traditionally opposed approaches was one aspect of Frege’s later achievement in logic. But Frege’s subsequent way of extracting something like the original subject–predicate structure out of a given proposition (by adapting the mathematical form of analysis into “argument” and “function”) was to produce a purported subject–predicate structure that was wholly different to the one of traditional term logic. For Frege, argument terms were fundamentally conceived as *singular* terms, but singular terms, such as proper names, had officially been denied a role in Aristotelian syllogisms. In Aristotle’s syllogistic logic, the subject term of a judgment must include some “sortal” term to capture the *kind* to which the object belonged, as can be seen in the fact that the two judgment forms permitted have subjects that in respect of
“quantity” are either “universal” (as in “All Greeks are mortal”) or “particular” (as in “Some Greeks are bearded”). Adapted to perceptual judgments about individual objects, one could use a form of judgment like, say, “This Greek is mortal” within a syllogism, but “officially” syllogistic reasoning excluded properly singular judgments as in “Socrates is mortal.” Thus the object picked out by an argument term in Frege’s analysis, when that term is thought of as a singular term, could not be thought of as of the same categorical type as the object of Hegel’s “perception,” which is to be treated as an instance of a universal, a “this such,” but it was perfect for thinking of what was picked out in “the understanding” if we think of its constitutive structures as having a proposition based rather than term based logic. As Frege was to show, if one takes the proposition as semantically basic and then decomposes it into its parts, the resulting “subject” terms will be singular.

Brandom, however, challenges the standard representationalist understanding of Fregean argument terms as “singular terms” that can be mapped in a one-to-one relation to individual worldly entities. Following the dictates of the context principle, one can construe the semantic properties of singular terms in terms of the role they play in sentences. To talk of singular reference was, as Quine had put it, “only a picturesque way of alluding to the distinctive grammatical roles that singular and general terms play in sentences. It is by grammatical role that general and singular terms are properly to be distinguished.”26 One might think of the naming relation as absolutely fundamental to language, but Quine’s radical critique of the primacy of the denoting of singular terms was in fact an extension of a challenge to our most basic assumptions about language that had been part of the analytic movement since its inception.

From the earliest application of Fregean logic to philosophy by Russell, analytic philosophers had used Fregean propositionally based “predicate calculus” to reinterpret (“regiment”) the logical form of sentences of ordinary language. Russell had classically done this both for what in Aristotelian logic were treated as universally affirmative judgments (as in “All Greeks are mortal”) and for sentences whose subjects were definite descriptions (as in “The teacher of Plato was mortal”). Especially with the latter case, Russell had been trying to address the problem of nonreferring terms, as with his celebrated example, the definite description “the present king of France.”27 But such a technique of reinterpretating the apparent “subject” term of the sentence was just what was later extended by Quine to include
proper names like “Socrates” or “Pegasus,” traditionally thought of as paradigm singular terms. For Quine, a proper name such as “Pegasus” was to be treated as a predicate, in this case, the verb “is-Pegasus” or “pegasizes.” In earlier cases of such regimentation, the point had been to show that a sentence such as “All Greeks are mortal” shouldn’t really be thought as being “about” what the subject term apparently names, here all Greeks. Because Russell had schematized the sentence as a universally quantified conditional (roughly, for all things “if that thing is a Greek, then it is mortal”), the sentence itself should be thought of as “about” the totality of things (effectively, the whole universe, over which the quantifier “ranged”). Russell’s original point had been that it was erroneous to think of “All Greeks are mortal” as structurally akin to “Socrates is mortal,” but Quine was to undercut the very contrast by treating “Socrates is mortal” in just the same way! For Quine, “Socrates is mortal” was to be effectively treated in terms of a bound quantifier that “ranged” over a domain of discourse and as stating that if something is found that socratizes, then that thing is mortal. In fact, as Quine was well aware, his move of treating proper names as predicates could be seen as having a precedent in the way that medieval scholastic logicians had got around Aristotle’s prohibition on using singular judgments within syllogisms. In the context of syllogisms, the sentence “Socrates is mortal” could be treated as having the logical form of a universal judgment on the grounds that like “All Greeks are mortal,” it is exceptionless. But as we have seen, treating something simultaneously as a singular and a universal was just what Hegel had claimed operated within “sense-certainty.”

As proper names had provided the paradigm form of the way we think of ourselves as picking out or “representing” entities able to be “given,” in Quine’s hands post-Fregean logic came to disrupt radically the “representationalist” dimensions of language by attacking the basic referential notion of naming. As he put it, names were “altogether immaterial to the ontological issue.” Thus Quine could regard physical objects as “posits” that explain sensory experiences and are “comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer.” Congruent with this, it would seem that the closest thing in natural language to what in Quine’s logical language is a referring term is a relative pronoun, such as “who” or “which,” serving merely to tie predicate terms together. Quine maintained the independence of this elimination of reference from the question of the actual ontology to which one subscribed, but it neatly fitted his strongly scientistic conception of the world in
which one can secure the truth value of a sentence without committing oneself to the existence of things apparently referred to in that sentence. For example, one might want to think of the sentence “the walls are bright yellow” as stating a truth even if one didn’t include the terms “walls” and “yellow” among the terms of one’s ultimate explanatory theories.

I have suggested that understood in this way, the reinterpretations of the nature of our referring terms going from Russell to Quine would give an analytic analog of the idea Hegel pursues with his account of the passage from the “shape of consciousness” called “perception” to that of “the understanding.” With Quine, those apparently representational assumptions about the nature of what is given to consciousness in “perception” have now been thoroughly undermined: judgments might seem to be “about” the everyday things we consciously use them for, but they are really about some posited “whatever” it is (elements of our best scientific explanations) that ultimately secures the truth of those judgments. It was just this radical detachment of the ultimate references of our judgments from the experienceable objects that they are naively taken to be about that motivates McDowell’s concern to find something that stops thought’s “frictionless spinning in the void.” In McDowell’s account, however, it leads to the idea – problematic from both Hegelian and analytic perspectives – that the contents of perceptual experience are fundamentally propositional. In Brandom’s account, by contrast, we find a solution to this problem that invokes ideas from Hegel’s solution to the problems of “the understanding” not by retreating to any “minimal empiricism” but by moving forward to Hegel’s treatment of self-consciousness in the next chapter of his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Brandom thus appeals to the intersubjective pragmatic infrastructure that in his theory underpins what we might think of as the mind’s capacity to be “about” the world, an account that he links to Hegel’s famous “recognitive” account of “spirit [Geist].”

**H1> Hegel and Brandom on the Recognitive Infrastructure of Intentionality**

In Hegel’s account of *understanding* as a shape of consciousness, such a consciousness had come to the self-understanding that the object it had taken as given was in fact in no sense “given” at all but rather “posited” by itself – in Quinian terms,
the value of a bound variable, some whatever that was responsible for the patterned events of one’s experience. In Hegel’s telling of this story, consciousness responds to the realization that what was previously thought to be “given” is actually an active posit, with the idea that such an object must be its creation. Thus in this new orientation, the assumption from which “consciousness” had started has been reversed: at the start of the series sense-certainty, perception, and the understanding, the “given” object was conceived as the “truth” of consciousness itself, but now consciousness has come to regard itself as “the truth” of its object. This new cognitive state is thus properly understood as a form of self-consciousness, and as productive of its object, it is understood as a primarily practical rather than theoretical intentional state. This is the starting point from which Hegel commences in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in chapter 4 (“The Truth of Self-Certainty”), section B (“Self-Consciousness”).

In this chapter the analysis becomes focused on the same internal contradictions of a now practical self-consciousness that had earlier plagued the shapes of consciousness in chapters 1 to 3. Self-consciousness takes its object to be really nothing more than that which it wills, and its immediate form, “self-certainty,” is that of a type of immediately appetitive and devouring subject, but this form of self-consciousness also will be revealed to be self-contradictory. Consider a primitive appetitive subject who desires some singular “this” and, devouring it, satisfies its appetite. In annihilating the previously independent object (the “this”), it annihilates the very thing that allowed it to be conscious of itself as a desirer. From the failure of this, Hegel thinks, this self-consciousness will somehow come to see that the only stable “mediating” object for it would be one that maintains its independence in the relation, and the only thing capable of that, on this model, is another self-consciousness.

It is this lesson that is worked through in the now famous passage from a unitary desiring self-consciousness to the duality of mutually recognizing ones in the “master-slave” section of the Phenomenology. In this section Hegel ultimately comes to focus on the nature of the relationship that holds between the two self-consciousnesses, the relationship of mutual “recognition” or acknowledgment (Anerkennung). It is in these passages that Hegel first suggests that definite patterns of such relationships of recognition actually constitute what he refers to as “Spirit” (Geist). Recognition is by its very nature a reciprocal affair, but this is not at all at
first apparent to the members of the relationship of master and slave. Thus the master regards his slave as a mere thing-like instrument of his will whose dependent nature stands in stark contrast to his own independence. However the master is in fact dependent upon his slave for that “free” recognition that he needs in order to be the properly “spiritual” (geistig) being that he takes himself to be. Both master and slave must eventually learn that the master’s independence is equally dependent upon that passive material objectivity he recognizes in his slave, and that the slave’s objectivity in truth harbors an active independent subjectivity that he recognizes in his master. As the earlier instances of objective givenness, this particular instance of the recognitive relation will be shown to be self-contradictory: they will collapse and be replaced by some other, more complex form.

In Brandom’s account, this idea of the fundamental nature of this intersubjective recognitive relationship is worked out within a theory of the pragmatics of language use. Within the Brandomian framework, we might then think of a problem analogous to McDowell’s “frictionless thought” and the master’s unilateral self-ascription of free agency. For example, a speaker might think, as did Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, that she could mean by her words whatever she wanted them to mean. Such a conception of verbal “mastery” would be in relation to one of total dependence or subservience on the part of that speaker’s interlocutor. But drawing on ideas from Wittgenstein’s later conception of “rule-following,” Brandom denies the conceptual possibility of any isolated individual “instituting” of the type of semantic relation that we regard as relating words to world. In Brandom’s account, interlocutors thus stand in the same relations of “reciprocal recognition” that Hegel finds at the heart of all human relations, even the apparently asymmetric ones of slavery. Although there is nothing simply “given” from the world to normatively constrain the semantic content of our claims, there are norms concerning the way words are put together and used in contexts that are beyond the “legislative” powers of any individual speaker. The “norm-instituting” practices responsible for the semantic relations that enable our words to bear on the world are necessarily social ones, at the heart of which are relations of reciprocal recognition.

Thus the way that I string words together and apply the resulting sentences is not answerable to things or facts in the world as commonly understood. In my speaking I am only answerable to my interlocutor as a recognized bearer of the social norms that we co-institute in the very process of conversing. When I utter, for
example, “Socrates is ugly,” my sentence does not confront some independently real “fact” in the world that determines its truth value. (A “fact” for Brandom is just a true proposition, the content of an utterance that is true, and its truth in turn is explained in terms of what is preserved in correct inferences. From Brandom’s conceptually holistic point of view, to talk of something that makes the utterance true would be to talk of the world as a whole.) Rather, if it “confronts” anything in particular, it will be something like your disposition to give utterance to some contrary content, for example, “Socrates is beautiful”! Such a response will challenge my “entitlement” to my original words, and so challenge me to reveal their “title” by coming up with a reason backing up my statement. I might, for example, say something like “Socrates has an offensively snub nose,” an assertion that is meant to stand in the appropriate inferential relation to my earlier one. But here the response will be appropriate only if there is consensus on the legitimacy of the pattern of “material inference” from “Such and such has a snub nose” to “Such and such is ugly,” and of course my entitlement to that assumption could be further challenged.

For Brandom, the discipline of logic is what results when we reflectively give challengeable expression to the social norms that govern our inferential practices in a way analogous to that in which expression has here been given to our aesthetic norms. Making such norms “explicit” is, he thinks, ultimately what Hegel was doing in his massive Science of Logic.

We might then sum up some of the ways in which the so-called “Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelianism” of McDowell and Brandom approximates but remains distinct from the thought of the historical Hegel. McDowell, in his critique of the “myth of the given,” takes over from Hegel the idea that the content of experience is fully conceptual, but McDowell departs from Hegel in equating the conceptual nature of perception with the thesis that perceptual content is propositional, thereby collapsing what Hegel distinguishes as perception and the understanding. Like McDowell, Brandom’s Hegelianism derives from Sellars’s critique of the “myth of the given,” but largely bypassing perceptual experience, he concentrates more on the idea that the semantic contents of our judgments are derived from their inferential relations in the “space of reasons.” And taking this “space of reasons” as grounded in historically changing social practices of assertion, questioning, and reason giving, he thereby interprets Hegel’s key concepts of “recognition” and “spirit” or “Geist” in terms of his own “social pragmatics.” However, the same objection that was raised for McDowell
might be raised for Brandom: relying exclusively on the logic of Frege for his “inferentialist” approach to semantic content, Brandom seems also to have eliminated any structural distinction between perception and understanding as “shapes of consciousness.”

<H1>Dialectical Logic and Ontology</H1>

In relation to the entirety of the systematic content of Hegel’s philosophy, the work of the “Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians” bears on relatively few aspects of Hegel’s thought. Nevertheless, what they do bear upon are surely those parts that are central to his overall system, and this had certainly not been usual in cases where analytic philosophers had engaged with Hegel’s work. In particular concrete areas of his philosophy, especially in the area of political philosophy, Hegel has not lacked analytically trained sympathetic readers, but this has usually been at the expense of those areas being detached from Hegel’s systematic “logical” concerns. Hegel himself had insisted on the logic at the heart of his system, and that was the logic that Russell dismissed as antiquated and responsible for faulty metaphysical assumptions. The attempts of McDowell and Brandom, which draw on modern post-Fregean logic, to rehabilitate just those core logical areas of Hegel’s thought for which he has been traditionally dismissed deserve to be taken seriously. This said, however, one does not find much in the work of either that engages with that aspect of Hegel’s logic for which he is probably most well known – the so-called “dialectical” nature of his logic with its controversial claims about the nature of “contradiction.”39 We might therefore ask after the possibility of making sense of Hegel’s dialectic within an otherwise analytic version of Hegel’s logical thought. Indeed, it may be that the structural distinction between perception and the understanding that is largely effaced by McDowell and Brandom is particularly relevant here.

In <i>The Problems of Philosophy</i>, Bertrand Russell notes of the three self-evident logical principles, the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, that rather than being laws primarily pertaining to thoughts, they should be regarded as laws pertaining to existence – laws “that things behave in accordance with.”40 Perhaps nothing about Hegel’s way of thinking here concerns analytic philosophers as much as his apparent denial of just these three laws. When Russell talks of the law of
contradiction, he refers to what is often called the law of noncontradiction: “Nothing can both be and not be.”41 But when Hegel invokes the law of contradiction, he means it literally: it is the law that “everything is inherently contradictory,”42 and with this he attacks the purported “first law of thought … A = A.”43 This conception of identity and the associated law of noncontradiction are for Hegel characteristics of “reflection” and “the understanding” rather than speculative “reason,” and are expressions of what he calls the “affirmative principle,” which he attributes to Plato but from which he exempts Aristotle: “While … with Plato the main consideration is the affirmative principle, the Idea as only abstractly identical with itself, in Aristotle there is added and made conspicuous the moment of negativity, not as change, nor yet as nullity, but as difference or determination.”44

Among the most immediate roots of Hegel’s dialectical logic is surely the subject matter that is covered in “Division Two” of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, “The Transcendental Dialectic,” in which contradiction is linked to the unfettered operations of inferential reason. Kant’s basic argument there is well known: metaphysics had classically sought knowledge of the world as it is “in itself” on the basis of inferential reasoning from pure concepts alone, thus applying concepts beyond those limits that had been established earlier in “The Transcendental Analytic.” Properly, concepts, both empirical and pure, should be thought of as applying to contents that are given in “intuition,” a form of representation that in being both “singular” and “immediate” stands in contrast to the “general” and “mediated” nature of conceptual representation. For Kant, inferential reasoning can aid in the unification of knowledge, as when we posit entities that explain certain observable phenomena.45 But there are definite limits to this: a potentially rational explanation of appearances can be extended to posit some ultimately nonappearing entity as in classical metaphysics. That something has gone wrong in such forms of thought, Kant thinks, is signaled in the fact that it falls into irresolvable “antinomies.”

In chapter 2 of the “Transcendental Dialectic,” the “Antinomies of Pure Reason,” Kant tracks how attempts at achieving “absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances,” an “allegedly pure (rational) cosmology,” will fall into contradictorily opposed views that seem intrinsically resistant to any rational resolution.46 Ultimately, Kant’s diagnosis of such problems of metaphysics amounts to the claim that in all such metaphysical claims, the distinction between intuition and concept as different representational forms has been effaced. Although concepts and intuitions both in
some sense unify manifolds, the modes of unification are clearly different.
Traditionally, concepts have been conceived as unifying knowledge by grouping particulars under some general concept as when we bring particular cats under the genus “cat,” or when we bring the genus itself under some higher one, such as “mammal.” Certain features of the behavior of my cat, Socrates, might be explained by features possessed by cats in general, but in turn cats may share features with all other mammals, and so on. Here the unity achieved will be a “distributive” unity among judgments about cats and other things, and Kant warns us against confusing this type of conceptually mediated unity with the unity that we think of as given in intuition – the unity of some experienced spatio–temporal object: my cat Socrates, for example. We may not normally be tempted to think of the genus “cat” as a large cat-like empirical object, but this seems to be the type of error that, according to Kant, leads us to think of the world as a whole as a type of object about which we can have conceptual knowledge. Thus Kant distinguishes the “distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience” from a “collective unity of a whole of experience,” and thinks we are led to confuse these types of unity on the basis of what he calls “transcendental illusion” or “transcendental subreption.”

Kant’s warnings about these traps of reasoning using traditional syllogistic logic indeed seem to converge with Russell’s critique of the faulty metaphysics that he saw resulting from traditional logic, the same critique that motivated his practice of reinterpreting the logical structure of traditionally conceived universal affirmative judgments. For Russell, we should not think of the logical structure of “all cats have two kidneys” on the model of “Socrates has two kidneys.” “All cats” do not, in short, name or refer to some kind of thing that is considered as the object about which “has two kidneys” could be predicated. On Kant’s diagnosis, traditional metaphysics seems to conceive of its task along these lines, and the result is its falling into contradiction. Moreover, Kant’s diagnosis of the problems here seems close to Russell’s concerns about confusing the apparent subjects of universal judgments with singular things. In “transcendental subreption,” concepts are confused with intuitions; concepts, it will be remembered, are general representations, and intuitions are singular. In standard set-theoretic interpretations of Frege’s logic, a concept corresponds to a class of entities, and singular representations refer to members of such classes. Russell famously pursued the paradoxes and antinomies that resulted from confusing these two ideas.
We have glimpsed something along the lines of this phenomenon already in Hegel’s account of “sense-certainty.” The singular “this” of experience was, at the same time, taken by the experiencing subject as an instance of a more general category, “thisness.” The object of sense-certainty was meant to be irreducibly singular but at the same time it instantiated a type of universality and thus became embroiled in the type of dilemma that, according to Kant, affected metaphysical thought traditionally conceived. However, though Kant seemed to have regarded the self-contradicting thought of metaphysics as avoidable, Hegel considered this “dialectic” as an essential dimension to any self-reflecting thought at all; as an essential dimension of thought, it is thereby regarded as an essential dimension of the objects presented to us in thought.

To preserve something of this dialectical structure within analytic philosophy it would seem that we would need to make sense of at least three ideas: first, the idea that “objects” have not fixed but variable logical or categorical structures; next, that this variation is not random but in some way orderly; and finally, that this orderly variation is somehow bound up with the rational working out of the “contradictions” internal to each of these constitutive structures considered in isolation from the others. Making sense of these ideas from within the framework of analytic philosophy would undoubtedly be a challenge, but perhaps the same resources upon which McDowell and Brandom have drawn may still be useful here.

Hegel’s idea in the opening chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit of a succession of “shapes of consciousness,” when translated into the framework of analytic concerns with issues of reference and meaning, suggests the idea of a plurality of ways of thinking and talking about objects such that grammatically distinct ways correlate with differently structured objects. I have suggested that Hegel’s objects of “perception” are conceived basically as “Aristotelian” objects that might typically be thought of as expressed in everyday unreflective discourse with a traditional subject–predicate grammatical structure. But as we have seen, this discourse can be “regimented” into forms of discourse with overtly different grammatical forms. We might think, then, that when Russell paraphrases a sentence whose subject is a definite description as one whose form is given in terms of quantifiers and variables, those sentences have in some sense become “about” objects with a different categorical structure, the “posits” of the Hegelian “understanding.” Of course on one way of thinking of this phenomenon, there has been no real change
within the nature of the “objects” referred to. The most obvious way to take the
activity of analysis is to think of the logical paraphrase as the sentence that truly
captures the actual logical structure of the object it is about, and to think that the
nonparaphrased sentence is not really at all about the purported object it appears to be
about. Russell, after all, wanted to deny that the sentence “All Greeks are mortal” was
in any way about some collectively conceived object, “all Greeks.” Along these lines,
many scientific eliminativists want to deny the reality of many of the objects we
purport to perceive and talk about.

This attitude, however, is the attitude that idealism of the Kantian variety
opposes. This idealism was, after all, developed on the basis of the idea that the
“form” of objects of cognition, including their conceptual form, should not be thought
of as something that belonged to the objects “in themselves.” Within analytic
philosophy, such a distinctly Kantian approach might be thought to be found in those
critical of the Russellian view that the logical structure of our thought or talk is
dictated by the logical structure of an independently considered world. Indeed, the
very collapse of the idea of reference, initiated by Russell and made explicit in
thinkers like Quine and Davidson, itself suggests a collapse of the classically
Russellian view. Within analytic philosophy, however, the immediately resulting
view is often like that found in Hegel’s “self-certainty,” the type of view McDowell
diagnoses as “rebounding” from the myth of the given.

In the view that so rebounds, the objects of thought will be conceivable as
capable of variation and change because they are mere reflections of the variable and
changeable ways in which we talk about them, but McDowell is correct that Hegel
was critical of any such “subjectively idealist” alternative to a precritical realism.
Hegel’s way of avoiding this type of subjectivism was to appeal to “reason,” which he
conceived of in a way resembling Aristotle’s thought of a world-pervading “nous.”
Different types of objects, then, had to be linked in logical ways rather than simply
juxtaposed relativistically, and this was achieved by the idea of the contradictory
nature of objects themselves within any one shape of consciousness or Geist and the
idea that these contradictions would be resolved with the passage to some succeeding
shape. We return again, then, to the peculiar idea of the contradictory nature of such
objects, but it should be kept in mind how Kant’s resistance to the idea that the logical
structure of thought reflects, even ideally, the logical structure of the world
considered independently of thought (that is, considered “in itself”) opens up the
possibility of difference within the ways objects can be logically constituted and so
the possibility of such objects themselves being “contradictory.”

One way this might perhaps be approached within the analytic frame is to take
up the theme of the intersubjective nature of language pursued by Brandom, the idea
that links to the primacy of the idea of intersubjective recognition in Hegel. Think, for
example, of a situation in which I am discussing with an interlocutor the color of
some “object” we are both currently perceiving. Disagreement may lead us to
reflectively place our opposing claims within the “space of reasons,” and we start to
bring diverse theoretical considerations to bear on each other’s judgment (the quality
of the ambient lighting and the possibility of color blindness, for example). Qua
object of “perception,” this object will have the particular logical structure of a
substance whose color is thought of as an immediate perceivable attribute. However,
this becomes replaced by the posit of a more theoretical discourse – the “whatever”
that is responsible for our experience of color. We want to say that our simply talking
about it couldn’t have changed the object and that it is “the same” object discussed in
different ways, but if as Wittgenstein held, “grammar tells us what kind of object
anything is,” and here our logical grammar has changed, then there seems
something wrong with expressing our intuition in this way. We have no available
unproblematic way of individuating the thing that is supposed to remain the same.
From a Russellian perspective, this is surely irrational, but the reasons for this, the
idea that there is an unproblematic, atomistically conceived, external self-identical
referent for the sentence, is just what Quine’s development of Russell’s innovations
seems to have eliminated. Quine, we might say, had prised analytic philosophy
away from Russell’s Platonic “principle of affirmation,” and put analytic philosophy
on its path to Hegelianism, even perhaps one with a potential for some kind of
“dialectical” logic intact.

1 See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (London:
2 On the Kantian roots of Frege’s philosophy see, e.g., Hans Sluga, Frege
(London: Routledge, 1980), and Robert Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic


6 “The trouble we have been running into is that the justification seems to depend on the awareness [of having the sensation], which is just another belief. … The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes.” Donald Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” in *Kant oder Hegel?* ed. Dieter Henrich (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1983), 427–428.


8 Ibid., 44.

9 Ibid., 11 and *passim*.

10 Ibid., 27–28.

11 Ibid., 44.

12 See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 12. Russell had believed that Kant’s account of intuition was essentially in agreement with his position on sense-data. Ibid., 85.


15 This is reflected in the so-called context principle, wherein names have a meaning only in the context of a proposition, as discussed in the next section.

of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality


19 “[O]nly in the nexus of a proposition has a name meaning.” Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, §3.3.


22 “The subtlety and sophistication of Kant’s concept of representation is due in large part to the way in which it is integrated into his account of the inferential relations among judgments.” Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 92.

23 Ibid. In particular, Brandom finds in Hegel’s methodological use of the combination of “mediation” and “determinate negation” ideas about the implicit structuring of the linguistic practice of the asking for and giving of reasons that are at the heart of his own rationalist pragmatism. In this way, the post-Fregean inferentialist movement toward a type of conceptual holism found in Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Rorty, and others effectively reprised the move found within post-Kantian idealism away from Kant’s focus on judgments toward Hegel’s on inferences.


Thus “logicians in past centuries … commonly treated a name such as ‘Socrates’ rather on a par logically with ‘mortal’ and ‘man,’ and as differing from these latter just in being true of fewer objects, viz. one.” Quine, *Word and Object*, 181.

Quine’s move was, of course, more radical. For the medievals, this was a matter of *accommodating* singular judgments within the framework of a term logic. For Quine, it effectively amounted to the *elimination* of the distinction between singularity and universality.

“To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable. In terms of the categories of traditional grammar, this amounts roughly to saying that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun. Pronouns are the basic media of reference; nouns might better have been named propronouns.” *From a Logical Point of View*, 13. See the detailed discussion of this point in David S. Oderberg, “Predicate Logic and Bare Particles,” in *The Old New Logic: Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers*, ed. David S. Oderberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).

“The necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth was a Thing, an ‘other’ than themselves, expresses just this, that not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), ¶164.

There will always, of course, be some *causal constraint* exercised by the world in our perceptually based verbal responses to it, but the conflation of this with
the idea of *rational constraint* – i.e., that to which we could appeal in justification – was just what Sellars had attacked as the “myth of the given.”

I have explored Brandom’s approach to the role of contradiction in Hegel in *Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 7.


Ibid., 72.


Ibid., 413.

Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, 140. It should be noted here that that aspect of Aristotle that Hegel has in mind here is his conception of God as “*noesis noeseos noesis,*” “thought thinking itself.”

This happens, for example, when a physician posits the presence of some underlying aetiological agent causing the pattern of symptoms identified as a certain disease.


Ibid., A582/B610.

Ibid., A293–303/B349–359.


Thus, in 1902 Russell conveyed to Frege the bad news of the inconsistency afflicting one of the axioms of his attempt to ground arithmetic in logic. The axiom required that one think of a certain expression as containing a term that simultaneously played the role of *function* with a particular argument and the argument of that function. Russell’s posed the problem in terms of a class of classes that could not be considered members of themselves.


One could say that there is an enduring “external” referent for our changing sentences, the world itself. (After all, once we have Russellized a sentence such as “all Greeks are mortal” into “if something is a Greek, then it is mortal,” there is still *something* that makes the new sentence, if true, true: the world itself). I would suspect
that Hegel could be satisfied with this. What we have to avoid is taking this thought any further and thinking that there was something to be said about *the way* the world is that is responsible for the truth. For this, we have to attribute to the world a form, and then we are back in the problem.

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