

Wilfrid Sellars's Disambiguation of Kant's "Intuition" and its Relevance for Conceptions of Perceptual Content

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In the opening pages of his 1966 Locke Lectures, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes*, Wilfrid Sellars alludes to what he takes to be the ambiguity or "Janus-faced" character of Kant's notion of "intuition" as developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Sellars, 1966, p. 2).

Appealing first to the formal distinction between intuitions and concepts, he notes that in Kant's taxonomy it is the *generality* of concepts "whether sortal or attributive, a priori or empirical" that distinguishes them from intuitions, since "Kant thinks of intuitions as representations of individuals" (ibid., p. 3). But this way of drawing the distinction, Sellars notes, opens up the possibility of thinking of intuitions, nevertheless, as *types* of concepts—that is, as "conceptual representations of individuals rather than conceptual representations of attributes or kinds" (ibid.).

Not all conceptual ways of capturing an individual can be thought of as intuitional: the phrase "the individual which is perfectly round", for example, doesn't capture what is for Kant the *other* defining feature of intuitions, their *immediacy* (Sellars, 1966, p. 3). But in turn, the immediacy appealed to, Sellars thinks, could itself be understood in either of two ways. The immediacy of the relation of representation to object might be thought of such that the intuition is *caused* by the object, *or* it may be construed phenomenologically as a type of *immediacy to consciousness* of the intuited object thought of on the model of a demonstrative "this". Although not rejecting the relevance of the former possibility in his reading of Kant, and noting that he will return to this theme later, Sellars takes the model of the demonstrative to be "on the whole, the correct interpretation" of Kant's notion of an intuition (ibid.). But Sellars now directs our attention to Kant's discussion of the shaping of intuition by the productive imagination in the B Deduction. That, as Kant makes clear, the productive imagination is

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actually “the understanding functioning in a special way” (ibid., p. 4) suggests the involvement of concepts in the shaping of intuition. The demonstrative captures the immediacy of intuitions, but the involvement of concepts now suggests that the intuition not be considered simply as analogous to a “this” but rather to a “this-such” (ibid., p. 5). This then, is the type of intuition that is really a species of *conceptual* representation.

It is just this conception of intuition as a “this-such” that signals for Sellars the underlying *Aristotelian* shape of Kant’s thinking here: “we are at once struck by the kinship of Kant’s view that the basic *general* concepts which we apply to the object of experience are derived (by the analytic activity of the understanding) from the intuitions synthesized by the productive imagination, with classical Aristotelian abstractionism” (Sellars, 1966, p. 5). This kinship, however, presents the interpreter of Kant with a puzzle. On the Aristotelian picture, the presented content as a “this-such” allows the possible *abstraction* of the conceptual element such that the perceiver thereby *comes to possess that concept* such that it is now available to be applied as a predicate in judgments. But this implies that the “such” of the perceptual content could not itself be truly conceptual, as Kant thinks of concepts as *prototypically* applied in judgments. Thus, one should not, with the abstractionist, portray the different way in which the representation “cube” occurs in the phrase “this-cube” and “this is a cube” in terms of some *genetic* priority of the former. From a Kantian perspective, I could not grasp a representation content as a “this cube” unless I already *had* the capacity to make judgments of the form “this is a cube” (ibid.).

Sellars describes as “puzzling” Kant’s apparent acceptance of Aristotle’s abstractionist prioritizing of a representation such as “this-cube” over the representation “cube” considered as a universal able to be applied in judgments. As a representation “this cube” is “essentially *incomplete*” because it would not be able even to play a role in a speaker’s “mental listing” unless that speaker knew *how* to complete it to form a judgment such as “this cube is a die” (Sellars, 1966, p. 6). In fact, in his writings on Aristotle (Sellars 1959, essays 3 & 4), Sellars, not uncontroversially, interprets Aristotle as conceiving of *forms* as particulars rather than universals, an interpretation that fits with this reading of Aristotle as prioritizing representations of the form “this A” over the representation “A” used as predicated as in “this is an A”. But this option should not have been available to Kant who, unlike Aristotle, treats concepts as paradigmatically predicative.

It is this puzzlement that leads John McDowell to dismiss both

Sellars's reading of Kant and his accompanying analysis of perceptual content. Thus, in "The Logical Form of an Intuition" (McDowell, 2009, pp. 23–43), McDowell considers and rejects Sellars's claim as to the ambiguity of Kant's notion of intuition. Not only does it misrepresent Kant, it is incompatible with the "basic Sellarsian conviction" that McDowell sees himself as true to, even if Sellars himself had wavered (*ibid.*, p. 26n7). This is the conviction "that the capacity to experience things as thus-and-so should be seen as coeval with the capacity to judge that they are thus-and-so" (*ibid.*), the conviction behind his own account of perceptual content.

In this paper I suggest that McDowell is far too hasty in dismissing Sellars's quasi-Aristotelian account of Kantian intuitions. Not only does Sellars's claim as to the ambiguity of Kant's notion of intuition point to a tension *within* Kant (one that came to be pointed out by Hegel), it also suggests a way around a crippling problem facing McDowell's *own account* of perceptual content. Of course, the "puzzle" of dealing with the abstractionism of the Aristotelian account of perceptual content needs to be solved, but this I suggest, requires no more than a minor adjustment to Sellars's own presentation. In the next section I argue for the potential possessed by the Aristotelian reading of perceptual content to provide a remedy for a serious problem facing McDowell's own purportedly Kantian-Sellarsian account of perception. Following that, I propose an amendment to Sellars's way of construing the "this-such" proposal for Kantian intuition as a way around the problem of Aristotle's abstractionism.

Problems within McDowell's "Sellarsian" approach to perception

In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, based on a series of lectures given at University College London in 1957, Sellars had brought together the idea of perceptual experience understood as seeing something to be the case with the linguistic act of making a claim. To say "that a certain experience is a *seeing that* something is the case, is to do more than describe the experience. It is to characterize it as, so to speak, making an assertion or claim, and ... to *endorse* that claim" (Sellars, 1997, §16). In the same spirit, in *Mind and World* McDowell introduces the idea of perceptual openness to facts by way of an analogy with Wittgenstein's discussion of *asserting*. "When we say, and *mean*, that such-and-such is the case", says Wittgenstein, "we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short of the

fact; but we mean: *this—is—so*” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §95, quoted McDowell, 1996, p. 27). McDowell transposes this form of words to the context of perceptual content to become “when we see that such-and-such is the case, we, and our seeing, do not stop anywhere short of the fact. What we see is: that such-and-such is the case” (McDowell, 1996, p. 29). We might call this McDowell’s *Tractarian* conception of the perceptual world—it is a perceptual world conceived as a “totality of facts [*Tatsachen*], not of things [*Dinge*]” (Wittgenstein, 1922, §1.1). But such a “factualist” rather than “objectualist” conception of perceptual content can strike one as counterintuitive. True, I can think of myself as seeing *that* my desk has a particular color, *that* it stands besides the window, but that I can see *that* such facts “obtain” can seem to be, in some sense, secondary to or explainable by the fact that I see *the desk*. And I can see the desk only because I am in my study facing *it* with an unimpeded view. *Proximity to* and having an *unimpeded view of* as conditions for *seeing* seem to be an important part of what we mean by “seeing”. But *objects*, not “facts” seem to be the sorts of things one can be close to or far from, or that one can have unimpeded or impeded views of.

To a critic motivated by such considerations, the idea that experience itself somehow *contains* a claim or assertion can seem wildly counterintuitive, as if, as Michael Ayers has put it, experience has a “quasi-linguistic” content (Ayers, 2004). McDowell has responded that his view leads to no such counter-intuitive consequences (McDowell, 2009, pp. 134–7). His approach, McDowell argues, is entirely consistent with the common-sense view of experience to which the objectualists appeal. Agreeing with the general “shape” that Ayers, drawing on the tradition of empiricism, attributes to experience, McDowell comments that “it is precisely to make room for a view with this shape that I urge the conception of our experience that Ayers resists” (McDowell, 2009, p. 140). With his “quasi-linguistic” charge, McDowell counters, Ayers has mistaken his approach for the type of idealism in which “the world is a mere reflection of a self-standing subjectivity” (*ibid.*, p. 143). But *this*, replies McDowell

depends on assuming that in any such position the form of thought must be taken to be explicable first, before we even consider thought’s bearing on reality, and only subsequently said to coincide with the form of the world. In such a view the form is supposed to be in place as informing thought, which is surely subjective, before one argues that it informs reality as well. And then the claim that it informs reality does look like a projection of something that

was first in place as subjective on to what is supposed to be objective. (ibid.)

Despite this defence, however, McDowell has more recently *retracted* the “propositionality-of-content” claim—a retraction that could be taken as *conceding* something to Ayers’s “quasi-linguistic” criticism. Thus in the paper “Avoiding the Myth of the Given” (McDowell, 2009, pp. 256–72) he points to the differences between “discursive” and “intuitional” content. While discursive content is usefully modelled on linguistic utterance and can thereby be considered “articulated”, intuitional content should not be thought of in that way (ibid., p. 262). Furthermore, not only is intuitional content not a result of “our putting significances together” (ibid., p. 263), it is not, he claims, “articulated” *at all* (ibid., p. 262). But while this might help in deflecting the “quasi-linguistic” charge, it seems to be at variance with one of the basic features of McDowell’s position in *Mind and World*, the idea that “in enjoying an experience one is open to manifest facts” (McDowell, 1996, p. 29), as surely the “facts” onto which experience is open suggests *articulation*—the very propositional articulation that had given rise to the Ayers’s “quasi-linguistic” charge.

This issue of the “articulation” of intuition thus presents a dilemma for McDowell. Without articulation, it is hard to see how the content of intuition can play a role in the justification of perceptual judgment, but with it one seems to be advocating a “quasi-linguistic” account of experience. In “Avoiding the Myth of the Given” McDowell talks of a perceiver’s exploiting the unarticulated content of intuition by somehow *carving out* a certain determinate content from it and then “put[ting] it together with other bits of content in discursive activity” (McDowell, 2009, pp. 263–4). Although not discursive, intuitional content can nevertheless still be considered *conceptual*, because

every aspect of the content of an intuition is present in a form in which it is already suitable to be the content associated with a discursive capacity... The content of an intuition is such that its subject can analyse it into significances for discursive capacities ... [T]he subject of an intuition is in a position to put aspects of its content, the very content that is already there in the intuition, together in discursive performances. (ibid., p. 264)

But what guides the analysis of an intuition “into significances for discursive capacities” if the intuition is unarticulated?

It is at just this point, I want to suggest, that Sellars’s idea of perceptual content as having the shape of an Aristotelian “this-such” seems to offer

McDowell a way out of this problem. Intuition, on Sellars's conception as a "this-such", clearly has an articulation. If an intuition is thought of as analogous to the representation "this-cube", then presumably it is articulated in the way a perceived *cube* is articulated. And with this analogy we can see how perceptual content could be objectual and yet in some sense *conceptual*, but without being counter-intuitively "quasi-linguistic" or "discursive". And yet the "this-such" analysis still faces the problem that a "this-such" phrase is representationally *incomplete*. It cannot be thought of as a "given" that is prior to the capacity to exercise the "such" concept in a judgment. But does not this lead us back to McDowell's starting point—that the true content of perception must be, as it were, fully sentential? A closer look at Aristotle, I believe, shows a possible way out of this dilemma. But it will be seen that such a reading in turn introduces a *problem* for Kant, and that *another*, different notion of "intuition" will be needed to overcome problems associated with the "Aristotelian" characteristics of experience. Indeed, there is evidence that Kant *does have* another conception of intuition to do just this. As Sellars claims, Kant's notion of intuition was *ambiguous*.

Sellars's Aristotelian conception of intuition revisited

The problem with Sellars's bare "this-such" account is that a "this-such" is not a complete representation. As Sellars points out, one could not properly understand an incomplete representation such as "this-cube" unless "one knew how to complete" it to form a representation such as "this cube is a die" (Sellars, 1992, p. 6). But the idea of the latter form of representation as capturing the representational structure of perception *itself* leads to what I have called McDowell's "Tractarian" conception of the perceptual world, and with it the problem of conceiving perceptual content as "quasi-linguistic" in the sense of having a *discursive* articulation. However, the articulation of the perceptual claim that Sellars raises above with "this cube is a die" should not, if understood in a *properly* Aristotelian way, be taken as akin to that of the sorts of "facts" populating the modern *Tractarian* world. It is true that "facts" have a propositional structure, and the modern term "proposition" derives via the Latin "*propositio*" from Aristotle's word "*prótesis*". But this should not be taken to suggest that by "*prótesis*" Aristotle meant just what is *now* meant by talk of *propositions*.

In his historical study of the evolution of the notion "proposition", Gabriël Nuchelmans has pointed out that Aristotelian *próteses* can be

expressed in two grammatical forms. Beside “that” (“*hoti*”) followed by a clause with a verb in indicative mood, ancient Greek also uses a construction consisting of noun in the accusative case followed by an infinitive phrase (Nuchelmans, 1973, p. 33). These structures effectively go with what came to be thought of as “de dicto” and “de re” forms for the ascription of propositional attitudes. But also, like the modern idea of proposition, “*prótesis*” can be used to characterize the contents of “propositional attitudes” and also “to designate that which actually is the case in the world”, that is, it can refer to *states of affairs* (ibid.). However, a peculiarity of Aristotle’s treatment of *próteses* stands out. When using the noun plus infinitive construction, he sometimes calls *próteses* “things” (*pragmata*), and in one place describes these “things” as capable of being *false*. Aristotle gives two examples of the latter phenomenon—“the diagonal [of a square] to be commensurable [with the side of the square]” (which is false as the diagonal of a square is *incommensurable* with the side), and “you to be seated”, presumably said when the subject of the sentence is *not* seated, but, say, standing (Aristotle, 1960, bk. V, ch. xxix, 1024b19–20). In ancient Greek, the infinite form of the verb is used in contexts in which natural English expression would employ the gerund or “verbal noun”, the gerund not being found in Ancient Greek itself (Mollin and Williamson, 1997, p. 99). We might then use the expressions “the diagonal’s being commensurable” and “your being seated” for the rough English equivalent of Aristotle’s examples.

Some interpreters have understandably been puzzled by the fact that when talking of “false” *pragmata*, Aristotle seems to be referring to *states of affairs*, and *not* to be attributing a false belief or false perception to some particular subject. This leads Nuchelmans, for example, to assume that Aristotle *must* have intended to refer simply to a state of affairs *as believed or asserted* because, he writes, “there is nothing in the world with which the *pragma* can be identified” (Nuchelmans, 1973, p. 34). But for other interpreters, there are good reasons to take Aristotle at his word here and to regard an Aristotelian “state of affairs” as simply capable of *being* false. Thus Paolo Crivelli (2004) has insisted that it is precisely the “worldly” sense that Aristotle has in mind when he talks of false *pragmata* (Crivelli 2004, pp. 4–7), but if this is the case, then an Aristotelian state of affairs clearly must be different from, say, Wittgenstein’s “*Tatsache*”, or any other equivalent modern versions of a “fact”, as what *we* call “facts” are, of course, necessarily *true* (Ibid., p. 47n11).

“A state of affairs, which is an object” says Crivelli,

is composed of two further objects: one of the objects of which it is composed is a universal, the other is either a universal or an individual. A state of affairs is true when and only when the objects of which it is composed are reciprocally combined in the relevant way; it is false when and only when the objects of which it is composed are reciprocally divided in the relevant way. (ibid., p. 4)

Here Crivelli's "when and only when" construction gives the hint as to how we are to understand this peculiarity. We can understand how Aristotelian states of affairs *qua pragmata* might be *false* when we grasp that Aristotle's equivalent to a truth-bearing "proposition", the "*prótesis*", if true is not thereby *timelessly* true. A state of affairs described as, say "you to be sitting" *becomes* "false" just when, say, *you stand*. And this, it would seem, is a consequence of the combination of Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth with the assumption that a certain *prótesis* can be true at one time and false at another (ibid., p. 183; Modrak, 2001, p. 54). Conceived in the modern way, a proposition if true is *timelessly* true, but this is an assumption that, as Arthur Prior has pointed out, was not shared by logicians up until the time of the Renaissance (Prior, 1957, p. 104). Indeed, according to Prior, the idea of timelessly true or false propositions only started to become the dominant view in the nineteenth century, and it wasn't until the turn of the twentieth century that it became the *standard* view within both *traditional* approaches to logic with Keynes, Venn and Johnson and the new logic championed by Russell (ibid., p. 116). And, of course, the timeless view is the view that is found in Frege, and in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. But while this was a conception of "facts" or "states of affairs" that may have suited the theoretical purposes that were driving those involved in the reform of logic and semantics around the time of the birth of analytic philosophy—that of providing a logical foundation for mathematics—we might ask why we should think of "facts" so construed as what one is "opened to" in perceptual experience? Might not Aristotle present us with a viable alternative to any "Tractarian" conception of perceptual contents?

This, then, forms my suggested revision of Sellars's original "this-such" as the verbal analogue of a Kantian intuition. Rather than a bare "this-such", we might think of the appropriate expression as "this-such ϕ -ing". And, I suggest, it is just the logical features of *próteses* making them peculiar from the modern point of view that make them appropriate for thinking about the content of perception. That Aristotle calls a *prótesis* a *pragma* already suggests something more "objectual" and less "linguistic"

than contemporary “facts”. And the tensedness of *prótheses* that results in them changing their truth value better captures the status of what we are “open to” in perception. On this model, then, we might then think of the natural expression of the content of experience is closer to the “this-such ϕ -ing” than by what follows a “that” in English. What I see is “you sitting” or “this man sitting” rather than “that you are sitting” or “that this man is sitting”. Sellars wants to hold onto the idea that there is something like a *claim* implicit in perceptual experience, and Aristotle’s insistence that such *pragmata* can be true or false at least captures the *claimability* of such states of affairs. Thus, “this man sitting” (with “sitting” read as a gerund) will be *false* where it is the case where he is, say, standing or lying and the elements of this man and “sitting” have “separated” as when his *being sitting* has been excluded by a contrary property such as his *being standing*. In this sense, it is *more* claim like, and hence “complete” than the phrase “this man”.

But I suggest that the real advantage of thinking of perceptual experience as expressed in this Aristotelian way is to be found in the fact that the truth to which it gives expression is *not* timeless. As the *demonstrative* aspect of the “this-such” conception of intuition suggests, objects of perceptual experience are paradigmatically in the *now*. I see you sitting, and I grasp *what I see* as something that can become false *if* and *when* you decide to stand. To preserve the idea that the content of perceptual experience is a component of some modern Fregean fact, I would have to think of the content as somehow indexed as in the expression “I see you sitting *at time t*”, *said at time t*. But this indexed content looks like a form that is appropriate for some subsequent *reflection* on my experience. For example, I might say, “I saw him sitting in the square by himself around mid-day. Later when I returned he was standing, chatting to a group of friends.” However it looks entirely artificial to try to capture some *present* perceptual experience in this way. When I see some man sitting, I see *him sitting*—period. We might subsequently learn that what I am seeing through a powerful astronomical telescope is something taking place not now but millennia ago. But the default understanding of perception is surely that what it is that I am seeing is something happening *now*.

We started with Sellars’s claim of the Aristotelian “this-such” conception of perceptual experience capturing one side of Kant’s conception of “intuition” once it had been disambiguated, and my modification of Sellars has been to extend Sellars’s “this-such” to a “this-such ϕ -ing”. I further argued that it is the “tensed” logical feature of the

“this-such ϕ -ing” analysis that makes it appropriate for thinking of it as a rough linguistic analogue of the contents of perception. But it is just this feature of the “this-such ϕ -ing” content that shows why *this* conception of intuition could not be the whole story of the role played by intuition in Kant’s philosophy. On this reading, the contents of judgments made on the basis of perception would, if expressed in the way that the experience is *itself* expressed, have truth values that were *not* timelessly true. But when Kant thinks of judgments as representations belonging to the “transcendental unity of apperception”, surely judgments with timeless truth values is *exactly* what he wants. The idea is that the content of my judgments have to cohere into a unified representation of the world, and this is not going to be helped by judgments that I hold to be true today *becoming false* tomorrow. Kant himself signals a difference between two different forms of judgment when, in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* he distinguishes “judgments of experience” from “judgments of perception” (Kant, 1997, §18). What I want to suggest is that this distinction signals a similar “Janus-faced” feature of Kant’s conception of judgment that matches that noted by Sellars with respect to his account of intuition.

The other face of intuition.

Sellars had noted another way of understanding the “immediacy” of Kantian intuition besides the phenomenal immediacy that he gives expression to with the “this-such” locution: we may think of intuition as being *caused by* its object. Others have commented on the apparent ambiguity of Kant’s concept of intuition in related, but not quite the same terms. Kant describes intuitions as both *singular* and *immediate* representations which contrast with the *generality* and *mediate* nature of concepts, but as Charles Parsons (1969) has pointed out, it is far from clear that the singularity and immediacy conditions for intuitions coincide. Indeed, when one stresses the *singularity* of intuitions, a different conception of Kantian intuitions emerges from that conceived by Sellars in terms of the “conceptual representation” of individuals. Kant had held onto the ancient distinction between “singular (*einzel*)” and “particular (*besonder*)” *qua* different representations of individuals. For Aristotle, a *particular* judgment, like a universal judgment is actually a judgment *about* the universal in question. While “all Greeks are pale” says something about the universal Greekness by virtue of saying something about *all* its

instances, “some Greeks are pale” says something about Greekness by saying something about *some of its instances* (Whitaker, 1996, pp. 84–9). Even though it represents only *one* instance, a “this-such” representation within this system would count not as a singular representation but as a *particular* one, a fact confirmed by Kant’s treatment of the quantity of particularity in the *Jäsche Logic* (Kant 1992, pp. 598–9). But Kant specifically classifies *intuitions* as “singular (*einzel*)” representations (Kant, 1998, A320/B377), and interpreters including Manley Thompson (1972), Beatrice Longuenesse (1998) and Mary Tiles (2004) have stressed parallels between the role played by such “singular” intuitions in Kant’s transcendental logic and *singular terms* in Frege’s formal logic. In Thompson’s words, the formal logic presupposed *by* Kant’s transcendental logic is that of “first order quantificational logic plus identity but minus proper names or other singular terms that are in principle eliminable” (Thompson, 1972, p. 334).

This makes the formal logic implied by his transcendental logic very different from the Aristotelian syllogistic or term logic that Kant “officially” takes as the model of formal or “general” logic. From the perspective of Aristotelian term logic, that which is picked out as the subject of a judgment will not be represented by a singular term, as singular judgments do not have a place in syllogisms, but by a sortal concept employing *particular* term. This is just the category exemplified by a “this-such” and this is the conception of “intuition” that will come to the fore when intuitions are thought of in terms of their phenomenal *immediacy*. But when thought of as analogous to a singular term (or a *bare* demonstrative), a different conception of an intuition will emerge. When intuitions are regarded as analogues of properly singular terms, Kant’s intuition–concept distinction can seem to signal Frege’s later innovatory distinction between object and concept (Tiles, 2004, p. 85). Beatrice Longuenesse has shed light on this aspect of Kant. Kant thinks of concepts as being able to be applied to the content of intuitions, but in denying a cognitive role to properly *singular* judgments, and thinking of the subject terms of categorical judgments as necessarily containing *concepts*, he seems to suggest a type of logical deep structure to categorical judgments as traditionally conceived. Rather than thinking of such judgments as formed by the *joining of concepts*, he thinks of intuitions as *mediating* the application of concepts to objects such that “the objects subsumed under the subject-concept are also subsumed under the predicate-concept” (Longuenesse, 1998, p. 86). With this, Kant seems to suggest something like the modern analysis of a categorical judgment in terms of a

conditional, a practice that was familiar within the rationalist and idealist traditions (Bradley, 1883, bk. 1, ch. 2). Rather than thinking of the subject term as referring to some object *of which* a property designated by the predicate is affirmed, the categorical judgment is read as saying whatever it is that the subject term applies to is such that the predicate term also applies to it.

On Sellars's reading of Kant, then, the ambiguity of the notion of "intuition" lines up with whether or not the focus falls on the issue of *immediacy* or *singularity*, which in turn maps onto the different role played by intuitions in judgments of perception and judgments of experience. When the issue of immediacy is to the fore, an intuition is taken as equivalent the *subject term* of a sentence expressing perceptual judgment and of the form "This A is F", where "A" is a "sortal" or kind term, and F an attributive predicate. Those contexts in which the issue of *singularity* is to the fore—contexts of properly "experiential" judgments—the situation is more complicated. An intuition is *then* taken as equivalent *not* to the subject term of a categorical judgment, but to a representation to some *underlying something* to which the *concepts* "A" and "F" both apply.

For Sellars, Kant's ambiguity thus reflects his unacknowledged reliance on two different types of judgment forms appealing to term and propositional logics, respectively. But for Sellars's larger purposes this is ideal, as it captures a basic distinction within our ways of conceiving of the world that he refers to as the "manifest" and "scientific" images respectively. Elsewhere I have suggested that a similar distinction is maintained by Hegel, for example, in the distinction between "perception" and "the understanding" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Redding, 2007, ch. 3). Sellars's (and Hegel's) "disambiguation" of Kant of course raises issues well beyond the scope of this paper, but one powerful motivation for not dismissing Sellars's thought here are the resources it supplies for a credible account of the contents of perception.

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