The Possibility of German Idealism after Analytic Philosophy: McDowell, Brandom and Beyond

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The late Richard Rorty was no stranger to provocation, and many an analytic philosopher would surely count as extremely provocative comments he had made on Robert Brandom’s highly regarded book from 1994, *Making It Explicit.* Brandom’s book was, Rorty asserted “an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage.” The reception of Kant within analytic philosophy has surely been, at best, patchy, but if it is difficult to imagine exactly what Rorty could have had in mind by analytic philosophy’s “Kantian phase,” the idea of an immanent Hegelian one would strike many as ludicrous. Given that the beginnings of analytic philosophy are conventionally described in terms of the radical break initiated by Russell and Moore with the Hegel-inspired idealism of their teachers at Cambridge in the closing years of the 19th century, the distinctly anti-Hegelian character of analytic philosophy has been held to be central. Moreover, the increasing naturalistic tenor of recent analytic philosophy would seem hardly propitious for a revival of 19th century idealism. And yet Rorty’s description should not be dismissed as mere provocation.

While Brandom’s references to Hegel in *Making It Explicit* are only fleeting, what he does say there clearly signals the view that Hegel should not only be seen as one of the key figures in the development of modern philosophy, but also as particularly relevant to the contemporary state of core disciplines like logic and semantics. Moreover, neither was Brandom alone in the 1990s in expressing such a view, as 1994 had also witnessed another highly regarded analytic philosopher professing a type of “Hegelian turn.” Thus John McDowell in *Mind and World*, also somewhat fleetingly, appealed to Hegel’s “absolute idealism” as offering solutions to problems at the heart of contemporary analytic philosophy. Moreover, the claims of McDowell and Brandom were not unprecedented. From the side of Hegel scholarship, in 1975 Charles Taylor had portrayed Hegel as having many intelligible and interesting things to say to contemporary philosophy despite what Taylor took to be his metaphysics, but from the late 80s and early 90s, a quite new take on Hegel had been coming into view which promised the good bits of Taylor’s
Hegel without the bizarre metaphysical commitments. In Robert Pippin's path-breaking *Hegel’s Idealism* of 1989, Hegel was seen as taking the idealism of Immanuel Kant in a direction something like the direction in which analytic philosophy had been taken by the mid-twentieth century by the likes of Wittgenstein and Sellars. While Sellars was only mentioned in passing by Pippin, Terry Pinkard, in *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (1994) utilized Sellars’ ideas more extensively. Given that it is Sellars’s work that has inspired the Hegelian turns of both McDowell and Brandom, perhaps it is just possible to think of analytic philosophy as capable of an “Hegelian stage,” and of Hegelian philosophy as capable of an “analytic form.” In the following section I briefly map the paths by which McDowell and Brandom have found their way to Hegel.

**The paths from Pittsburgh to Berlin:**

The egg from which this strange mutation of “analytic Hegelianism” has started to hatch is, undoubtedly, Wilfrid Sellars’s well-known epistemological critique of the “myth of the given,” as set out in his “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” The target to Sellars’s critique was the type of “givenness” with which many are familiar from Russell’s seminal work from 1912, *The Problems of Philosophy*. Like traditional empiricists, Russell had appealed to immediate knowledge of or “acquaintance” with sensory givens (“sense data”) in order to provide certain foundations for empirical knowledge of the world, but Sellars pointed out the difficulties of doing this in the context of a philosophy being transformed by the adoption of the type of Fregean logic that Russell himself had advocated and developed. Very broadly, Russell’s appeal to sense-data was an appeal to the ultimate status of just the sorts of independent “things” [Dinge] that Wittgenstein had attacked in the opening sentences of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* when he declared that the world was “the totality of facts [Tatsachen], not of things [Dinge].” What motivated Wittgenstein’s claim here was the “context principle” that he had taken from Frege: “[O]nly in the nexus of a proposition has a name meaning.”

Sellars, who had a detailed knowledge of the history of philosophy, was well aware that this critique of “the given” threatened to lead from a type of Kantianism that he endorsed, towards a type of Hegelianism that he did not. However, neither McDowell nor Brandom share this worry, intending, rather, to undermine the assumptions upon which Sellars’s worry had relied, assumptions they see Sellars himself as having implicitly dismantled. But from
Sellars’s starting point, each, I suggest, have taken a somewhat different route in their journey from Pittsburgh to Berlin.

While taking Sellars’s classic critique of myth of the given as his starting point in *Mind and World*, McDowell quickly signals the obvious danger awaiting the thinker rebounding from the lure of the given. Abandoning the myth of some passively received items capable of rationally constraining the active application of concepts in perceptual judgments can lead to the embrace of an *equally* implausible conception of concept application entirely freed from external constraint. Here “exercises of concepts threaten to degenerate into moves in a self-contained game.” Indeed, McDowell finds this danger threatening in the approach of another critic of the given, Donald Davidson, who, like Sellars, had been critical of the role of “intermediaries” between mind and world, and had attempted to hold onto the idea of the world’s constraining “friction” on thought, by stressing the *causal* constraints exercised by the world on judgment. Any such an account, thinks McDowell, cannot capture the *normative* role that experience plays in providing thought with its objective purport: what is needed is a way of maintaining the idea of experience as exercising *rational*, and not *simply* *causal*, constraint on belief. Rather than show how experience can justify belief, Davidson’s causal account at best shows how it can offer “exculpations.”

Of course, any such minimal empiricism must come unencumbered by the “mythical” interpretation of the given as some non-conceptual “ultimate ground” or “bare presence” to which we can gesture in justifying our claims. Davidson had expressed his rejection of the myth of the given in terms of the idea that the only thing capable of justifying a belief is another belief, but McDowell thinks that this move effaces the obvious distinction between judgments inferentially arrived at and the non-inferential judgments of perception. Insisting on experiential justification, McDowell’s answer is to regard the “deliverances of experience” or “bits of experiential intake” as necessarily *already conceptual*. If the contents of experience are conceptual, then we can see how they can maintain the appropriate justificational relation to beliefs—and it is this idea that points McDowell in the direction of Hegel.

According to McDowell, Kant himself had been on the verge of a philosophy freed from the intolerable oscillation afflicting recent epistemology between the myth of the given and the idea of thought as a “frictionless spinning in a void” that results when experience is deprived of
the role of rationally constraining thought. But Kant was still ensnared in a version of the myth courtesy of his theory of sensory “intuitions,” regarded as non-conceptual mental representations. At one level his idea that thought is constrained by the representations of the receptive faculty—intuitions—seems innocent enough. “From the standpoint of experience,” Kant did not conceive of intuitions as making a separable contribution to the joint activity of the receptive and conceptual faculties, and so for him, “experience does not take in ultimate grounds that we could appeal to by pointing outside the sphere of thinkable content.” But Kant joined to the account given from this standpoint one described from another, “transcendental,” standpoint and “in the transcendental perspective there does seem to be an isolable contribution from receptivity. In the transcendental perspective, receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the impact of a supersensible reality, a reality that is supposed to be independent of our conceptual activity in a stronger sense than any that fits the ordinary empirical world.” However, Hegel had “urged that we must discard the supersensible in order to achieve a consistent idealism,” and this move, thinks McDowell, “frees Kant’s insight so that it can protect a commonsense respect for the independence of the ordinary world.” It is this idea of the thoroughgoing conceptual nature of experience that leads McDowell to embrace the “Hegelian” thought of the world itself as “made up of the sort of thing that one can think.” Thus at the end of Lecture II, McDowell makes his approximation to Hegel explicit when he notes that “it is central to Absolute Idealism to reject the idea that the conceptual realm has an outer boundary, and we have arrived at a point from which we could start to domesticate the rhetoric of that philosophy.”

In Making It Explicit, Robert Brandom invokes quite different aspects of Hegelianism to those invoked by McDowell. According to Brandom Hegel initiated a radical “inferentialist” alternative to the dominant “representationalist” paradigm of modern philosophical semantics, an alternative that reappeared in analytic guise in the work of Wittgenstein, Sellars and others in the mid-twentieth century. Representationalists typically think of sentences or thoughts as composed of items that represent or stand for worldly things, properties, relations, etc.—they have a basically naming conception of the way language or thought and world come together. But Brandom develops an “inferentialist” approach that starts from the “context principle” of Frege and Wittgenstein. Rather than being the ultimate units of reference, a name has a meaning “only in the nexus of a proposition.” But in his later writings, Wittgenstein had widened the relevant context within which names find their meaning from single sentences or propositions to bigger
stretches of discourse, and a similar direction had been taken by Sellars and Quine around the same time.

Like McDowell, Brandom thinks that Kant was on the verge of this insight of contemporary philosophy. Kant recognized the “primacy of the propositional” of the context principle with his idea that the “fundamental unit of awareness or cognition, the minimum graspable, is the judgment.” Some readers of Kant have taken his employment of intuitions as a type of semantic device—singular representations which, by mediating between concepts and world, ultimately tie concepts to those worldly items that satisfy them. Seen in this way, Kantian intuitions resemble Russell’s “logical proper names”—a resemblance with fits with Russell’s identification of Kant’s intuitions with his “sense-data.” But Brandom finds this aspect of Kant, along with conventional model-theoretic semantics that is used in conjunction with Frege’s own logic, to be ultimately at variance with the spirit of the context principle, especially in its expanded form. Rather, the progressive aspect of Kantian thought lies in the holistic idea that locates any judgment within the community of logically cohering judgments signaled by the notion of the “transcendental unity of apperception,” and Brandom finds the resources for a holistic critique of model-theoretical semantics in Frege himself.

In the Begriffsschrift (Concept-script) of 1879 Frege had suggested that the only features relevant to a sentence’s conceptual content were those that affected the possible inferences that could be drawn from that sentence. While Frege himself had later retreated from this inferentialist view to a more representationalist one, his former student Rudolf Carnap was to maintain the inferentialist approach by defining the semantic content of a sentence in terms of the class of its consequences that held other than for reasons of logical form. Sellars had adopted this approach and it forms the basis of Brandom’s own inferentialist semantics in which the semantic content of a sentence is entirely derived from the totality of “material” inferences within which an asserted sentence stands. As, following the context principle, the semantics of all the sub-sentential parts of a sentence are derived from the semantic content of the sentence itself, the meaning of those parts will in turn be explained inferentially. That is, no atomistic theory of names is necessary and the representationalist outlook is vanquished.

For Brandom, this was just Hegel’s way beyond the purported semantic contribution of intuitions in Kant. Thus, while the inferentialist stance was only implicit in Kant “it remained for Hegel … to complete the inversion of
the traditional order of semantic explanation by beginning with a concept of experience as inferential activity and discussing the making of judgments and the development of concepts entirely in terms of the roles they play in that inferential activity.” In this way, the post-Fregean inferentialist movement towards a type of conceptual holism found in Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Rorty, and others effectively reprised the move found within post-Kantian idealism away from Kant’s focus on judgments towards Hegel’s on inferences, a move summed up by Hegel’s dictum that the syllogism is the “truth” of the judgment, rather than something that consists of judgments.

In *Mind and World* and *Making It Explicit*, all references to Hegel are very general and might be read as merely adding a frisson of the exotic to these works. But is there really the proximity of these issues to Hegel’s philosophy as they suggest? A closer look at Hegel suggests that there is.

**Hegel’s History of Analytic Philosophy from Russell to Quine and beyond**

Smitten fans of Hegel often attribute to him the most implausible of predictive powers, but it can be difficult not to read the first four chapters of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* as alluding to issues that were to become central to the history of analytic philosophy. In chapters 1 to 3 of this work, Hegel aims to demonstrate the inadequacy of the idea that knowledge can be founded on the pure givenness to consciousness of “objects” of various kinds. In the first of these chapters, “sense certainty,” the particular object given to consciousness is meant to be a simple non-conceptualized singular item, something akin to Kant’s idea of an empirical intuition considered in isolation from any concept, and able to be picked out by the use of a bare demonstrative, “this”! As Sellars had implicitly acknowledged, Hegel’s critique is close to his own critique of epistemological “givens,” for example, the “sense data” that the early Russell had claimed could be known with certainty in “acquaintance” and picked out by demonstratives considered as “logically proper names.” In Hegel’s account, the very idea of a bare singular presence knowable non-conceptually, is shown to be riven by contradiction. The epistemological outlook of sense-certainty had conceived of the bare “this” as given in an immediate way without the participation of any general concept, but effectively Hegel suggests that such a “this” in order to be cognitively relevant must, at the same time, be taken as an instance of a more general category—we might say, taken as an *instance* of “thisness.” In the object that comes to replace it in Chapter 2, the object of the shape of consciousness that Hegel calls “perception” (*Wahrnehmen*), the fact that it instantiates some general kind is made explicit, and so this object is effectively
conceived in the way that Aristotle conceived of a substance—that is, as an instance of a general kind, a “this such.”

In Chapter 2, the concept of such a self-subsistent object of “perception” with its particular categorical constitution undergoes a similar collapse and is replaced in Chapter 3 by a conception of something much more like a theoretically posited object found in modern scientific explanations of the world—the notion of a “force,” for example. This outlook Hegel calls, “the understanding,” and what ultimately exists for the understanding are no longer simply everyday things perceived as instances of kinds. The understanding’s “forces” are not “perceived” directly at all; they are posited in attempts to explain certain observable effects, and the contrast between “the understanding” and “perception” aligns with the type of difference that Sellars talked of in terms of different “scientific” and everyday “manifest” images of the world.34

I suggest that Hegel’s series of postulated “objects” in these opening chapters might be aligned with the array of purported referring terms discussed in the early history of analytic philosophy. I have mentioned the parallel between “sense-certainty” and Russellian sense-data qua “logically nameable” givens of immediate acquaintance, but the “this such” objects of Hegel’s “perception” too seem to have an analogue, as objects picked out by definite descriptions,35 a purported species of referring term that Russell eliminated by analysis in his classic paper of 1905, “On Denoting.”36

Following Frege, Russell had been concerned with the possibility of empty terms such as the proper name “Pegasus” or the definite description “the current King of France.” Earlier he had criticised what he took to be the misleading syntactic structure of universal affirmative sentences which seemed to model sentences like “All Greeks are mortal” on singular sentences like “Socrates is mortal.” Employing a form of paraphrase that utilized Frege’s terminology of quantifiers and variables, “All Greeks are mortal” thus came to be replaced by a sentence with a conditional form something like “For all things, if that thing is Greek, then it is mortal.” In “On Denoting” he extended this technique to sentences with definite descriptions in subject place, such that “The present King of France is bald” became paraphrased in a way that eliminated the apparently referring noun phrase, “the present King of France.” In short, with the technique of logical paraphrase Russell eliminated subject terms from sentences that he thought liable to be misunderstood as types of names—the phrase “all unicorns,” for example, as liable to be conceived as a name of a collective subject, or the phrase “the present king of France” as the
name of a particular person. But he still held to the idea that naming was an essential dimension of the way language connected to the world—one simply had to find the right type of name such as “logically proper names.” Hence his recourse to the objects of “sense certainty.” However, by mid-century Quine challenged the model itself: for him, a singular term “need not name to be significant,” and this opened up a deep disagreement at the heart of the analytic project.

For Quine, talk of singular reference was, as he put it, “only a picturesque way of alluding to the distinctive grammatical roles that singular and general terms play in sentences. It is by grammatical role that general and singular terms are properly to be distinguished.” Russell’s attack had been directed at understanding the sentence “All Greeks are mortal” as structurally akin to “Socrates is mortal,” and so treating “all Greeks” as a collective proper name. But Quine was to undercut the very contrast by treating “Socrates is mortal” in just the same way! For Quine, “Socrates is mortal” was to be effectively treated in terms of a bound quantifier that “ranged” over a domain of discourse and as stating that if something is found that socratizes, then that thing is mortal. As Quine was well aware, treating proper names as predicates was just how medieval scholastic logicians had gotten around Aristotle’s prohibition on using singular judgments within syllogisms, as they had treated singular terms as “universals.”

I have suggested that a definite description, in employing a subject term that included some general concept to designate an individual thing, is the sort of phrase that captures what Hegel thought of as a typically Aristotelian object of “perception,” the successor of the purported quasi-object of “sense certainty.” Russell’s technique in “On Denoting,” then, might be though of as enacting the analysis of the “perceived” object of the Phenomenology into the objects of “sense certainty.” But while Russell “regressed” within the Hegelian series to a position more like that of sense certainty, Quine might be seen as having progressed within the series, to replace the objects of “perception” by the posits of “the understanding.” But a consequence of this has been the problem diagnosed by McDowell as the picture of concept application free from empirical constraint, in which concept application threatens “to degenerate into moves in a self-contained game.” McDowell’s response to the Quinean “degeneration” is effectively to dig in at the level of Hegel’s conception of the perceptual object and regard perceptual experience as thoroughly conceptual. Brandom’s response is different.
Considered against the background of Chapters 1 to 3 of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Brandom’s attempt to go beyond the dilemma diagnosed by McDowell has him reformulating Hegel’s solution to the collapse of the given objects of consciousness in Chapter 4. Hegel’s solution to the problems that flow from the understanding is found in his radically anti-Cartesian account of the primacy of the relation of reciprocal recognition holding between cognitive subjects. Crudely, Hegel attempts to show that if all I can know are my own *posits*, then *what* I posit cannot simply be up to me. If we think of positing an object as something like issuing a decree or rule about what in experience is to *count as* an instance of that object, then for this notion to have any content, a subject would have to be able to *hold herself* to that decree or rule in her subsequent behaviour. That is, the relation a conscious subject bears to its posited object must be understood as holding internal to that subject’s *normative* relation to herself, a practical capacity to *hold herself* to her own rules — her “self-consciousness.” Next, such a holding oneself to a rule can only be understood within an overarching relation *between* subjects. I can only hold myself to a particular rule if I belong to a community of agents who can also recognize the rule and can hold me to it, thereby recognizing *me* as a rule-following subject.\(^42\) Thus, what separates out human beings from the rest of nature as the “spiritual” (*geistig*) dimension of their existence is this capacity for “reciprocal recognition” that Hegel famously introduces in his account of the simple model of social life with the master and slave.\(^43\) With this, Hegel’s phenomenology leaves the Cartesian domain of consciousness and self-consciousness and becomes, as the title conveys, a phenomenology of “spirit” (*Geist*). That is, it becomes a phenomenology tracing the dynamics of concrete systems or networks of such recognitively mediated social relations that Hegel sees as operative in different societies in history.

Brandom’s solution to the problems of reference within analytic philosophy is thus effectively Hegel’s solution to the problems of consciousness transposed into the key of a pragmatics of language use. While there is nothing simply “given” from the world to constrain the semantic content of our claims, there are nevertheless social norms concerning the way we put words together in sentences and the way we put our sentences together in patterns of material inference. For Brandom to make an assertion is to make an undertaking to another: it is to commit oneself to giving reasons to one’s interlocutor for believing it, should she bring it into question. This brings out the primacy of the relations of material inference: to give a reason is to offer a further assertion from which the original can be materially inferred. Moreover, inferential relations figure further in that to make an assertion is not only to commit oneself to the truth of the sentence itself but implicitly to the further
sentences that can be materially inferred from it. Conversations are exchanges in which we “keep score” of each other’s changing inferential commitments and entitlements, and at the heart of this relation is the Hegelian stance of “reciprocal recognition.” In our asserting we are not answerable to the world as such, but to each other and so must recognize each other as beholden to the same rules that are immanent to our social practices and able to be made explicit, reflected upon and critically transformed within those social practices.

In this way, Brandom has embedded central technical issues that have occupied many analytic philosophers for the last hundred years within a meta-conception of normative social practices mediated by institutionally encoded “normative statuses” within which individuals stand—practices and institutions that he sees as at the heart of what Hegel thinks of as rationally self-transforming “spirit” or “Geist,” and whose “shapes” are charted in subsequent parts of the Phenomenology of Spirit. From such a perspective, philosophical practice cannot remain at the level of such technical problem-solving, say those of logical semantics or epistemology—a limitation which continental philosophers often see as a stifling characteristic of analytic philosophy. Philosophy must reflect upon the historically given normative relations within which modern discourses like that of philosophy itself function. Ethical and political considerations, thus, could no longer be confined to mere subject areas of philosophy to be approached with a conceptual armature constituted prior to and free from such considerations. With the work of McDowell and Brandom, then, we get a sense of how the traditional antagonism between Hegelian and analytic philosophy might be overcome.

But is it Hegel?

Of course neither McDowell nor Brandom would want to be held to the plausibility of all of Hegel’s claims. As Hegel had put it, philosophy is “its time” raised to the level of thought, and Hegel’s time was clearly not ours. So, for any reading of Hegel there will arise the question of what can, and what cannot, be separated from what we might take to be the contingencies of the time and culture to which he belonged, and we might think of our relation to Hegel here in ways broadly parallel to those that Hegel employed with respect to philosophers of his past. But beyond this generally historicist point, it is already possible to see a tension between what lessons Brandom and McDowell themselves wish to extract from Hegel, a tension between what we might call their respective “rationalist” and “romantic” interpretations.
Here Brandom is helpfully explicit with respect to what he takes to be Hegel’s relation to the “Romantic expressivist tradition that he inherited.”\textsuperscript{44} Hegel’s version of this was, he points out, a \textit{rationalist} approach which “gives pride of place to \textit{reasoning} in understanding what it is to say or do something.”\textsuperscript{45} I suspect that from the side of the more conventional Hegelians, however, Brandom’s analytic translation might condemn Hegel to a framework of which he was consistently critical—the framework that typified Kant’s philosophy, “the understanding,” while Hegel’s were offered from the standpoint of “reason.”\textsuperscript{46} Elsewhere I have suggested that McDowell’s concern with the more \textit{perceptual} aspects of experience link him to a less rationalistic form of thought, one more characteristic of those early romantic attempts to counter what they saw rationalism’s threat to \textit{value}.\textsuperscript{47} Does this mean, then, that an analytically \textit{reconstituted} Hegel is in danger of being torn into irreconcilable opposed halves? This would be a fate akin to that of the historical Hegel, whose philosophy fell prey to warring “left” and “right” factions over the issue of religion. I suggest that Hegel himself may provide a way around this.

The part of Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} that coheres with McDowell’s employment of Sellars’s critique of the “myth of the given” is, as I have suggested, the critique of “sense-certainty” that leads Hegel to the consideration of “perception”. In contrast, Brandom is more concerned with the progression beyond “perception” to “the understanding” as well as the answer Hegel provides to the problems of \textit{it} with his “recognitive” account of the basis of self-consciousness. But in all such transitions, we are meant to see how each superseded “shape” of consciousness or self-consciousness is, while \textit{negated}, still somehow \textit{incorporated} into the superseding shape—the process that Hegel captures with the term “\textit{Aufhebung}”. I suggest that Brandom’s social pragmatic interpretation may give us the means to make sense of this: might it not be that we employ different \textit{types} or \textit{styles} of reasoning in different situations or contexts? While reflecting on the nature of our reasoning in natural-scientific contexts, we may situate ourselves within the more rationalistic forms of thought like that of “the understanding,” but in other contexts, say reflecting on the nature of more value-laden forms of relation to the world such as literature or history, we might want to preserve forms of reasoning that stick closer to the shape of “perception.” Thus, just as in some areas of contemporary analytic philosophy, appealing to some form of “contextualism” here—a “cognitive contextualism”—may be what is needed.\textsuperscript{48}
After a century of non-communication, the emerging dialogue between analytic philosophy and German idealism promises a rich future. Regardless of the directions that such an engagement may take, it will be difficult to ignore the path-breaking work of Brandom and McDowell.

9 Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, § 3.3.
10 Thus Sellars referred to his lectures as referred to his lectures as his “incipient *Meditations Hegeliènnes*” (*sic*). Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, § 20. Sellars actually advocated a hybrid of Kantian and scientific realist thought.
12 Indeed, such a focus on *causal* constraint in the effort of find a way around the problems of the Russelalian approach to sense-data has been a prominent feature of much work in analytic epistemology in the second half of the twentieth century.
14 Thus McDowell talks of making room “for a different notion of givenness, one that is innocent of the confusion between justification and exculpation” (ibid., p. 10).
16 McDowell uses the phrases “experiential intake” or “bits of experiential intake” as a paraphrase of the Kantian term “intuition” in a number of places in *Mind and World* (e.g., pp. 4, 6, and 9).

“The subtlety and sophistication of Kant’s concept of representation is due in large part to the way in which it is integrated into his account of the inferential relations among judgments.” Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 92.

A “material inference” is simply an inference that does not hold because of logical form, for example, the inference from “Wollongong is to the south of Sydney” to “Sydney is to the north of Wollongong.”

Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, p. 96. In particular, Brandom finds in Hegel’s methodological use of the combination of “mediation” and “determinate negation,” ideas about the implicit structuring of the linguistic practice of the asking for and giving of reasons which are at the heart of his own rationalist pragmatism.


See, for example, Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 12. Russell had believed that Kant’s account of intuition was essentially in agreement with his position on sense-data. Ibid., p. 85.


A definite description, I suggest, in employing a subject term that included some general concept to designate an individual thing, is just the *sort*
of phrase that captures what Hegel thinks of as a typical object of "perception," an object characterized in Aristotelian way as an instance of a kind. Aristotle in fact discussed this type of judgment as a particular judgment, restricting syllogisms to universal and particular judgment types, and disallowing singular judgments, such as judgments with proper names in subject position. See my Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 89–91.


39 Thus “logicians in past centuries … commonly treated a name such as ‘Socrates’ rather on a par logically with ‘mortal’ and ‘man,’ and as differing from these latter just in being true of fewer objects, viz. one.” Quine, Word and Object, p. 181.

40 Reference by definite description is what in Russell corresponds to the Aristotelian approach of picking out an object as instance of a kind in a particular judgment form. See above, footnote 35.

41 McDowell, Mind and World, p. 5.

42 Without this, the gap between the facts of my behaviour and the implicit norms being followed in the behaviour would collapse.


44 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, p. 34.

45 Ibid.

46 Here the thorny question of Hegel’s relation to the romantics is crucial. Rather than rejecting Enlightenment reason, the Jena romantics of the 1790s were rather trying to accommodate it within a broader conception of reasoning, ones could find a place for the truths of literature and religion. And while Hegel clearly criticised certain romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel, he was equally clearly influenced by others, such as Schelling and Hölderlin.

47 Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, chs. 5 and 6.

48 Kant was an idealist, rather than a realist, about logical form, and it is just this idealism that will be useful for Hegel’s cognitive contextualism. Were one a realist about form, one could ask which of the cognitive forms, for
example, that of perception or that of the understanding, gets the world right by capturing its basic form. But this question is meaningless for the idealist. On the relevance of Kant’s formal idealism for this tradition, see my Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche (London: Routledge, 2009).

Bibliography:


