Hegel’s Anticipation of the Early History of Analytic Philosophy

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Abstract: The opening chapters of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* have for some time been taken as speaking to various concerns central to early analytic philosophy. In particular, Hegel’s diagnosis of the problems of “sense-certainty” has been read as anticipating the problems discovered within attempts like that in early Russell to found knowledge on some immediate “acquaintance” with “sense-data.” Here, utilizing a parallel between “shapes of consciousness” and “shapes of speech,” I extend the idea of such an Hegelian “anticipation” to that of a dialectic running through analytic philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century.

Putting it very crudely, it might be said that in the much-discussed opening three chapters that make up the section “Consciousness” of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel sketches and “test-drives” various models for a consciousness able to experience and know the world. Kant had thought of objects of experience as necessarily having conceptual (as well as spatio-temporal) form, but non-conceptual (“intuitional”) content. But for Hegel, that objects show themselves to have a conceptual form emerges as one the first lessons of experience as tracked in chapter 1. Moreover, in contrast to Kant’s focus on the unity and stability of such form, Hegel wants to display a series in which successive “shapes of consciousness” emerge from the resolution of contradictions affecting their predecessors. We might say that while Kant had famously asserted the identity of “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general” and the “conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience,” Hegel points to the ever-present tension between them, examining the fate of particular conceptions of the constitution of objects in the light of the “experience” based upon those conceptions, and with this
transforms philosophy’s task, as Kant conceives it. Thus in the place of the reconfigured metaphysical project signalled by Kant which gives a definitive map of “what reason brings forth entirely out of itself” via the discovery of “reason’s common principle,”4 Hegel radically historicizes reason into a series of particular finite forms, each driven to self-overcoming because of the constitutive contradictions at its centre.

While the opening chapters of the *Phenomenology* constitute only a small fragment of that work, they have been found to provide fertile ground for thinking about a number of central issues in contemporary Anglophone philosophy. This has been particularly true of the first “shape of consciousness” treated by Hegel—“sense-certainty.” With its idea of a bare singular presence purportedly knowable non-conceptually in terms of some immediate sensuous quality, the objects of sense-certainty show clear parallels with the *sense-data* of Bertrand Russell’s early philosophy that purportedly constitute the atoms of perceptual experience and are known directly and non-conceptually in “acquaintance.”5 Moreover, just as Hegel appeals to the model of the demonstrative pronoun, “the ‘this,’” to capture the purported immediacy and singularity of the contents of sense-certainty, Russell too appeals to demonstratives as the proper names of sense data—in fact demonstratives stand as paradigms of proper names in language, strictly considered.6 Juxtaposing the givens of the to-be-overcome sense-certainty with the sense-data of Russellian “acquaintance” then allows us to think of Hegel as, in some way, anticipating Wilfrid Sellars’s celebrated critique of the “Myth of the Given” in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*.7

However, perhaps this fruitful nexus between Hegel’s thought and early analytic philosophy can be extended. Kenneth Westphal in particular has argued at length for the relevance of the *Phenomenology’s* opening chapters for contemporary analytic epistemology.8 In Hegel’s account, sense-certainty shows itself to be riven by contradictions, and is reconceived as a shape of consciousness called “perception” developed in chapter 2, but in turn, the self-subsistent objects of perception undergo a similar collapse and are replaced, in chapter 3, by the posited rather than directly “perceived” forces found in modern scientific explanations of the world. For Westphal, Hegel here articulates a distinctive epistemology adequate to the Newtonian turn in early modern science. While in sympathy with Westphal’s interpretation, here I explore the relationship between Hegel and analytic philosophy on a semantic rather than epistemological terrain, and seek a parallel between
the *Phenomenology*’s series of shapes of consciousness and the evolution of views within early analytic philosophy about the nature of reference. Just as there is a clear parallel between the role of demonstratives within Hegel’s “sense-certainty” and Russell’s conception of the givenness of sense-data, there are, I suggest, parallels between further “shapes of consciousness” in the *Phenomenology*’s chapters 2 and 3 and the developing conceptions of reference in the course of early analysis.

The thought here is a simple one. Henry Harris has discussed Hegel’s “sense-certainty” as drawing upon a type of pre-philosophical outlook of everyday life: in his words, it is the “consciousness of Hegel’s ‘Bauersfrau’ who is comfortably at home in her world of singular things, each with its proper name.” Indeed, we seem, like Harris’s Bauersfrau, to naturally associate the idea of things “given” to consciousness with the sorts of things to which we can unproblematically refer. In sense-certainty, we are, as Harris notes “in the world that Adam bequeathed us, the world of things with names.” In Hegel’s dialectic, upon reflection consciousness comes to recognize its initial conception of what is given to it as problematic and to be replaced by givens of a different shape. Similarly, it might be thought, upon reflection on our capacity to talk we might be led to think of the conception of language as names to be attached to things as also problematic and to be replaced by a more adequate conception. Indeed, such ideas seem to play a large role in the history of early analytic philosophy, prompting the question as to whether the progress of these two “dialectics” may show similarities. I believe they do. In the following sections I entertain the fantasy of Hegel as having anticipated something about the shape of the history of the first half-century of analytic philosophy in order to bring out these parallels.

*Shapes of Consciousness and Conceptions of Reference*

We are meant to follow the progress of “consciousness” through the series of “shapes” in the opening chapters of the *Phenomenology* by observing the way that each successive shape is able to resolve problems that had become obvious in the preceding shape. The history of early analytic conceptions of reference might also be thought of in terms of a series of attempts to characterize the properly referring parts of speech which express thought. If Hegel himself already gives us the lead here with his link between the demonstrative and that which is purportedly “given” in sense-certainty, what might be said about possible semantic analogues of further “shapes of consciousness”?
Comparing Hegel’s reflections on the fate of “the this” of sense-certainty to Sellars’s reflections on the Kantian notion of “intuition” in his *Science and Metaphysics*, Willem deVries has pointed out that the crucial direction in which Hegel’s argument travels in the sense-certainty chapter is towards a conception of “the this” as necessarily having *distinguishable moments* such that “the ‘this’ makes sense only in the context of a system of classificatory predicates. . . . [I]t can be seen as an argument that a ‘this’ must be a ‘this-such’ and never a *pure* ‘this.’” A crucial step in Hegel’s argument appeals to a “simple experiment” involving the use of language. Can the truth of a claim about a singular content that is given indexically as the referent of “now” survive being written down? Of course it cannot: the judgment “now is night” might be true when it is written down, but not twelve hours later. But “truth,” claims Hegel, must be what *endures*, and the apparently singular referents of words like “this,” “now,” “here” do not. Hegel interprets this as showing that what is “meant” here cannot be what is said, or written down. What is meant, the “absolutely singular, wholly personal, individual things,” cannot be what is expressed, and language has “the divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said.” The semantic contents of words such as “this,” “here,” and “now” are properly thought of not as *names* but as universals, words expressing *concepts*, and it is this fact that is made explicit in “perception.” The analogue of the shape of “perception” then, as deVries points out, would seem to be a term with an *explicitly* conceptual content, a “this-such,” rather than a bare “this.”

*The Aristotelian “Thing” of Perception*

The object of perception is, unlike the simple and singular object of sense-certainty, *articulated*. “Since the principle of the object, the universal, is in its simplicity a *mediated* universal, the object must express this its nature in its own self. This it does by showing itself to be the *Thing* [das Ding] *with many properties.*” Effectively, these “things” of perception are conceived along the lines of the primary substances of Aristotle’s *Categories*. First, Hegel considers the possible structure for such an object as a simple *bundle of properties*: “this salt” for example, might be thought of as a simple bundle of its constitutive properties (white, tart, cubical, and so on), coexisting in the “here” in an apparently indifferent manner. Such a conception of a thing as a bundle of atomic property-instances without any substrate within which those properties inhere is much as is found classically in Plato, or in a modern “subjective”
form in Hume, but this does not capture the sense of an enduring material substrate persisting throughout changes in its perceptible properties, as found in Aristotle. Hegel describes the properties of the perceived object as determinate “in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others as their opposites.” Moreover, this complexity of the perceived properties signals that they can no longer be thought of as simply coexisting as in a bundle: they inhere in a “one” that excludes other ones. In Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel describes Aristotle’s sensuous substances as involving “opposites that disappear in one another,” but also “matter” as “that which endures, the permanent in this change.”

However, this could not be all that is to be said of Hegel’s thing of perception, as a tension—for Hegel, a contradiction—within the notion of substance is already apparent in Aristotle. In the Categories, Aristotle defines “substance” negatively, as “that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject.” In that work, sortal predicates such as “man” are “said of” subjects, and attributive predicates such as “pale” are described as “in” subjects. There, substances just are the things subject to these two kinds of predication, such as “the individual man or the individual horse.” Elsewhere, however, things are more complicated. In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle describes the perceived “one” as a universal, not a particular: “for although you perceive particulars, perception is of universals,—e.g. of man, not of Callias the man.” Similarly, in the Metaphysics, substance becomes identified with the form—the “such” of the “this-such”—of individuals, not the concrete individuals themselves. That is, Aristotle seems to prevaricate as to whether the substance is what one immediately sees—the individual (atomu) man or horse of the Categories—or something underlying or within and expressed by these individuals—in Aristotle’s examples, something that is responsible for the man’s being a man, and the horse’s being a horse. Similarly in Hegel’s Phenomenology, the perceived thing is shown to be more complex and, indeed, contradictory. And the contradictoriness, for Hegel, is a function of the fact that something conceptual or universal is at the heart of thinghood as the post-Categories Aristotle suggests.

The role played by conceptuality in the human capacity to perceive individual things is further taken up when Hegel returns to the theme of perception in the section “Observing Reason” in chapter 5, “The Certainty and Truth of Reason.” A reasoning consciousness is not to be equated with a passively observing “unthinking consciousness” as the consciousness of the earlier perception chapter had taken itself to be. Observing reason instinctively
knows that “what is perceived should at least have the significance of a universal, not of a sensuous this [sinnlichen Diesen].”26 This was something that “we” phenomenological observers could note about the content of perception, but it was not explicit for the perceiving consciousness. “Observing reason” brings out the underlying structure of “perception” qua shape of consciousness by employing descriptions to capture the content of this shape. “This superficial raising out of singularity, and the equally superficial form of universality into which the sensuous object is merely taken up, without becoming in its own self a universal, this activity of describing things, is not yet a movement in the object itself.”27

With these considerations in place, a parallel can be seen to emerge between this shape of consciousness in Hegel’s presentation and a number of semantic assumptions central to early analytic philosophy, as Russell had appealed to descriptions as the mechanism via which proper names could achieve reference: “the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the name by a description.”28 If Bismarck had uttered the name “Bismarck,” Russell tells us in The Problems of Philosophy, then, assuming “that there is such a thing as direct acquaintance with oneself” he could have used that name “directly to designate the particular person with whom he was acquainted.”29 But only Bismarck could use the name “Bismarck” in that way. All others can only know Bismarck as a component of facts known by description,30 and so when I, for example, refer to Bismarck, the name can refer to the long-dead person only in virtue of my associating it with some definite description such as “the first Chancellor of the German Empire.”31 Russell’s denial of the cognitive role of ordinary proper names and his replacement of them by definite descriptions thus has parallels to Aristotle’s later insistence that in perceiving “Callias,” what is actually perceived is grasped in terms of a concept (“man”) and so cannot strictly be the individual Callias himself. But the descriptivist analysis of perceptual content in Hegel’s account fails, as does the descriptivist analysis of proper names in Russell’s account, and both these failures are bound up with internal problems with the Aristotelian infrastructure of this thought.

Perceptual Understanding and the Limitations of Identifying Descriptions

In the Perception chapter, Hegel discusses “perceptual understanding” or “sound common sense,”32 a transitional shape of consciousness that in grasping its object as a universal has actually entered “the realm of the
Understanding.” However, “this universal, since it originates in the senses, is essentially conditioned by it.” Later, in the section “Observing Reason” in chapter 5, the limitations of such a restricted form of the understanding are described further. Perceptual understanding is not a proper understanding of the object, but a form of cognition adequate only to remembering it. Hegel links this to the fact that here the universal at the heart of the perceived object is characterized by its static self-identity (“sich gleich Bleibende”), and we might take the capacity for “remembrance” here to be more-or-less equivalent to the capacity for re-identifying particular things—the type of capacity enabled by the ability to use identifying descriptions. But what observing reason needs in order to progress towards a proper understanding of the thing is to capture it not just in terms of any identifying description but one that captures the essential nature of the perceived thing. By distinguishing “what is essential and what is unessential, the Notion rises above the dispersion of the sensuous” and captures its object in terms of membership of a genus and its differentiae which not only “enable cognition to distinguish one thing from another” but which capture “that characteristic whereby the things themselves break loose from the general continuity of being as such, separate themselves from others, and are explicitly for themselves.” But we have already learned from the chapter “Perception” that any attempt to deal with the contradiction at the heart of Aristotle’s conception of substance by the expedient of distinguishing essential from non-essential properties proves to be empty. In the chapter on the understanding, it will not be essential properties that are invoked to explain the behaviours of things, but underlying forces, the expression of which in the realm of appearance can be described in terms of laws. The understanding is thus typical of the outlook found in modern philosophy rather than in Aristotelianism, although it is clearly connected to Aristotle’s understanding of a thing’s form as an entelechy.

In the earliest years of analysis, it was the problem of “empty names” that was to force Russell to find a way around treating descriptions as fundamental to reference. The underlying thought here is that in a judgment we normally think that it is the nature of whatever is picked out by the subject term that renders whatever is said about it true of false. That is, it is something about bats that make the sentence “bats fly” true and something about pigs, that makes the sentence “pigs fly” false. But what if what the subject term purports to refer to doesn’t exist? For Russell, proper names gained their reference courtesy of some definite description satisfied by the object referred to, but
descriptive phrases still seem to be meaningful (e.g., “the first Chancellor of the Antarctica”) when there is nothing of which they are true. Russell’s ensuing critique of the primacy of descriptions in establishing reference involved a critique of just the implicit subject–predicate logic that had articulated the object of perception qua “thing with many properties.” And, furthermore, the basic thrust behind the need to surpass this Aristotelian categorical structure for both Russell and Hegel would in both cases be bound up with the problematic assumption that the world is ultimately one made up of the sorts of “things with many properties” that we “perceive” in everyday life.

The basically Aristotelian shape of the perceived “things” of the Phenomenology’s chapter 2 can be thought of as the ontological side of the conception of predication internal to Aristotle’s term-based logic reflected in the Categories: it is just that understanding of objectivity implicit in the idea that we refer to substances in the world qua instances of kinds by the subject terms of our sentences and say something about the subjects of those sentences with the accident-expressing predicates drawn from arrays of contraries. In early analytic philosophy, however, just this conception of predication had come under attack because of the way that Frege had reconceived of the logical structure of a judgment.40 Whereas from within traditional subject–predicate logic a judgment had been regarded as resulting from the joining of independently meaningful terms designating kinds and properties, Frege had regarded the propositional content of the judgment as a truth function of its component basic propositions, and had regarded such basic propositions as the fundamental semantic units.41 This meant that the nature of predication had to be reconceived. Contrary to Aristotle, for Frege predication is a relation between an incomplete or “unsaturated” concept-expressing predicate on the one hand, and object-referring argument terms filling the empty valencies of that predicate on the other. “Completion” here was understood in truth functional terms: that is, as a matter of the predicate term’s mapping of its argument terms onto one of two “truth values” T (true) and F (false). As Frege put it, his logic gave “pride of place to the content of the word ‘true’” and from there he characterized a thought as “that to which the question “Is it true?” [was] in principle applicable.”42

It was this fundamental reconceptualization of the nature of predication that had allowed Russell to target the traditional conception of the subject–predicate relation as a source of a philosophical confusion. For example, with its associated “substance-accident” conception of objectivity, the Aristotelian
stance in logic tended to construe universal sentences like “all Greeks are wise” on the model of singular sentences such as “Socrates is wise,” giving the impression that the former were about some universal quasi-object such as the universal “greekness.” But for Russell, to take this sentence as referring to or being about something apparently given by its subject term—“all Greeks”—on the model of a singular sentence was simply mistaken. The correct, underlying form of such a sentence was the conditional, “for all things, if that thing is Greek, then it is wise”—a sentence in which no reference to a collective subject, or Aristotelian essence, appeared. On Russell’s telling of the history of philosophy, an uncritical attitude to the subject–predicate structure of sentences had underlain the problems of pre-analytic metaphysics, and in particular those of Hegel. “Analysis” aimed at a clarifying the logical shape of our claims and thereby liberating philosophy from the traps of Aristotle’s conception of substance, and setting it on a scientific footing.

For our concerns, Russell’s crucial instance on the use of the new logic for a form of analysis with philosophical teeth was provided in his 1905 paper, “On Denoting” in which he had introduced his so-called “theory of descriptions” to deal with the problem of non-referring names. Names were meant to acquire their reference courtesy of associated descriptions, but as the phrase “the present king of France” indicated, definite descriptions could be meaningful though empty. A sentence such as “The present king of France is bald” seems to express a thought, and so Frege’s question “Is it true?” must have an answer. But there is nothing to make the sentence true or false. Russell then used “analysis” to eliminate the offending subject-definite description in a similar way to that in which he had eliminated collective terms like “all Greeks” in the sentence “all Greeks are wise.” The suggestion is that the sentence be logically paraphrased in such a way to say something like “there is something such that it is a present King of France, and if anything is a present King of France it is that thing, and that thing is bald.” That is, the sentence is paraphrased in such a way that any “descriptive” reference to the sentence’s purported subject disappears leaving the sentence with a clear truth value—it is false. Such a paraphrasitic technique, now referred to as “transformative analysis,” promised for Russell “a reduction of all propositions in which denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur,” eliminating the problem of phrases which only purportedly denote.

We might say then, that with this form of syntactic transformation the problematic conception of a declarative sentence as comprising a referring
subject term (the grammarians “noun phrase”) followed by a predicate term (the grammarians’ “verb-phrase) came to be eliminated and replaced by a new shape of speech in a way analogous to the way that the Aristotelian object of “perception” in chapter 2 of Hegel’s Phenomenology came to be replaced by a new shape of consciousness. But how were these new shapes of speech to be thought of as connected to the world? Translated in the new predicate calculus, denoting phrases were meant to disappear, leaving sentences with variables “bound” by the existential quantifier. Frege had thought of such variables as ultimately replaceable by singular terms or “proper names,” but Russell rejected any fundamental role for proper names as standardly understood. Nevertheless, he still adhered to the Fregean model of the singular proper name as the part of speech that ultimately secured reference: it was the logically proper name that supposedly could not fail to refer that was his answer. Thus his settling for bare demonstratives naming “sense data” purportedly given with certainty in acquaintance.

From Perception to Understanding: Russelian Regression and Quinean Progression

In my account of Hegel’s schematic anticipation of analysis, then, I have Russell as having started off at that point towards the end of the Phenomenology’s chapter 2—the point of the collapse of the semantic equivalents of the things of “perception”—and as pushing forward towards “the understanding,” a realm no longer conceived as the realm of property substances or “things.” For Hegel too, everyday “things” have come to be eliminated from the realm of the understanding to be replaced by the “movement of appearance” behind which reality is conceived as some underlying “play of forces.” Russell too thinks of what is directly experienced as fluctuating appearances, but the atoms of which—his “sense-data”—are just those “sense-certainties” of the Phenomenology’s chapter 1. Moreover, unbeknownst to Russell, Hegel’s criticisms of sense-certainty were to catch up with him in the form of Sellars’s critique of the “Myth of the Given,” a critique Sellars’s himself labelled as his “incipient Meditations Hegeliènnes” (sic). But what of Hegel’s proposed way out of the limitations of “perception”? And were there any movements within the first half-century of analytic philosophy that effectively followed that path in contrast to Russell’s regression?

For Hegel, the development of the understanding beyond that of “perceptual understanding” involves a form of cognition that employs concepts
whose contents are no longer determined by sensuously given properties. In fact, transitions of this type are ubiquitous in Hegel. For example, in the section on theoretical spirit in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit from 1827 in the discussion of “representation” (Vorstellung), he describes the content of representation as “given” and immediately found [Vorgefundenes]. “In representation there is a sensible, immediate givenness, and the element of freedom, namely, that this content is my representation. . . . However I have not made the content. The content possesses an element of immediacy, givenness, of not being posited through my freedom.”\(^50\) It is only in thought that concepts function in a way such that they are no longer determined by some given sensuous content.\(^51\)

I suggest that a clear model for this is to be found in Leibniz’s critique of Locke’s “Myth of the Given”—that is, his critique of the Lockean conception of “clear and distinct ideas.” For Locke, impressions of colour were “clear and distinct,” but for Leibniz they were “clear and confused.”\(^52\) A cognizer able to differentiate a colour—blue, say, from green, yellow, red, and so on—but who is unable to discern those internal “marks” of the cognition of blue by which these differences could be explained, has only a clear and confused cognition. Knowledge of what it is about blue things that make them blue is required for a clear and distinct cognition. The movement in thought from a still Aristotelian conception of some given finite substance with empirically determinate properties to a different conception with which one attempts to explain the fluctuations of appearance—some conception of the underlying forces involved, for example—is just this type of Leibnizian movement from confused to distinct cognitions. In the 1950s, Leibniz had been described as employing analytic methods “strikingly similar to those of the present” to solve philosophical problems,\(^53\) and more recently as occupying “a pivotal point in the history of conceptions of analysis.”\(^54\) Indeed, Leibniz had called this technique “analysis,”\(^55\) and it fed into the philosophical method practiced by the pre-critical Kant—the “analytic” method. Analysis, in this sense, was a commonplace of the German tradition up to Hegel.\(^56\)

In Hegel’s chapter “Force and the Understanding,” it soon becomes apparent that in order to be known in a determinate fashion, any underlying force invoked in the explanation of appearance will require some opposing force,\(^57\) and “appearance” now comes to be understood as the expression of a “play of forces.” Thus Hegel says: “What is present in this interplay is likewise merely the immediate alternation, or the absolute interchange, of the
determinateness which constitutes the sole content of what appears.” That is, in contrast to perception, for which the world was fundamentally one of enduring things, of which only their “accidental” properties changed, from the point of view of the understanding, change itself has assumed centre stage. For the understanding it is the “law” of force—”the stable image of unstable appearance”—that is identified as the enduring or stable element within the phenomenal realm and that has replaced the things that were the enduring elements for perception.

Westphal has argued that the key insight of Hegel’s discussion of the play of forces (by which he means the forces of Newton’s universal gravitation) is that “the causal characteristics of things are central to their identity conditions.” Indeed, that an object can only achieve an identity in its relation to what is other to itself is one of Hegel’s most enduring themes. Throughout the first three chapters of the Phenomenology, consciousness has wanted to know the real as something present to it as a self-sufficient unitary entity—whether it be a sense-datum, an Aristotelian substance, or a unitary force—but such a view could not abide. The discussion of the play of forces has brought out the error behind the atomistic assumptions with which consciousness has been operating, the assumption that an object’s identity can be conceived in abstraction from its relations. But while this is something that the phenomenological observer can see, consciousness itself has yet to learn this. We have as yet to ask after the semantic equivalent of understanding’s “object” within the early history of analytic philosophy: what part of speech might understanding take to be the most basic referring unit? Here developments in analytic philosophy in the 1940s and 1950s might suggest the direction in which to seek an answer, as a novel way around the problem of “the Given” had been put forward by W. V. O. Quine.

It is Quine, I suggest, who we might see as having taken analytic philosophy from the Phenomenology’s chapter 2 to the end of its chapter 3 in a consistent way, freed from the Russelian interpretation that relies on the stance of chapter 1. From the early 1940s, Quine had questioned the Fregean premise that the argument terms “saturating” functions be thought of fundamentally as proper names, and suggested that they be irreducibly thought of as variables “bound” by the devices of universal or existential quantification. In Quine’s hands, proper names suffered the fate that definite descriptions had suffered in the hands of Russell, but while this had been implicit in Russell’s own descriptivist account of proper names, Russell had held onto the idea of the
primordial semantic role of proper names with his logically proper names. Self-consciously reviving the medieval tradition of treating singular terms as “universals,” Quine, was to treat proper names as predicates—”Socrates runs,” for example, becomes “whatever Socratizes runs.” Talk of singular reference was, as Quine put it, “only a picturesque way of alluding to the distinctive grammatical roles that singular and general terms play in sentences.” A singular term “need not name to be significant.” Nor for Quine was there anything remaining of the empiricist “givens” to consciousness which could be named in the way conceived by Russell, these subjective entities having been reduced to “stimuli” naturalistically conceived. Without any Russellian remnants of proper names, Quine could be quite explicit about the fate of the notion of reference: for him the parts of natural language closest to referring terms were now longer Russell’s demonstrative pronouns, but rather relative pronouns like “that” or “who,” the informal equivalents of the variable that really simply served the task of linking predicates together.

For Quine, there being no “substantives” remaining in language correctly understood that could name the perceivable things constituting the world, there was really nothing left of the original idea of “reference.” Everything we talk about we should think of as “irreducible posits” that explain sensory appearances and are “comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer.” And rather than conceive of the relation of thought to world as secured by some privileged parts of language—proper names, definite descriptions, logically proper names—securing the representational function of sentences, Quine appeals to nothing less than whole theories. With this, Quine introduces the “semantic holism” that Russell had originally reacted against in his idealist predecessors, and this is part of the reason behind Richard Rorty’s claim of the “re-Hegelianizing” of analytic philosophy “under the leadership of Quine.”

Rorty’s claim was clearly meant to provoke. Certainly no Hegelian, Quine was just as “realist” in his philosophy as had been Russell: what ultimately exist are just those mind-independent things that make our successful scientific theories true. But as Peter Hylton has pointed out, it is just those aspects of Quine’s position that follow from his semantic holism (the theses of “ontological relativity” and “the inscrutability of reference”) that “seem to undermine realism by indicating that we do not really know what we are being realistic about.” More radically, Rorty has regarded Quine’s scientific realism as a view that can find no internal support from the views on language which he espouses. Here we might think of Rorty as purporting to speak from the
position of the “phenomenological observer” for whom what remains implicit in Quine’s position, and is not obvious to Quine himself, has become explicit.

Historically there indeed seems to be something compelling about the idea of Quine’s role in the “re-Hegelianizing” of philosophy, his holism having been an important contributor to what I have referred elsewhere as the “return of Hegelian thought” within analytic philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century.70 Were we to plot these post-Quinean developments against the ground-plan of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, they would clearly take us directly into many of the issues treated in the next section of that work, “Self-Consciousness” with its more practical than theoretical orientation. 71 This takes us beyond the scope of this paper, but on the basis of what has been presented, I suggest there are strong grounds for considering that the dialectic of conceptions of reference within early analytic philosophy, utilizing “transformative analyses” of “shapes of speech,” parallels in significant ways the dialectic of the “shapes of consciousness” in the opening chapters of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. But short of his possessing Swedenborgian powers, it might be asked, how could Hegel have been capable of capturing the broad paths of a philosophical movement that post-dated him by about a century? Perhaps the thought here is not too outlandish, however. Simply, one might make some sense of this “anticipation” by questioning Russell’s claims about the depth of the revolutionary break instigated in philosophy by the adoption of the new logic, and by contextualizing analytic philosophy within aspects of the modern philosophical tradition with which Hegel was acquainted.

Russell’s Revolutionary Amnesia

It is an occupation hazard for revolutionaries to overplay the depth of the rupture with the past initiated by their actions, and Russell might be considered to be no exception. As we have seen with respect to Hegel’s attitude to traditional “substance” philosophy in his account of perception and the understanding, Russell’s claim that Hegel was unknowingly within the grip of Aristotelian conception of substance and the term logic that underlay it is simply untenable. Hegel’s discussion of the “thing” of perception shows his alertness to an ambiguity already present in Aristotle’s philosophy concerning the nature of that to which properties are attributed in judgments.

Russell’s portrayal of the entrapment of Hegel and other pre-analytic philosophers in the ontology of substance is the compliment of his exaggera-
tion of the revolutionary status of modern logic and the form of analysis it made available, but it is now not unusual for interpreters to trace important connections between the approaches to logic of Frege and Kant. And if one subscribes to the a view of Hegel as a substantially post-Kantian thinker, then the idea that Hegel’s logic might not be simply reducible to some variant on Aristotle’s syllogistic might not seem so strange. But Russell had been intent on portraying the contrast between new and old logics in the starkest possible terms.

In *My Philosophical Development*, Russell describes having learned from Peano in 1900 of the treatment of universal affirmative categorical judgments as conditionals—the type of logical rephrasing that would provide the model for his “transformative” analysis of descriptions in the essay “On Denoting” of 1905. However, in the actual paper itself, Russell attributes this treatment of categorical judgments not to Peano but to Bradley, referring in a footnote to his *Principles of Logic* of 1884. In fact, Bradley devotes the second chapter of that work, “The Categorical and Hypothetical Forms of Judgment,” to the treatment of categorical judgments as hypotheticals, sketching the extensive history of this in the nineteenth century from the work of the Kantian Johann Friedrich Herbart. Indeed, earlier than Herbart, the basic idea can be found in Wolff and Leibniz, and is at least implicit in Kant’s transcendental logic. And as for the more general strategy of “transformative analysis” modelled on it, while the new logic provided a way of making this type of logical reparsing of judgment forms explicit, the principle behind it was not novel. Indeed, recently, Angelica Nuzzo has suggested a reading of Hegel’s logic as an “analytic” programme for the “clarification and revision of language—both of ordinary language and the language of traditional logic and metaphysics.” As recent scholarship on the history of analytic philosophy has shown, a variety of notions of “analysis” were in play in the first decades of the movement. The very earliest sense of analysis was that of *decomposition*, an approach that accompanied the atomistic ontology that the early Moore and Russell opposed to the “logical holism” of their idealist predecessors. But as early as Russell’s “On Denoting,” analysis in the “transformative” sense of translation into a different syntactic “shape” came to play a role alongside the “decompositional” form. Moreover, the types of problems inherent in the atomistic assumptions targeted by Sellars in his critique of the “Myth of the Given” were to bring the idea of “decompositional” analysis into question. It is the transformational rather than the decompositional conception of analysis that Nuzzo detects in
Hegel and that we have noted in the transition from “perceptual understanding” of the Phenomenology’s chapter 2 to the understanding properly so-called of chapter 3.\textsuperscript{79} Hegel, I suggest, could anticipate certain developments within analytic philosophy because philosophy had been “analytic” long before the beginnings of the movement that bears that name.\textsuperscript{80}

NOTES


2. Moreover, in chapter 4, this leads to a consideration of \textit{practical} self-consciousness within a similar and parallel series, and then to a further contextualizing of self-consciousness within shapes of “spirit,” and so on.


4. Ibid., Axx.


6. Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” p. 177. Here Russell describes proper names as “words which do not assign a property to an object, but merely and solely name it.” What Russell refers to as “strictly proper names” came to be called “logically proper names.”


10. Ibid., p. 209.

11. DeVries, “Sense-Certainty and the ‘This-Such,’” p. 70. Similar criticisms of Russell’s idea of referring “strict” demonstratives came to be made by Peter Geach in the 1950s. See,


13. Ibid., §110.

14. Ibid., §112.


18. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §114. In the *Categories*, Aristotle says that what is most distinctive of a substance is that it is “numerically one and the same” and yet “is able to receive contraries. For example, an individual man—one and the same—becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good” (Aristotle, *Categories*, V.4a10). See also ibid., 3b25–4a10. Here the properties relate to each other as mutually excluding contraries, as captured by the “term negation” characteristic of the predicates of Aristotle’s logic. In analytic circles, this type of negation remains occasionally discussed in terms of the relations among the “determinates” of a “determinable,” a distinction introduced early in the twentieth century by the Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson. See, for example, W. E. Johnson, *Logic* (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1964), vol. 1, p. 176.


20. This is the source of the *contradiction* that, for Hegel, is at the heart of the finite substance.


22. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, trans. with a commentary by J. Barnes, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 19.100a17–b1. In his commentary, Barnes asks how perception, if it starts with particulars, can jump to universals. “Aristotle’s answer is that perception in fact gives us universals from the start. . . . He means that we perceive things as As” (ibid., Commentary, p. 266).

Aristotle’s suggestion that one doesn’t perceive *Callias* as such but the universal he instantiates coheres with the distinction he employs between *singular* and *particular* judgments. In his three-fold classification of judgments in chapter 7 of *De Interpretatione*, Aristotle describes the first group as containing judgments *about* individual substances (*singular* judgments) while the second and third groups contain judgments *about* universals. Judgments of the second group express truths about universals by predications *made universally* about their members, as in “all men are mortal,” but according to C. W. A. Whitaker (*Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996]), the “particular judgments” found in syllogisms and discussed in the *Anterior* and *Posterior Analytics* also belong to this category. That is, particular judgments are *also* “about” universals, but in contrast to the judgments made about universals by saying something about all of its members, particular judgments do this by way of reference to some of its members—or more accurately, to *part* of its membership.
That one perceives the universal “man” in Callias rather than Callias himself, coheres with the treatment of perceptual judgments as strictly “particular” rather than singular.


24. Aristotle’s *Categories* is usually thought to be an early work from his time in Plato’s Academy. See, for example, Christopher Shields, *Aristotle* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p. 30.


26. Ibid., §244.

27. Ibid., §245.


29. Ibid. Russell was to take back this idea of self-acquaintance. That is, while earlier treating “I” as a logically proper name, he later came to restrict logically proper names to the demonstrative alone.

30. In terms of Russell’s early epistemology even someone “acquainted” with Bismarck technically did not know him by acquaintance. One could know another only as a component of facts knowable by description.


33. Ibid., §129.

34. Ibid., §245.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., §246.

37. Ibid. A description might pick out an individual by means of some characteristic that is not essential—as when Helen is picked out by the phrase “the tallest woman in this room,” for example. While such descriptions may enable the discrimination of Helen from others, this hardly captures what it is that makes Helen Helen—Hegel would say, it does not capture the way that Helen distinguishes herself from others.


39. This is the thought underlying so-called “truth-maker” theory.

40. Although the actual recognition of the centrality of Frege himself to these developments was to lag behind the actual revolution that was underway.


43. Thus, for example, in 1914, Russell writes: “Mr. Bradley has worked out a theory according to which, in all judgment, we are ascribing a predicate to Reality as a whole; and this theory is derived from Hegel. Now the traditional logic holds that every proposition ascribes a predicate to a subject, and from this it easily follows that there can be only one subject, the Absolute, for if there were two, the proposition that there were two would not ascribe a predicate to either. Thus Hegel’s doctrine, that philosophical propositions must be of the form,
'the Absolute is such-and-such,' depends upon the traditional belief in the universality of the subject-predicate form. This belief, being traditional, scarcely self-conscious, and not supposed to be important, operates underground, and is assumed in arguments which, like the refutation of relations, appear at first such as to establish its truth. This is the most important respect in which Hegel uncritically assumes the traditional logic.” Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (London: Allen and Unwin, 1914), p. 48.


45. As we have seen, Russell’s sentence with a purportedly “denoting phrase” in subject place can be thought to be akin to what in Aristotle’s taxonomy was a “particular” rather than a “singular” term. Up until “On Denoting,” Russell had thought that such “denoting phrases” were referentially unproblematic.


48. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §143. For a recent account pressing the incompatibility of the notion of “thing” with the scientific outlook, see James Ladyman and Don Ross, with David Spurrett and John Collier, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

49. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, §120.


51. Hegel’s use of the distinction between the cognitive forms of representation and thought is most commonly discussed in the context of his philosophy of religion, but its relevance is much more general.

52. In New Essays on the Human Understanding, Leibniz insists that an immediate sensory idea of colour would be “clear” but confused (G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and ed. P. Remnant and J. Bennett [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 255). To be made distinct it would need to have its “inner structure . . . deciphered” (ibid.). All clear ideas “are distinguishing . . . but only those which are distinguished, i.e. which are in themselves distinct and which distinguish in the object the marks which make it known, thus yielding an analysis or definition” are distinct (ibid., pp. 255–56). For a particularly helpful account of Leibniz’s role in the history of the early modern approach to “clear and distinct ideas” see Graciela de Pierris, “A Fundamental Ambiguity in the Cartesian Theory of Ideas: Descartes and Leibniz on Intellectual Apprehension,” in Dialogue, Language, Rationality. A Festschrift for Marcelo Dascal, ed. Michael B. Wrigley, special issue of Manuscripta Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 105–46.


55. This particular conception of “analysis” appears to come from Aristotle to Leibniz via the Renaissance Aristotelian Jacobo Zabarella. See my Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chap. 4.

56. Although he doesn’t discuss the parallel in exactly these terms, Paul Guyer has pressed the case for the importance of Leibniz for Hegel’s logical thought. Paul Guyer, “Hegel, Leibniz, and the Contradiction in the Finite,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 40, No. 1 (1979), pp. 75–98.

57. This reproduces the role of contrastive negations in determination that we have already seen at work in Aristotle’s conception of the determinate properties of finite substances.


59. Ibid., §149.


61. Of course, this view is antithetical to Leibniz’s principle of identity. Guyer sees Hegel as using Leibniz’s logical principles to undermine Leibniz’s idea of monadic self-sufficient identity so as to arrive at his concept of the contradictory nature of all finite particulars. Guyer, “Hegel, Leibniz, and the Contradiction in the Finite,” pp. 85ff. Significantly, Frege and Russell seem to have been particularly influenced by just those aspects of Leibniz’s thought on identity that Hegel challenged. See, for example, Ignacio Angelelli, “On Identity and Interchangeability in Leibniz and Frege,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Vol. 8 (1967), pp. 94–100.

62. For example, in W. V. O. Quine, Mathematical Logic (New York: W. W. Norton, 1940), §27.

63. Thus “logicians in past centuries . . . commonly treated a name such as ‘Socrates’ rather on a par logically with ‘mortal’ and ‘man,’ and as differing from these latter just in being true of fewer objects, viz. one” (W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960], p. 181).

64. Ibid., p. 96. As Quine had earlier put it, a singular term “need not name to be significant.”


66. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View, p. 44.


68. “For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer’s gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience” (Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” p. 44).


71. Thus Robert Brandom has linked the theme of intersubjective “recognition,” so central to the *Phenomenology’s* chapter 4, to his own pragmatist form of inferentialist semantics. See, for example, Robert B. Brandom, *Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), chap. 2.


77. Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 90.


79. Leibniz’s idea of translation into a “characteristica universalis” is, of course, very suggestive of the “transformative” approach to analysis based in the Fregean model of the *Begriffsschrift*. As Maria Rosa Antognazza has demonstrated in *Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century* (trans. Gerald Parks [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007]), Leibniz extensively used the grammatical reparsing of claims about the Trinity in the effort to negate the apparent contradictory nature of the doctrine.

80. An earlier version of this paper was presented to a meeting of the Hegel Society of America on Hegel and Analytic Philosophy at the 2009 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. I am grateful to the organizers and to many there who provided feedback on that version, and in particular to my co-presenters, Kenneth Westphal and Christopher Yeomans. I am very grateful as well to the helpful criticisms of two anonymous readers of this journal on an earlier, sketchier version.